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Abstract: Demanding Taxation, disciplining, and even at times requiring the 
sacrifice of life, the State is undoubtable one of the most influential and 
important structures within a subject’s existence.  Nonetheless, despite these 
great demands, very few subjects actually choose or construct the State they 
inhabit. On the contrary subjects rather find themselves born into these great 
structures which transcend their existence. Consequently understanding how 
subjects come to learn about, and relate to, these great structures they are 
thrown into is vital for both an understanding of politics and the human condition 
generally.  
In this thesis I will explore an alternative approach to investigating the 
subject and State relationship: The ‘Subjective approach’. Inspired by the thought 
of Danish Philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, the aim of this approach will be to 
explore the encounters that the subject has with the State, what perception of 
the State is given to subjects in these encounters, and how the relationship 
between subject and State grows out of such encounters.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore to provide prolegomena to such an 
approach. I shall aim to outline why such an approach should be considered for 
investigating subject and State relations, and explore how one may begin 
articulating such an approach.  
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Introduction  
 
“Wherefore then hast thou brought me forth?”  (Job, 11:18). 
Unable to understand the purpose or reason behind his suffering, Job called out 
the above address to God in search of answers. He needed to know why God had 
created him, why he was ‘brought forth’, why he existed.  
Such an example is overtly theological in nature as it asks how one relates to God, 
and how one might understand oneself within his divine plans. Nonetheless, it also 
reveals something central to the human condition: the anxiety and the drive to 
discover why we exist and what our purpose and relations in the world are. We all 
find ourselves thrown into a world that transcends us and in which we must seek 
explanation for our life. Thomas Hobbes once compared such an anxiety to the 
plight of Prometheus who, chained to a rock by the gods, had his liver perpetually 
devoured by eagles (Hobbes, 2008:72). This search for meaning in the world is 
fundamental in our understanding of ourselves and our relations.      
This is no truer than in the case of political existence. We all find ourselves born 
into a pre-existing political order which both wields great power over our lives and 
demands our loyalty and obedience. Thus, understanding how we relate to this 
order is a fundamental question to understanding ourselves and our place within 
the world. 
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The aim of this thesis is to try and further our understanding of how the subject 
may relate to the modern State. In particular it will explore the possibility of a 
‘subjective’ approach to understanding this relationship.  
In this introduction I will explain what I mean by a ‘subjective approach’, introduce 
why I believe this is an issue we should concern ourselves with, and explain how I 
will carry out this exploration in the following chapters.   
The first sections of this introduction will be dedicated to clarifying what I intend 
to achieve in this thesis. Section one will clarify what I mean by ‘subject’ and ‘State’. 
Section two will then outline what I understand by a ‘subjective approach’. Section 
three will then explain what I intend when denoting this thesis ‘prolegomena’. This 
clarified I will then proceed in section four to discuss the methodological issues I 
must consider when carrying out my investigation. Finally section five will give a 
chapter outline of the thesis.    
 
1. Relationship between Subject and State 
 
In  Economy and Society, Max Weber defined the modern State as ‘a compulsory 
organisation with a territorial basis’ (Weber, 1963:56).Weber further 
characterises the State as an administrative and legal order which claims 
jurisdiction over its members and the territory in which it controls a monopoly of 
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force (Weber, 1963:56). Consequently, we can understand the modern State as 
an administrative and legal order which governs a territory. This order further 
demands obedience from subjects within the said territory and enforces this 
with the claim to be the only body which can legitimately use force.       
Nonetheless, Quentin Skinner has advised caution in simply understanding the 
‘State’ through such a compact definition. In his ‘Genealogy of the Modern State’, 
Skinner insists that concepts that have been the subject of ideological disputes 
over a long period of time, such as the ‘State’, are bound to resist such rigid 
definitions. Instead Skinner advocates a ‘genealogical’ approach which considers 
earlier conceptions of the State as to avoid a rigid, and impoverished, 
understanding (Skinner, 2009:326).   
Now, an extensive genealogy of the modern State is admittedly outwith the scope 
of this thesis. Nonetheless, what I do wish to establish here is a general 
understanding of what the ‘modern State’ is to ground the basis of my study. With 
this intention in mind it is worth considering the conclusions of Skinner’s 
genealogical investigation.  
Skinner comes to the conclusion that:  
‘we can scarcely hope to talk coherently about the nature of public power 
without making some reference to the idea of the state as a fictional or moral 
person distinct from both rulers and ruled’ (Skinner, 2009:362). 
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Thus we may observe central to the understanding of ‘State’ is the idea of a ruling 
body conceived as something separate from both the subject and the particular 
ruler of a polity.  Such an understanding is further demonstrated in Skinner’s 
seminal work, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, one of the central 
aims of which is to indicate the process by which the modern understanding of the 
‘State’ came to be formed1.  Skinner argues that, in the Middle Ages, the ‘State’ 
was largely seen as synonymous with the ruler who attempted to hold on to his 
position.  A decisive shift in thought was however made in the early modern period. 
This ‘shift’ was from this idea of the ‘ruler maintaining his state’, which simply 
meant upholding his own position, to the idea that there is a separate legal and 
constitutional order, that of ‘the State’, which the ruler has a duty to maintain. It 
was this change in thought from the ruler maintaining his position, his ‘state’, to 
the idea that there was a separate entity, the ‘State’, that enabled the State to be 
conceptualised in its ‘distinctively modern terms’. That is, as Skinner phrases it, 
the State conceived ‘as the sole source of law and legitimate force within its own 
territory, and as the sole appropriate source of its citizens’ allegiances’ (Skinner, 
2002:x)2. 
                                                          
1 The other aims Skinner lists are to outline an account of the principal works in late medieval and 
early modern political thought, and to exemplify a certain approach to the study and 
interpretation of historical texts (Skinner, 2008:ix-x).  
2 In Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Skinner discusses extensively the historical changes 
that allowed for this shift in understanding to come about, indicating such key factors as the loss 
of supreme authority by both the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Emperor (Skinner, 
2008:351). Skinner further draws attention to early modern thinkers who he argues were central 
in articulating the modern understanding of State, thinkers such as Walter Raleigh and Jean 
Bodin (Skinner, 2008:357).  
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What is important to recognise here is that, with the emergence by the end of the 
Sixteenth century of this idea that there was a distinct entity which was the sole 
and appropriate objects of subjects’ allegiances, we arrive at the foundations of 
the modern understanding of ‘State’. This is indeed an understanding which 
Skinner acknowledges is characterised by Weber’s definition (Skinner, 2002:x).  
In this thesis by ‘State’ I thus mean the disembodied legal entity which claims to 
be the sole source of legal authority and allegiance in the territory which the 
subject inhabits. How subjects relate to this authority is the central issue my thesis 
is concerned with.  
With this identification of ‘State’ I am also further able to address the 
chronological boundaries of this thesis. Given that I have identified an 
understanding of State as it originates in the late Sixteenth Century, I will not 
discuss theories of the subject’s relationship to the State prior to this period. This 
is of course not to say I will give no consideration to philosophical ideas prior to 
the Sixteenth Century, as this would be to completely ignore the influence such 
philosophies have had on the course of modern thought.  However I will not use 
such thinkers to illustrate the different approaches to the ‘State’ which I will 
engage with. To clarify, use an example: I will consider the ideas of Plato in so far 
as they relate to the ideas of Søren Kierkegaard, as not to do so would be to ignore 
a vital influence of Kierkegaard’s philosophy3. However I will not address Plato’s 
                                                          
3 The central importance of Kierkegaard to my study will be made evident in the next section.  
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own political theory, as may be found in say The Statesman or The Laws, as this 
falls outwith the time period in which discussion about the particular ‘modern’ 
understanding of the State was possible4.  
Having thus clarified my understanding of State I wish to now clarify what I signify 
by ‘subject’. In particular I wish to use the term ‘subject’ in a conscious move to 
distance myself from the term ‘individual’. The reason for this is because 
‘individual’ can be understood to be a term that originates in a specific historical 
period and carries loaded political meaning.  
In his A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the origins of 
this understanding of the ‘individual’ lie in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries. He argues that its origins are owed chiefly to Martin Luther’s theology: 
which posited the subject as stripped and abstracted from his social attributes and 
placed directly before God, and the political thought of Niccolò Machiavelli: which 
understood the  subject as unconstrained by social bonds and with only the 
achievements of his own ends as criteria for action. The articulation of the 
                                                          
4 This also raises an issue of my use of terminology. As Skinner observes, although a ‘modern’ 
understanding of the State emerges in the late Sixteenth Century, it does not mean that this term 
is constantly deployed by thinkers from this period onward. Skinner for instance highlights that in 
the Six Books of Commonwealth Bodin often speaks of the la République rather than l’ État, and 
further the 1606 English translation of his work more frequently uses the term ‘commonwealth’ 
than ‘State’ (Skinner, 2008:355).  Consequently, when authors uses such words as 
‘commonwealth’ rather than ‘State’ in their works, I will not attempt to change this. I will only 
use the word ‘State’ when the author explicitly does so, or in analysis pertaining to my own 
intentions of understanding the central issue of the relationship between subject and State. As 
for my own use of the term State: it appears to me most suitable to use, when formulating my 
own stance and arguments, the more recognisable modern term of ‘State’, as opposed to say 
‘commonwealth’ 
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‘individual’ is however given its fullest treatment in Hobbes’ Leviathan, where 
Hobbes takes the universe to be composed only of concrete individuals who 
pursue their own interests (MacIntyre, 2002:126) 5  . Such an interpretation is 
complemented to a degree by Otto von Gierke’s Community In Historical 
Perspective. Gierke argues that the origin of this idea of the ‘individual’ can be 
observed as the subject was slowly emancipated from feudal ties and fellowships 
in the later Middle Ages. This process of emancipation was complemented by a 
growth in the power of the State, a process which he claims was part of a universal 
tendency to achieve the condition of ‘absolute State’ and ‘absolute individuality’. 
The ultimate goal of this process, Gierke argues, was to establish a condition in 
which ‘apart from the State, there are only individuals’ (Gierke, 2002:112).  
Thus, we get this idea of the ‘individual’ to signify a concept emerging in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century. This ‘individual’ is in particular perceived to 
be a single being who is unencumbered by contextual relations. This 
conceptualisation brings with it troublesome political implications. It has in 
particular been strongly identified with political liberalism6.  
                                                          
5 For the entirety of MacIntyre’s discussion about the origins of the ‘individual’, see in particular 
Chapter Ten of Ethics: ‘Luther, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza’ (2002).  
6 To illustrate this consider for instance George Klosko’s discussion of Hobbes and the ‘individual’. 
Klosko highlights that Hobbes began from the premise of the individual, and argued vigorously 
that society is composed of nothing but individuals.  He further contends that the individual’s 
primary goal is self-preservation. This goal is derived from assumptions about the nature of ‘man’ 
considered apart from and prior to any contextual situation. In all these respects Klosko holds 
Hobbes is a liberal. Indeed he asserts Hobbes’ approach is distinctively liberal, and indeed 
deserves credit for being the first to pioneer such an approach (Klosko, 2012:110).  
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Such an understanding of the ‘individual’ has unsurprisingly not come without 
controversy. Charles Taylor has for instance argued that this ‘individualism’ has 
resulted in a ‘narrowing’ of people’s lives and a loss of social meaning (Taylor, 
2003:3). MacIntyre has similarly remarked that the ‘acids’ of individualism have 
‘eaten into’ moral structures, thus creating a great confusion and difficulty for 
articulating a coherent account of ethics (MacIntyre, 2002:257).  
By the choice of the term ‘subject’ I wish to therefore distance myself from this 
particular concept of ‘individual’ which is associated with the ‘liberal’ conception 
of an ‘unencumbered’ being7.  
It should nonetheless be observed that the term ‘subject’ also has a history. In 
the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology the subject is defined as: ‘one who is 
under the dominion of a sovereign et.’ (Onions, 1966:880). We may see historical 
examples of this for instance in James VI and I’s discussion of how he desires his 
‘subjects’ to make an open profession of their allegiance (1194:117). Consider 
also how Sir John Fortescue asserts how the King of England cannot change the 
laws without the ascent of ‘his subjects’ (1997:17) and that this is different to 
how the King of France rules over his subjects (1997:49).  
                                                          
7 I may add to this that Kierkegaard also has a particular understanding of the ‘individual’ which 
he perceives to be a ‘Christian category’ representing the subject as standing alone before God 
(Kierkegaard, 1998:123). I will thus again avoid the term ‘individual’ as not to create later 
confusion between Kierkegaard’s understanding of the subject and my own.  Again the 
importance of Kierkegaard for this study will be made clear in the next section.  
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We may thus observe that the term ‘subject’ invokes the notion of a being who is 
obliged to a particular sovereign power. It thus can be understood to convey an 
understanding, not of a general disembodied being as does the term ‘individual’, 
but rather a particular historically bound being who is ‘subject’ to a particular 
political authority. It is thus due to this evocation of a particular being inhabiting 
a particular context, and being subject to a particular State, that I have opted to 
select the term ‘subject’ for use in my thesis8.        
Thus, by subject I wish to understand he who exists within a particular historical 
period and is embedded within its cultural and political meaning. When 
understanding the relationship between the subject and State it is consequently 
how a particular subject may relate to the particular State he inhabits which I 
wish to consider9.  
 
 
2. A ‘Subjective Approach’  
 
I am using a particular understanding of ‘subjective’ as is inspired by the use of the 
term in the work of Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s most 
                                                          
8 It should be observed that the Etymological Dictionary also draws attention to the idea that the 
individual denotes a person or thing existing as ‘separate entities’ (Onions, 1966:470).   
9 Although using the masculine pronoun I mean both female and male subjects. The adoption of 
only the masculine pronoun is used for the sake of brevity and consistency.  
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extensive explanation of what he means by ‘subjective’ comes in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript.  Here, he associates ‘subjective’ with the sense of 
‘inwardness’, arguing that the primary task for a ‘subjective thinker’ is to 
‘understand himself in existence’ (Kierkegaard, 2012:294). Thus we may consider 
an understanding to be ‘subjective’ when it is related to a subject’s own 
perception of his existence.  
This conception of subjectivity Kierkegaard relates to an understanding of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘objective truth’.  Kierkegaard argues something is perceived 
‘objectively’ when reflection is directed at truth ‘as an object to which the knower 
relates’. This is importantly related to the idea of an ‘external observer’.  
Kierkegaard claims when someone tries to understand an ‘objective truth’ he 
stands back and tries to understand the phenomena in question from a removed 
position from which he may gain a holistic understanding (Kierkegaard, 2012:133).  
Thus for instance, when looking at historical events, such an ‘external observer’ 
might look for the ‘truth’ in the historical process, and not necessarily how the 
subject who lives through this history experienced and perceived these events. 
The ‘subject’s perception’ is consequently overlooked and lost in pursuit of 
understanding the ‘bigger picture’; ‘like a herring shoal in the ocean: the individual 
herrings are not worth much’ (Kierkegaard, 2012:133).   
In contrast to this Kierkegaard asserts that, when truth is considered ‘subjectively’, 
reflection is not directed on the object of truth itself but rather how the subject 
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‘relates to this truth’ (Kierkegaard, 2012:167-8). Thus, we may interpret that 
‘subjective truth’ is not the truth of the object under consideration, but rather how 
the subject perceives and relates to this object. Consequently the aim of a 
‘subjective approach’ is to understand how the subject comes to perceive himself 
and his existence, and from this perception constructs his relationship with the 
world around him. Thus, Kierkegaard insists that a subjective approach must focus 
on the development of the particular subject. Therefore, instead of what is 
important for the ‘age’, a ‘subjective approach’ rather focuses on how the 
particular subject understands himself and his relations within this age. Such an 
approach consequently does not take the ‘removed vantage point’ of an external 
observer, but rather seeks to better understand the vantage point of the actual 
existing subject (Kierkegaard, 2012:179)10.  
This understanding of ‘subjective’ also leads Kierkegaard to make some particular 
claims about ‘truth’. Kierkegaard makes the claim in Postscript that ‘if only the how 
of this relationship is in truth’, a subject can still be ‘considered to be ‘in truth’’, 
                                                          
10 To support my interpretation I may look to Marc Taylor’s secondary commentary. As an 
example of an ‘objective truth’ Taylor discusses a physicist conducting a scientific experiment 
(Taylor, 1975:52-3). In such a case the subject, that is the physicist, is separate from the truth he 
wishes to establish, in Taylor’s example the motion of an electron, which he achieves through 
observation. This is in contrast to the ‘subjective truth’ that the appropriate mode of life is that of 
the Christian. This latter truth does not concentrate on anything external but must rather focus 
on the subject himself and his relations to the world. Such a subject is consequently not an 
‘observer’, as is the physicist, but is in fact himself the subject of investigation. Taylor draws 
attention of this difference primarily to explain Kierkegaard’s method of authorship. He asserts 
that, unlike an objective truth which can be communicated directly, as the physicist may through 
a scientific equation, a subjective truth must be communicated indirectly as to ‘bring the reader’ 
to an awareness of it. It is for this reason Taylor asserts Kierkegaard opted for the method of 
pseudonymous writings (Taylor, 1975:54). I will discuss Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous method in 
section four.  
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even if he ‘related in this way to untruth’ (Kierkegaard, 2012:168). We may 
interpret from this that, even if the subject believed in something that was ‘untrue’, 
as long as he himself genuinely believed it was the truth, it would be considered 
true from the ‘subjective perspective’.  This is because what is being considered 
true is not the fact itself, but the way in which the subject relates to it.  
We may consider this in light of a historical example. In the Seventeenth Century 
many subjects in the British Isles believed that their monarchs were appointed by 
God, a doctrine commonly known as the ‘Divine Right of Kings’. Now, we might 
assert that this can be considered untrue from an ‘objective perspective’, for one 
would struggle to find empirical evidence that the British monarch had been 
appointed by God. However this does not make it untrue from a subjective 
perspective. This is because a subjective perspective focuses not on the object, the 
King and his right to rule, but on the subject and his understanding of this claim. 
Now many subjects did believe that the King was appointed by God and 
understood their existence through this normative claim. Consequently, although 
the objective fact that the King is appointed by God may be dubious, it is true that 
the subject believes this fact and understands his existence by it. Consequently, as 
this relationship is true, the ‘Divine Right of Kings’ may be understood to be 
‘subjectively true’. 
Thus we may understand two approaches to understanding relationships. The first 
attempts to understand relations from a ‘removed vantage point’ in order to 
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observe the situation objectively; this style of approach often neglects the 
subject’s perspective. I will call this approach a ‘removed approach’. Of course one 
might argue that all academic works are to a degree ‘removed’, as one cannot 
actually step into the perspective of the subjects we are studying; such a 
movement is a biological impossibility. However, what I want to designate by 
referring to this approach as a ‘removed approach’ is the conscious effort to stand 
back and remove oneself from the subject’s perception as to gain a perspective of 
the ‘bigger picture’.  
The second approach, on the contrary, makes a conscious effort to try understand 
how events may appear to the subject, and explores how his relations may be 
formed from this perception. This is what I shall understand as a ‘subjective 
approach’.   
It will be maintained in this thesis that the predominant approaches to 
understanding the relationship between the subject and State have been in the 
nature of the ‘removed approach’. As a consequence. they have overlooked or 
neglected the experiences and perspective of the subject who actually inhabits the 
State in question. Thus, in order to address this oversight, this thesis will explore 
the possibility of a ‘subjective approach’ to understanding this relationship. 
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3.  ‘Prolegomena’  
 
I will now explain what I indicate by titling this thesis ‘prolegomena’. The word 
‘prolegomena’ is the ancient Greek term for ‘prologue’ or ‘introduction’, 
particularly in regards to poetry. Thus, we find Aristotle in The Art of Rhetoric 
describing a ‘proem’ as the beginning of an ‘oration’; which in poetry is the 
‘prologue’;  and in ‘playing the pipe’ is the ‘prelude’ (Aristotle, 2002:171).    
It may appear at first strange that I desire to describe my whole thesis as 
‘prolegomena’. However I believe this term, especially in later use, captures 
something that is illustrative of my intentions in this thesis.  
Consider for instance Immanuel Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. 
In the ‘preface’ to his work, Kant claims that these ‘prolegomena’ are intended not 
for pupils but for ‘future teachers’. He continues that such work is designed, not 
to help them give an exposition of an existing ‘science’, but for the ‘discovery of 
this science itself’ (Kant, 2004:63). He continues its purpose is to convince all those 
who are working on metaphysics to ‘suspend their work’ and consider ‘whether 
such a thing as metaphysics is possible at all’ (Kant, 2002:63).  
We may thus see that what Kant intends by his Prolegomena is to introduce a new 
science and to make his readers consider if such a science is possible.  
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We may see similar ideas conveyed in T.H. Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics. Green 
begins Ethics by questioning whether such a thing as a ‘Moral Philosophy’ exists in 
the first place (Green, 1906:1). He then proceeds by explaining why he holds that 
a metaphysics of morals to be both important and the proper foundations of every 
system of ethics (Green, 1906:3). Thus, we can see in Green, like Kant, the 
indication that his prolegomena are intended to introduce a new approach and 
explain why it is required.  
Now, I do not dream of proposing a ‘wholly new science which no one had 
previously even thought of’, as does Kant (Kant, 2004:68), nor do I propose to 
introduce a doctrine that all other systems should be based upon, as does Green 
(Green, 1906:3). Nonetheless, what I do propose is to explore the possibility of a 
new approach to understanding the relationship between the subject and State, 
namely an approach formulated from the ‘subjective perspective’. In this thesis I 
thus wish to outline why such an approach should be considered, and how one 
would begin conceptualising such an approach.  I consequently believe the title 
‘prolegomena’ as suitably indicative of these intentions. 
Nonetheless, just as ‘prolegomena’ is indicative of the intentions of my thesis, it is 
also indicative of its limitations. I realise that the ‘subjective approach’ to the 
subject and State relationship could open up the possibility of a full ‘subjective 
theory’ of politics. However, the construction of such a theory is beyond the remit 
of this thesis. Similarly it is not the intention to deploy this approach so as to gain 
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a better appreciation of any particular ‘case’. This thesis rather intends to give an 
explanation of why the possibility of a ‘subjective approach’ should be considered, 
and to explore how one may begin to formulate such an approach. The title of 
‘prolegomena’ is thus suitably indicative of my present work’s parameters.     
Having thus explained what I mean by the terms used in my title, I can now clearly 
articulate what I mean by:  
‘Prolegomena to a subjective approach to the relationship between subject and 
State’. 
It is namely my intention to introduce and begin to explore how the subject 
understands and relates to this abstract legal body that claims authority over his 
existence.  
 
 
 
   4.  Methodological Considerations  
 
I will now proceed to consider the methodological concerns I must address when 
consulting the work of previous philosophers. To achieve this I will split this section 
into two further subsections. First 4.1 will consider how I will proceed to interpret 
23 
 
previous articulations of the subject and State relationship. Section 4.2 will then 
give particular attention to issues concerning the interpretation of Kierkegaard.   
 
4.1 Approaches to the subject and State relationship  
In order to address the dominant approaches to the subject and State 
relationship I will illustrate three approaches to this issue. I will define these 
three approaches as the ‘rational approach’, the ‘contextual approach’ and the 
‘critical approach’. I will argue that each of these approaches, to a lesser or 
greater extent, outline what has been described as a ‘removed’ understanding of 
the relationship.  
The discussion which will follow in these subsequent chapters will consequently 
focus on common arguments among thinkers which are illustrative of these 
different ‘approaches’. Such a method has both its advantages and 
disadvantages. As John Horton writes in his study Political Obligation, the 
benefits of this method include the ability to focus on distinct arguments without 
becoming diverted by periphery or secondary arguments. It also allows one to 
consider a broad type of argument, rather than focus on the complex arguments 
of particular political theorists whose nuances may coexist uneasily together 
(Horton, 2010:18-9). It will thus be evident that such a method is beneficial for 
my intentions as it allows me to illustrate these three approaches to the Subject 
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and State relationship, without becoming tied down in the nuanced arguments 
of particular theorists.       
I would thus stress that I am not trying to argue that any of the theorists discussed 
represent definitively one ‘approach’. Indeed, one might observe that a thinker as 
complex and diverse as Jean-Jacques Rousseau for instance provides arguments 
that would fit into all three approaches11. There is also amongst intellectuals a 
great degree of controversy over what ‘approach’ a historical thinker may have 
adopted. We might for instance observe scholars such as John Rawls interpreting 
G.W.F. Hegel as a ‘reform-minded liberal’, emphasising the role of Hegel’s 
Sittlichkeit as the important ensemble of rational institutions which make possible 
the subject’s exercise of freedom (Rawls, 2000:349). In contrast, Roger Scruton 
has argued that Hegel is primarily a conservative thinker; stressing the importance 
of morality and custom in the formation of the subject (Scruton, 1990:44). Again, 
however, I would stress that my purpose here is not to label or categorise thinkers 
such as Hegel as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’, nor their approaches as primarily 
‘rational’ and ‘contextual’. My purpose is simply to discuss their arguments so as 
to help illustrate different approaches to the issue of the subject and State 
relationship.   
                                                          
11 In the Social Contract for instance we may observe Rousseau putting forward an argument 
fitting within the ‘rational approach’ (1968:64), in The Government of Poland Rousseau however 
provides a defence of culture and tradition more in line with the ‘contextual approach’ (1985:10-
18), and finally in the ‘Discourse on Inequality’ Rousseau provides and argument so critical of the 
modern State it could be considered as part of the ‘critical approach’ (2010:185).  
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Similarly, I am not primarily concerned about the final conclusions the thinkers 
discussed come to in regards to the subject and State relationship, that is in as 
much as they go beyond my purpose of highlighting why a ‘subjective approach’ 
should be explored. Thus, for instance I am not overly concerned by the fact that 
Hobbes conceived the State as an all-powerful ‘Mortal God’ (Hobbes, 2008:114) 
whilst John Locke perceived it more as an ‘umpire’ (Locke, 1998:324), or that John 
Stuart Mill argued that the subject should be safeguarded against State power 
(Mill, 2008:8), whilst Rousseau contended that the needs of the community always 
take precedence over the needs of the individual subject (Rousseau, 1968:68). 
What I am rather concerned with is the fact that, as will be argued, all these 
thinkers display characteristics of what I shall call the ‘rational approach’ to the 
subject and State relationship.   
It should be observed however that this method also has its disadvantages. The 
principal disadvantage Horton highlights is that it has the potential to drain the 
arguments of particular philosophers of their complexity and richness. This runs 
the particularly dangerous risk of setting up the proverbial ‘straw man’ (Horton, 
2010:19). 
 Nonetheless, as I am only discussing the arguments of these philosophers as they 
illustrate different approaches, and not ‘assigning’ the thinkers discussed to the 
approaches, I will not be tempted to reduce their thought as to make them fit 
certain ‘philosophical camps’. I will thus be able to discuss particular arguments 
provided by each philosopher in adequate depth without marginalising other 
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arguments or nuances contained within their thought, a practice which would 
result in the creation of ‘straw men’.      
 
4.2 Interpreting Kierkegaard  
Kierkegaard is an exceedingly complex thinker, and his work is both incredibly 
varied and conceptually difficult. Indeed, Kierkegaard scholars have argued that 
his works can be classified into four very different types of writing: the nine 
pseudonymous texts written between 1841 and 1850, the religious works written 
under his own name, the collection of articles written as attacks on the Danish 
Church, and finally his journal12.  In light of this, it is important that I identify which 
body of work I will focus on, why I have selected this, and how I will approach it.  
For this study I will focus primarily on Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship. 
The reason for this is that it is in this set of writings that Kierkegaard focuses upon 
the development of the self and lays the foundations for his subjective approach13.  
                                                          
12 For more on this classification of Kierkegaard’s work see Taylor Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous 
Authorship (1975:11-14).  
13 It should be noted here that many Kierkegaard scholars would argue that such an approach to 
Kierkegaard’s thought cannot be achieved by focusing so selectively on the pseudonymous 
writings. For instance scholars have argued that an understanding of other bodies of his work, 
such as the journal entries or the religious writings, are necessary in order to fully appreciate the 
meaning and intention of the pseudonymous works. In response to this I would stress that the 
purpose of this work is not an exercise in ‘Kierkegaard Studies’; I am not attempting to render a 
new or ‘the true’ interpretation of Kierkegaard’s thought, although in saying this I would of 
course not wish to abuse his thought or render an interpretation that was not backed by textual 
evidence. The purpose of this study is to render an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s thought which 
can be serve as an inspiration for developing my own approach for exploring relationship 
between the subject and the State. Consequently Kierkegaard’s other writings, and the 
biographical and historical circumstances that informed his thought, will only be considered in as 
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It should also be made clear here that I am not concerned with excavating 
Kierkegaard’s position in regards to philosophical stances such as idealism or 
existentialism, nor to specific writers such as Hegel. I will rather concentrate on 
providing an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s works as can inform my overall of 
intention of exploring a ‘subjective approach’.    
I now turn to consider the intention of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship, 
important as this will be to informing my approach to these works. In The Point of 
View of my Work as an Author, one of the few works Kierkegaard published under 
his own name, Kierkegaard claims to ‘break his silence’ and explain the intention 
of his pseudonymous writings14.  He proceeds to explain that his whole authorship 
pertains to Christianity and addresses the issue of how one becomes a Christian 
(Kierkegaard, 1998:23).  
The Point of View thus reveals that Kierkegaard’s intention in the pseudonymous 
works was to instruct his readers on how to become Christian. Nonetheless, the 
question remains why Kierkegaard chose convey this message through the means 
of pseudonymous authorship. There are two related answers to this question. The 
first involves the nature of the information Kierkegaard was trying to convey. The 
                                                          
far as they help render this interpretation and thus contribute to the overall intention of this 
thesis. Once more a good account of the debates concerning the different approaches to 
Kierkegaard’s thought is provided by Taylor (1975).  
14It should be noted that before Point of View was written Kierkegaard had already openly 
admitted that he was the author of the pseudonymous works at the end of Postscript (2009:527). 
28 
 
second pertains to the historical context in which he was trying to convey this 
information.  
First of all, the nature of the information. As we saw the question is ‘how’ one 
becomes a Christian. Information concerning ‘how’ one becomes a Christian, or 
indeed ‘how’ one becomes anything according to Kierkegaard, cannot be directly 
communicated in the same way as one may transmit that ‘two plus two is four’ or 
that ‘the speed of a passing car is sixty mile per hour’. Information, such as the 
latter examples, are ‘objective truths’ that are external to the subject and require 
no inward reflection to accept. Knowledge of ‘how’ one becomes something 
conversely requires that one not only accepts what one is being told, but also that 
one appropriates this knowledge and puts it into practice. Thus, one may only 
think objectively about the speed of a car, but in order to learn ‘how to drive’ one 
must not only receive the knowledge of how to drive but must also appropriate 
this knowledge and put it into practice. Thus, the knowledge is not just considered 
objectively but is considered in relation to oneself.  Consequently, learning ‘how’ 
to do something requires an inward reflection that learning about purely objective 
information does not. Learning ‘how’ to be Christian is therefore not the 
consideration of God’s existence objectively, but is rather the acceptance of the 
idea that God loves us and the putting of this understanding into practice. It is, as 
Kierkegaard explains in Postscript, a question about the subject’s acceptance of 
truth (Kierkegaard, 2009:107).  In order to answer this question the audience was 
consequently required to turn inwardly and consider their own selves, and it was 
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to provoke this inward reflection that Kierkegaard adopted the method of pseudo-
authorship.  
We must also consider here the context Kierkegaard wrote in. Mid-Eighteenth 
Denmark was a Christian country in what was a wider Christian Europe. 
Kierkegaard nonetheless believed this idea of ‘Christendom’ to be an illusion. This 
was because he perceived it as populated by people who believed themselves to 
be Christian but never went to Church or ever thought about God, in other words 
people who believed they were Christian but in fact were not (Kierkegaard, 
1998:43). The task Kierkegaard thus faced was conveying an argument as to why 
one ought to be a proper Christian to an audience who were under the illusion 
that they already were Christians.  
Kierkegaard did not believe such a task could be achieved directly, for instance by 
lambasting his audience from the vantage point of an extraordinary Christian. Such 
a ‘direct assault’ would only infuriate the audience and entrench the illusion. 
Kierkegaard thus instead took an indirect approach and attempted to catch his 
audience’s attention by presenting himself in the manner of life they themselves 
actually lived in: the aesthetic (Kierkegaard, 1998:43-4). His aim was not just to 
gain his audience’s attention but to also have them recognise themselves in the 
lifestyle presented and, as a consequence, think more deeply about themselves 
and the ‘truth’ of their existence. As argued by Mark Taylor, the pseudonymous 
works are a mirror which allowed the reader to recognise himself and locate his 
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place in existence (Taylor, 1975:57).  Indeed a ‘mirror’ is the metaphor used in the 
preface to Stages of Life’s Way; ‘Such Works are Mirrors: when an ape looks in, no 
apostle can look out’ (Kierkegaard, 1988:8).  
I may return to the example of learning to drive a car to better illustrate this. One 
may consider trying to teach someone who cannot drive but is nevertheless 
convinced that he can. If one bluntly told him that he was not driving correctly he 
may become infuriated and refuse to listen further to your teachings. One would 
therefore seek a less direct way of revealing to the pupil that what he is doing 
cannot be considered driving. Kierkegaard would set out to do this by first 
describing someone who is unable to drive a car, and then getting the pupil to 
recognise themselves in this portrayal. Such recognition would thus reveal to the 
pupil the fact that what he is doing cannot be considered driving. This illusion lifted, 
one could then convey to the person how to correctly drive a car.   
The purpose of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous aesthetic and ethical writings can 
thus be interpreted as a means of reflecting to the reader the nature of his 
existence in order to make him realise that this existence cannot be considered 
Christian. Thus, for instance, if someone read Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings and 
recognised himself in what is portrayed, he would become aware that the life he 
led was ‘aesthetic’ as opposed to ‘Christian’. Having thus dispelled the ‘myth of 
Christendom’ Kierkegaard could then reveal in the ‘religious writings’ the 
possibility of a Christian existence. Thus, by revealing the truth about the reader’s 
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own mode of existence, and opening them to the possibility of an alternate 
Christian life, Kierkegaard sought to indirectly teach his audience how to become 
a Christian.  
It will thus be clear from this discussion that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works 
can be interpreted as a unified body with one specific intention. Consequently a 
key assumption that will underpin my interpretation of Kierkegaard is that his 
pseudonymous works may be read as a coherent whole15.  
My approach to Kierkegaard can thus be said to be one that is textual yet 
historically sensitive; I am trying to appreciate what Kierkegaard was trying to say 
and achieve within the framework of the historical context in which he lived. This 
is so that, although I intend in this thesis a ‘political reinterpretation’ of 
Kierkegaard’s thought, I do not render a misinterpretation or abuse of his thought.  
In this way my approach, although in many ways is different to the ‘contextualism’ 
of the Cambridge School, nonetheless shares one of its key concerns in being 
historically sensitive to philosophical texts. In regards to this it is worth briefly 
outlining the ‘contextual approach’ to intellectual history that Skinner lays out16. 
                                                          
15 It should perhaps be observed that what the interpretation of Kierkegaard we have given here 
is the ‘conventional’, or as Steven Shakespeare refers to it, the ‘first story of Kierkegaard’ 
(Shakespeare, 2015:1-2). There are of course Kierkegaard scholars, Shakespeare included, who 
offer an alternate interpretation. However once again it will be stressed that the purpose of this 
thesis is not an exercise in ‘Kierkegaard studies’ and thus it I not my intention to consider and 
analyse alternate interpretation of Kierkegaard. My intention is to derive an interpretation of 
Kierkegaard’ thought from which I may construct a subjective approach to my own political 
question. In light of this following the conventional interpretation is both satisfactory and indeed 
most appropriate.    
16 Here I am referring of course to Skinner’s earlier work, in particular ‘Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas’ (1969), as opposed to his later genealogical studies.  
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Firstly Skinner insists that works in political philosophy should not be regarded as 
‘dateless wisdom’ or be said to contain ‘universal ideas’. Similarly, it must not be 
regarded that we may completely understand what an author is saying from only 
the text itself, and thus in absence of any consideration of the historical factors in 
which it was written (Skinner, 1969:3-5)17. On the contrary, the arguments of 
philosophical texts must be understood, not as answers to universal and timeless 
problems, but to particular problems as they arise in the particular historical and 
contextual circumstances in which the authors wrote (Skinner, 1969:50). We must 
therefore understand the historical context as a ‘framework’ by which we can 
interpret the author’s arguments (Skinner, 1969:49).      
However, Skinner is keen to stress that this context must be considered as a 
‘framework’ to the argument, not the ‘determinate’. It is thus important Skinner 
argues that we must not regard the authors’ arguments as determined by the 
historical circumstances in which they lived. Thus, Skinner argues, as well as the 
context, the force and the intention of argument must be understood. It must for 
instance be investigated whether a writer intended to support the historical norms 
he inhabits or whether he was satirically criticising them; a simple view that the 
                                                          
17 Skinner cites an incredibly vast range of examples of scholars who have attempted to engage 
with historical texts in such a way, and it would be implausible for me to recount all of his 
examples here. For a full account I would thus refer the reader again to ‘Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas’ (1969).  
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context caused the author to write his arguments would not reveal any of these 
intentions (Skinner, 1969:46)18.    
Unlike Skinner, however, my intention here is to write ‘political philosophy’, not 
‘intellectual history’. I am thus not so much interested in attaining a ‘true’ 
interpretation of texts, although I of course do not want to abuse them, but rather 
to gain an interpretation of them as will allow me to explore the possibility of a 
‘subjective approach’. There are thus a few areas of argument and debate in 
regards to contextualism which I shall not be concerned with.  
In ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, Skinner insists that an 
‘appropriate methodology of the history of ideas’ must first be concerned with 
reconstructing the historical context in which a text was written. This involves such 
procedures as the need ‘delineate the whole range of communications which 
could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion’ (Skinner, 
1969:49). I will nonetheless not be attempting to reconstruct the linguistic and 
historical context of Nineteenth Century Denmark. Thus, whilst this thesis will 
contain a chapter discussing Kierkegaard’s ideas, with the utmost historical 
sensitivity, it will not attempt to reconstruct the historical context in which he 
wrote.   
                                                          
18 The criticisms Skinner levies against at those who see context as a causal effect of an author’s 
ideas are discussed at length in ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ (1969). 
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Secondly, I mention Skinner’s claim that no argument that a past philosopher has 
given may directly address the problems of our present age (Skinner, 1969:52). It 
may consequently be derived from this that my intention to look to Kierkegaard in 
order to address a modern political problem is an exercise in futility. However, I 
would reply by insisting that I am not looking to Kierkegaard in order to answer 
any problem. On the contrary, I am looking to Kierkegaard in order to help 
formulate my own approach to the issue of the subject and State relationship. 
Thus in this way Kierkegaard is providing inspiration for my own exploration of a 
question relating to my particular context 19 . Consequently, although drawing 
inspiration from Kierkegaard, I can claim to be following Skinner’s advice to 
contemporary philosophers: I am ‘thinking for myself’ (Skinner, 1969:52)20.  
                                                          
19 One might here also draw attention to the methodological approach of Hans-George Gadamer.  
Gadamer explains that we should approach a historical text by understanding it within its own 
context, its ‘horizon’. Nonetheless he insists we do this from the historical context we ourselves 
inhabit, our ‘horizon’. As we become aware of this historical horizon we realise however that our 
own horizon is not isolated from the historical horizon but was formed by it. Consequently the 
historical horizon, after being projected, is superseded by our horizon as the two are ‘fused 
together’. As a consequence the reconstructing of the past is only one movement in this process 
of interpretation, for full understanding is only achieved when we realise the past as part of our 
own horizon in the present (Gadamer, 2012:305-4). Gadmer’s is primarily concerned with textual 
interpretation, and advocates an awareness of one’s horizons as to be conscious of one’s own 
prejudices which may colour our understanding of the text (Gadamer, 2012:272). In then talking 
about the ‘fusion of horizons’ Gadamer is consequently discussing how texts can be used to bring 
the subject to consciousness of the history and traditions which constitute his existence. It is 
similar to my approach in some ways as it represents how I do desire to understand the texts I 
am approaching within their context, and am doing so to address a problem that exists in my 
historical context. Nonetheless I do not intend here to use an understanding of these texts alone 
to address the issue, there will consequently be no ‘fusion of horizons’ in this work. The horizons 
will thus remain intact, and what I will instead do is take ideas from Kierkegaard’s work, 
contained as they are in his horizon, to construct a theory to address the problems within my 
own horizon.   
20 It should be observed that Skinner’s insistence that one must ‘think for oneself’ has incurred 
some controversy. As Melissa Lane highlights, this original instance implies a sharp distinction 
between the ‘historian of ideas’ and the ‘political philosopher’ (Lane, 2012:71). Nonetheless 
Robert Lamb and Lane have both highlighted that much of Skinner’s work, especially his later 
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5. Plan of Thesis 
When I labelled this thesis ‘prolegomena’ I claimed this encapsulated its central 
intentions. These were: to firstly illustrate why I believe a subjective approach 
should be considered, and secondly to begin an exploration in regards to how a 
‘subjective approach’ may be formulated. Thus, in order to achieve these 
intentions, my thesis must answer two questions:  
‘Why should one consider a ‘subjective approach’?  
And:  
‘How may one begin exploring the possibility of a ‘subjective approach’?  
This thesis will consequently be divided into two parts as pertain to each of these 
two questions.  
 Part One will illustrate why I believe a ‘subjective approach’ to the subject and 
State relationship should be considered. It will do so by illustrating what I perceive 
are the three dominant approaches to this question and their limitations. These 
three approaches are namely the ‘rational approach’, the ‘contextual approach’, 
and the ‘critical approach’. Each approach will be discussed in turn in Chapters 
                                                          
‘genealogical writings’, appear to contradict this earlier assertion (Lamb, 2009:249, Lane, 
2012:71-3). Nonetheless my purpose here is not to discuss the consistency in the thought of 
Skinner.  What I rather wanted to draw attention to by the use of his phrase ‘thinking for 
ourselves’ is that I do not wish to simply transpose Kierkegaard’s thought to  my own period to 
address issues central to it, but rather use Kierkegaard’s thought as inspiration to devise my own 
philosophical response to these issues.   
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One, Two, and Three respectively. This discussion in these three chapters will 
consequently constitute Part One of this thesis.  
Chapter One will first seek to illustrate the ‘rational approach’. I will argue that this 
approach can be illustrated through two key arguments: that politics should be 
understood according to rational principles, and that the relationship between 
subject and State can be understood on the assumption that the subject in 
question is ‘rational’. I will argue that such an approach is characteristic of a 
‘removed approach’ as it seeks to establish an understanding of the relationship 
between subject and State by consciously stepping back from the perceptions and 
experiences of existing subjects as it tries to conceptualise the relationship 
through the lens of ‘rationality’. The actual experiences and perceptions of the 
subject are consequently overlooked, and indeed any perspective which is in 
conflict with this understanding of ‘rationality’ is marginalised and dismissed.    
Chapter Two will then illustrate the ‘contextual approach’. Three arguments will 
be outlined which can be understood as illustrative of this approach. These are: 
firstly that rationality alone is an inadequate means of understanding the State 
and subject relationship, secondly that in order to understand this relationship 
one must investigate the historical and cultural context the relationship is situated 
in, and finally that one must proceed with a ‘particularity of approach’ which seeks 
to understand, not how the subject and State relate generally, but rather how 
particular subjects relate to particular States.  
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It will be noted that here the ‘contextual approach’ appears very similar to the 
proposed ‘subjective approach’ which I wish to explore. This is particularly 
apparent in its focus on particular subjects inhabiting particular States, a focus that 
I have already noted is also central to the proposed ‘subjective approach’. 
Nonetheless I will argue that beyond this initial common ground the intentions of 
the ‘contextual approach’ diverge significantly from what I wish to achieve 
through exploration of the ‘subjective approach’. In particular, I will argue that, 
after identifying that the subject must be considered embedded in a particular 
context, the ‘contextual approach’ then typically seeks to use this context in order 
to try and explain the subject’s relationships. As a consequence, it ‘steps back’ 
from the subject’s experiences and perspectives as it attempts to gain a deeper 
and more expansive appreciation of the historical context the subject inhabits. 
This is then used as a ‘lens’ through which the relationship between subject and 
State is surveyed. This ‘stepping back’ and adoption of a ‘contextual lens’ I will 
argue also make the ‘contextual approach’ a ‘removed approach’. The proposed 
‘subjective approach’ will therefore part ways with the ‘contextual approach’ here 
as it will not ‘stand back’ but rather ‘step forward’ as to identify and examine the 
particular encounters which occur within this context and which shape the subject 
and State relationship.   
Chapter Three will then turn to the last approach I wish to illustrate: the ‘critical 
approach’. Like the ‘contextual approach’ the ‘critical approach’ is also concerned 
with the context which the subject inhabits. However, unlike the ‘contextual 
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approach’, the ‘critical approach’ is highly critical of the phenomena that 
constitute this context, namely its historical traditions and cultural practices. 
According to the ‘critical approach’ such practices are used to mislead the subject 
in regards to his true relationship with the State, this true relationship being one 
of ‘oppression’.  This reveals the central assumption behind the ‘critical approach’ 
that the State is primarily a mechanism for oppression; States are typically 
conceived as tools utilised used by a dominant ‘class’ or ‘caste’ to supress another. 
Thus the ‘critical approach’ assumes that, if a State is present, then the subject 
must exist in a condition of oppression.  ‘Oppression’ subsequently become the 
lens through which the ‘critical approach’ attempts to survey the subject and State 
relationship; the ‘critical approach’ ‘steps back’ from the subject’s situation as it 
attempts to gain a deeper appreciation of the means of State oppression. Thus, 
once more the subject’s actual experiences and perceptions are overlooked and 
neglected. Indeed standpoints which do not correspond to this assumption that 
the subject is oppressed by the State, such as those of subjects who do not feel 
‘oppressed’, are dismissed as cases of ‘false consciousness’.  
Thus, it will be argued that the limitations of the three approaches arise out of 
their nature as ‘removed approaches’. In particular, by ‘standing back’ from the 
subject in order to develop and utilise their preferred lens, these approaches 
overlook and neglect the actual experiences and perception of the subject. Thus, 
I will argue we should explore the proposed ‘subjective approach’ in order to try 
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to gain a better appreciation of the particular experiences the subject has with the 
State and the perception of the State which derives from these.   
In Part Two I will turn to consider the possibility of this proposed ‘subjective 
approach’. I will begin by making clear that the ‘subjective approach’ differs from 
the three approaches discussed in Part One in that it does not attempt to ‘step 
back’ from the subject’s experiences and perceptions but rather attempts to ‘step 
towards them’ in an attempt to gain a better understanding of these particular 
moments.  I will argue that the intentions of the ‘subjective approach’ will be to 
examine the significant moments in which the subject encounters the State; 
exploring how these encounters unfold, what perception the subject gets from 
such encounters, and how the subject and State relationship grows out of and is 
effected by these moments. In this way I will propose that the ‘subjective 
approach’ is less a ‘lens’ for surveying the subject and State relationship as it is a 
sharp and delicate instrument, akin perhaps to a surgeon’s knife, which will be 
used to ‘cut in’ to the subject and State relationship and extract and isolate its key 
moments for analysis. Exploring the possibility of constructing and using this 
‘sharp instrument’ will thus be the intention of Part Two.  
In Chapter Four I will begin this exploration by investigating the thought of 
Kierkegaard. In this chapter I will in particular attempt to ascertain an 
interpretation of the philosophical concepts which will be key to exploring the 
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‘subjective approach’. These will be in particular: the ‘encounter’, the ‘self’, and 
‘freedom’.  
Chapter Five will then focus on reinterpreting these philosophical concepts from 
their theological understanding in Kierkegaard into a more secular and political 
understanding as will be used to explore the ‘subjective approach’. This 
understanding I call the ‘subjective understanding’. As well as providing a 
reinterpretation of the subject and his encounters I will also in this chapter 
introduce the concept of ‘Horizons’ which will take the place of Kierkegaard’s 
theological understanding of God in my reinterpretation21.  
Chapter Six will then build upon the ‘subjective understanding’ discussed in 
Chapter Five in order to explore the subject’s encounters with the State. In this 
Chapter I will consequently explore how we might conceptualise and understand 
this ‘encounter with the State’, how the subject may react to it, and how the 
relationship between the two grows out of these moments. I will also in the 
chapter explore how one might use this approach to investigate particular 
encounters that the subject may have with the State. This Chapter will further 
outline the questions which the ‘subjective approach’ may ask about the subject 
and State relationship and what further avenues of exploration these questions 
may lead us upon in the future.  Finally it will conclude by considering some 
                                                          
21 For the sake of clarity I will use the capitalised ‘Horizons’ when referring to my articulation of 
the concept as shall be developed in Chapter Five. This is to avoid confusing the concept I shall 
develop with the use of the term by other thinkers in western thought.  
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counter arguments which may be raised against my proposed ‘subjective 
approach’.  
Finally, in the conclusion I will provide a summary of my explorations in this thesis. 
I will then consider specific areas of further exploration which I consider to be 
particular fruitful areas for future research.  
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Part One  
Chapter One: The Rational Approach  
 
In this chapter I will illustrate what I shall denote as the ‘rational approach’ to 
understanding the relationship between subject and State. I will argue that such 
an approach can be illustrated by two characteristic arguments.  
The first argument is a broad normative argument in regards to how we ought to 
think about, and approach, politics. In particular, it argues that politics should be 
understood on the basis of ‘rationality’. I will call this argument the ‘rational 
conceptualisation of politics’.  
The second argument pertains more specifically to how the subject and State 
relationship is articulated. In particular it begins from the assumption that the 
subject in question is a ‘rational actor’. It considers this ability to ‘rationalise’ as 
the chief means by which the subject relates to the State. Consequently, it 
hypothesises what the relationship shall be on the basis of what choices it assumes 
a ‘rational subject’ would make. 
Having identified these two characteristic arguments, I will then proceed to 
demonstrate the limitations of this approach.  The first issue I will take with the 
‘rational approach’ is that, by putting such a premium on the subject’s faculty of 
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reason and the assumptions regarding what a ‘rational subject’ would select to do, 
it overlooks many of the historical and cultural factors which contribute to the 
subject and State relationship. Thus, one might say, the ‘rational approach’ does 
not consider subjects as they exist within historically bound space and time, but 
constructs its understanding from a ‘removed vantage point’ based on its 
assumption of the ‘rational actor’. This makes the ‘rational approach’ one of the 
clearest demonstration of what I have called a ‘removed approach’.  
The second issue I will raise is that, by looking exclusively through this ‘rational 
paradigm’, this approach excludes and marginalises many positions and forms of 
behaviour which do not fit with this paradigm. The ‘rational approach’ achieves 
this exclusion by attaching deprecatory labels to such modes of behaviour, such 
labels include ‘savagery’ or ‘barbarism’.  
In order to achieve the aims set out for this chapter it will be split into three 
sections. Section one will outline the broader normative argument that politics 
ought to be conceptualised on a rational foundation. Section two will then 
investigate the argument concerning the premises of the ‘rational subject’. Section 
three will then address the issues and limitations I have raised in regards to this 
approach.  
Before proceeding into the body of the chapter I make one last important point. 
As a result of my characterisation of the ‘rational approach’, I will discuss in this 
chapter a rich variety of philosophical arguments and positions which are at times 
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at odds with each other. I will for instance discuss such diverse political 
philosophies as ‘Social Contract Theory’, ‘Idealism’, and ‘Utilitarianism’. Such 
differing theories contain widely opposing lines of philosophical argumentation, 
such as teleology and deontology. Nonetheless, I will still understand them as 
illustrative of the ‘rational approach’ when they display either of the two key 
arguments illustrative of the approach as outlined above. Thus, for instance, 
although Immanuel Kant’s deontological arguments in the Metaphysics of Morals 
and Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian arguments differ widely in many ways, I will 
maintain they are both illustrative of a ‘rational approach’ as they share the 
assumption that political relationships should be constructed on a foundation of 
rationality, as opposed to say historical tradition. Again my intentions here are not 
to give a history of political thought, nor to give a categorisation of the 
philosophies discussed. Rather, I wish to provide an illustration of one particular 
approach to understanding the subject and State relationship. It is thus the 
similarities of these approaches, and not their fundamental differences, which I 
shall concentrate on as helps me make this illustration.   
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1. The Rational Conceptualisation of Politics  
 
I may begin my discussion with the thought of Thomas Hobbes. This is not 
necessarily because Hobbes was the first to give a ‘rational’ conceptualisation of 
the subject and State relationship, but rather because I believe he provides one 
of the best illustrations of such an approach22.  
In this section I am not overtly concerned with how Hobbes specifically 
articulated the subject’s relation to the State. This will be discussed in section 
two, when I come to consider the assumption of the subject as ‘rational actor’. 
On the contrary, given my intention here to illustrate the normative argument 
pertaining to why politics should be approached and understood through reason, 
I am more concerned with ‘why’ Hobbes adopts a rational approach to 
addressing the issue.   
 Hobbes asserts in De Cive that what he wishes to establish is an understanding of 
political philosophy which is in accordance with ‘science’, something he claims 
previous political philosophers have failed to do (2012:5).  In Leviathan Hobbes 
defines a ‘science’ as the labour of reason which seeks to first find the correct 
definition of things, before proceeding to establish a good method of deducing the 
consequences from these assertions (Hobbes, 2008;31). Thus, we may understand 
                                                          
22 Although it should be acknowledged that, in De Cive, Hobbes does claim to be pioneering a 
rational ‘scientific’ approach to political philosophy (Hobbes, 2012:5-6). 
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Hobbes’ project as an attempt to find a ‘scientific’ or ‘rational’ understanding of 
politics.  
In Chapter Twelve of Leviathan Hobbes takes aim at civil and religious 
governments grounded on ‘superstition’, citing for instance the Laws of the 
Roman Republic as founded by Numa Pompilius and Islamic law as founded by 
Mohamed (Hobbes, 2008:77-8)23. Hobbes criticises such political foundations as 
he believes they are inherently unstable. This is firstly because, as the authority of 
such polities rest in the subject’s superstition, when he ceases to harbour these 
beliefs his relations to the State will become unclear and be brought into question. 
Secondly, as the subject cannot hope to understand these spiritual mysteries by 
himself, he becomes dependent on the authority of others such as priests. The 
power individuals such as priests consequently hold over the subject makes him 
vulnerable to manipulation. The priest has for instance the power to confuse and 
lead the subject away from his proper duties and responsibilities (Hobbes, 
2008;79-2).  
It was precisely this confusion about political relationships, and the abuse of this 
confusion by priests and agitators, which Hobbes believed had caused the English 
Civil War. In his study of the English Civil War, Behemoth, Hobbes argued that the 
                                                          
23 Numa Pompilius claimed his laws were sacred because they were given to him through 
conversation with the nymph Egeria. Mohamed claimed that he established his holy laws through 
discussion with the Holy Ghost manifested in the form of a dove. In addition to this Hobbes also 
mentions the founder of the Kingdom of Peru who maintained both himself and his wife to be 
children of the sun (Hobbes, 2008:77-8).  
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clergy had used antiquated language and superstition in order to confuse the 
people as to where their true allegiance lay. Consequently, when disputes 
between the sovereign and the church occurred, loyalties were divided and civil 
war ensued (Hobbes, 1990:15-18). The Church is, nonetheless, just one example 
where Hobbes believed confusing language and superstition had made political 
relationships unclear. In Leviathan Hobbes also criticises the use of antique and 
emotive terms such as ‘Tyrant’ to confuse the people and encourage them to rebel 
(Hobbes, 2008:453).  
Hobbes therefore believed that if one could remove the confusion and ignorance 
which plagued political discourse, and people were instead made aware of the 
proper principles of politics and justice, then subjects would be ‘much more fitted 
than they are to civil obedience’ (Hobbes, 2008:15). In both Leviathan and 
Behemoth Hobbes asserted that this could be achieved through education, 
particularly through schools and universities once they had been properly 
reformed (Hobbes, 2008;15; Hobbes, 1990:71). Interestingly, Hobbes also makes 
clear that his Leviathan is one of the very texts that should be used to educate the 
citizenry in these new reformed universities (Hobbes, 2008;474). In light of this we 
may understand Hobbes’ very project as an attempt to replace the religious and 
superstitious understanding of politics with one based on science and reason, and 
further educate the people in regards to this.  
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We might therefore clearly recognise this first key argument of the ‘rationalist 
approach’ illustrated by Hobbes’ arguments. Finding that ignorance and 
superstition in politics were misleading subjects and leading to disasters such as 
the Civil War, Hobbes sought to an alternative ‘rational’, or ‘scientific’, 
understanding of politics. He thus clearly illustrates to us the normative argument 
that politics should be conceptualised in a rational manner24.  
I may here also draw attention to the arguments put forth by Benedict de Spinoza 
in regards to the relation between philosophy and religion in the Theological-
Political Treatise. Given the dangerous absurdities which result when people 
confuse religious and philosophical questions, Spinoza advocates for a sharp 
division to be made between the concerns of philosophy and the concerns of 
theology so that ‘each has its own kingdom, and there is no conflict between them’ 
(Spinoza, 2008:194). As a consequence, Spinoza insists that the concerns of politics 
are a matter for philosophy, and thus furthermore should be directed by reason 
                                                          
24 This interpretation of Hobbes as trying to explain political philosophy purely through reason is 
perhaps best represented by the ‘game theorist’ interpreters of Hobbes’ thought. See for 
instance David Gauthier (1969:79) and G.S. Kavka (1986:109-10). However, as Hobbes scholars 
such as Gabriella Slomp have highlighted, the ‘game theory’ approach is not an adequate means 
of understanding the entirety of Hobbes’ arguments. Instead she points towards a 
‘geometrician’s’ approach to Hobbes’ thought which puts more emphasise on the subject being 
an external observer to the ‘state of nature’ as opposed to the participant within it (Slomp, 
2000:141). As a result she advocates that one should interpret Hobbes, not as offering a rational 
way out of the ‘state of nature’, but rather explaining to his readers how to avoid the collapse of 
the political State into civil war (Slomp, 2000:7). Nonetheless, despite changes in considering 
‘who’ Hobbes might be addressing, it should be observed that emphasise on rationality is still 
predominant. As Slomp articulates; ‘the collective rationality of citizens enlightened by his 
‘political geometry’ can either save mankind forever from the occurrence of civil war (De Cive, 25-
6) or at least can postpone it indefinitely (Leviathan, 221)’ (Slomp, 2000:172). I might further add 
that this ‘geometer approach’, with its emphasis on an ‘observer’, also furthers my own 
understanding of the ‘rational approach’ being a ‘removed approach’.   
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(Spinoza, 2008:198). Thus, similarly as with Hobbes, we may observe Spinoza 
contending that religion and superstition should be excluded from the realm of 
politics, which instead should be under the guidance of reason.  
Another good illustration of this argument for a ‘rational conceptualisation of 
politics’ can be observed in the writings of Kant, and in particular the arguments 
given in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Admittedly Kant is not so 
much concerned here with politics, let alone the particular relationship between 
the subject and State, as he is with establishing the philosophical principles of 
morality. Nonetheless, the Metaphysis of Morals gives such an explicit account of 
human relations constructed solely on the premises of reason that I must give it 
due attention if I am to fully illustrate the ‘rational approach’.  
Kant’s task in this text is to establish a principle of morality that can be 
ascertained prior to any empirical condition the subject might inhabit. This a 
priori principle must therefore be founded in humanity’s universal ‘rational’ 
nature.  Furthermore, to be an a priori principle of morality, Kant insists that the 
principle must also not be limited to a particular circumstance, but rather must 
be able to be universalised into a general maxim or law which can hold for all 
rational beings across time and space. The consequent a priori principle that Kant 
finds for all subjects is to act in a way that you treat all rational beings, including 
your own person, as ‘an end’ and never as ‘a means’ (Kant, 2010:38). 
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 Kant illustrates this with the example of suicide. He imagines a subject who is 
incredibly miserable. He insists however that, no matter how miserable, such a 
person cannot rightly commit suicide as it would be in violation of the ‘universal 
maxim’ that one must always treat human beings as ends rather than means. 
This is because in committing suicide  the subject would be treating a rational 
being, himself, not as an ‘end’ but as a ‘means’ to achieve another ‘end’, namely 
to ‘maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life’ (Kant, 2010:38).   
Again, Kant’s arguments here are more about ‘morality’ than ‘politics’. 
Nonetheless, what to recognise is that ‘rationality’ takes the central role in 
defining subjects’ relationships as it is the ‘rational universal law’, independent of 
contextual circumstance, which is taken as the basis of conduct. 
 The closest Kant comes to giving a ‘political’ articulation of this notion in the 
Metaphysics of Morals is in his hypothetical account of the ‘Kingdom of Ends’.  
This ‘kingdom’ is described as a union of ‘rational beings’ united under an 
objective rational law which they participate in legislating (Kant, 2010:41). Again, 
it should be observed that Kant stresses such a ‘kingdom’ is ‘admittedly only an 
ideal’ (Kant, 2010:41), nonetheless it still makes evident the notion that political 
relationships, and thus by extension the subject and State relationship, ought to 
be based on rational laws and principles.   
In Kant’s attempts to find a basis for human relationships in a universal 
understanding of reason which is prior to any particular situation we may 
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observe one of the clearest illustrations of this first key argument of what I have 
termed a ‘rational approach’. Thus, although Kant’s ‘moral’ understanding of 
reason may be different from the more ‘instrumental’ understanding of Hobbes,  
I maintain they both illustrate a ‘rational approach’ to the question of subject 
and State relationships as they attempt to ground their interpretation on a 
conception of reason, as opposed to a historical or contextual understanding.  
This belief that politics, and in particular the State, must be understood rationally 
is further articulated by Hegel. In his ‘preface’ to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
maintains that the task of the ‘science of the State’, his work included, is to 
comprehend and present the State as something in accordance to reason (Hegel, 
2008:14). Hegel holds this view because he maintains that the State has been 
produced by reason and is a manifestation of this ideal. This view is best illustrated 
by his statement ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’: reason is 
an active force in the world which realises human freedom, most notably through 
the creation of institutions such as the State (Hegel, 2008:14).  
This idea is further developed in the Philosophy of History, where Hegel maintains 
that reason is ‘Sovereign of the World’ and history follows a rational process 
(Hegel, 1991:9).  The western European State is in particular viewed as the 
culmination of this process: ‘the embodiment of rational freedom’ (Hegel, 
1991:47). Thus, for Hegel, the western State is perceived as the product of reason, 
and must be understood as such.  
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Another clear illustration of this argument for a ‘rational conceptualisation of 
politics’ can be found in the arguments of utilitarianism.  We may indeed find in 
the person of Bentham a particularly fervent advocate for the belief that political 
relations ought to be built on clear principles of reason.  
As H.L.A. Hart argues, Bentham’s thought can be understood by his primary desire 
to ‘demystify’ the law. By ‘demystify’ is meant to remove the ‘veil of mystery’ 
which was used to protect unjust, anachronistic, inefficient, and generally harmful 
legal and social institutions. Such ‘forms of mystery’ included ‘glorification’ by 
pomp and ceremony, and the use of archaic dress and language which was 
unintelligible to the layman. In place of this ‘mystic practice’ Bentham sought to 
establish a clear, accessible and more rational legal code (Hart, 1973:2-4). Thus, 
we can see at the core of Bentham’s thought an attempt to place legal and political 
practices on a more rational footing.  
We may observe Bentham’s enthusiasm for ‘reason’, and scientific progress 
generally, in Fragment of Government where he claimed that in the age he lived 
knowledge was ‘rapidly advancing towards perfection’ (Bentham, 2005:3). 
Bentham goes on to argue that the rapid discoveries taking place in natural science 
ought to be complimented with a reform of the moral world. In particular he 
advocates the development of the consequences of the moral axiom of utility: ‘it 
is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and 
wrong’ (Bentham, 2005:3). How this is in particular related to government is 
53 
 
further illustrated in an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Bentham here sets out that the ‘measure of government’ is dictated by the 
principle of utility when it promotes more happiness than it diminishes (Bentham, 
2007:3).  
At the core of his illustration we may observe this forceful argument that the 
customs and the traditions of the State must be replaced with a clear rational 
principle upon which the relationship between subject and State ought to be 
oriented, this ‘rational principle’ is of course Bentham’s’ own philosophy of 
utilitarianism25.   
This argument is further illustrated by J.S. Mill’s hostility towards custom. In On 
Liberty Mill warns of the effects that custom can have on subjects’ liberty and their 
ability to think for themselves. He thus insists that subjects must learn to think 
rationally and ‘intelligently’ for themselves, and not follow custom blindly or 
mechanically (Mill, 2008:66).  
                                                          
25 Although I do not wish to enter into it in detail, it is worth noting how some more 
contemporary utilitarians share Bentham’s belief that politics and law ought to be established on 
a more rational footing. Consider for instance the arguments of Hart in his article on Bentham 
and the ‘demystification of the law’.   Hart criticises elements of the legal system which he claims 
inspire ‘irrational’ or ‘undeserved respect’ and make law appear ‘anachronistic’. In particular, 
Hart attacks the dress and dictum of the courts claiming such practices dress the law up like a 
‘ghost from the past’ and make the court appear like a ‘half-intimidating and half-comic historical 
pantomime’. This is an area of the law Hart thus contends Bentham’s reforms would be 
welcomed (Hart, 1973:12-3).   Thus we may observe a continual strain in utilitarian thinking that 
the law, and by extension the subject and State relationship, needs to be stripped of damaging or 
unnecessary pageantry and placed on clearer more rational foundation. Nonetheless, despite 
sharing some beliefs with Bentham, it should be noted that Hart dose not believe this 
‘demystification’ should be carried to the same extent that Bentham advocates (Hart, 1973:15-7).   
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Thus, despite the differing philosophies between thinkers such as Hobbes, Kant, 
Bentham and Mill, we might observe a common argument that is illustrative of 
what I have termed the ‘rational approach’. This is that our understanding of 
politics ought to be based upon rational principles. This argument can be largely 
observed to stem from the claim that previous understandings of politics which 
were based on custom or tradition are inadequate means for understanding the 
subject and State relationship. Consequently, such contextual articulations must 
be replaced with an understanding of politics based on reason.    
Having thus illustrated the normative argument that politics ought to be 
articulated through reason, I will now proceed to illustrate the means by which 
such an articulation could be made.  This will be done in the next section through 
the discussion of the assumption of the ‘rational subject’. 
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2. The Assumption of the Rational Subject 
 
It may be observed that the argument pertaining to the assumption of a ‘rational 
subject’ may take two forms. The first argument conceives of the subject 
abstracted from any particular context and stripped of all historical or cultural 
characteristics. Such a subject’s decision making process is thus unencumbered by 
any contextual influences and instead his choices are informed purely by his 
reason. How the subject relates to the State is thus conceived by hypothesising 
what choices such an abstract and unencumbered subject would make in regards 
to political affairs.    
The second form of this argument does not consider the subject as an abstract 
unencumbered being. On the contrary, it views him as existing within a historical 
epoch. Nonetheless, the subject’s primary attribute and characteristic is still 
considered to be his ability to think rationally. Thus, despite recognition being 
given to the subject’s context, primacy is still given to reason and it is still 
maintained that the subject’s decisions and relations, most notably with the State, 
are directed by what it is considered ‘rational’ for him to do. Thus, it may be 
attested that what these arguments share in common is the belief that reason is 
the chief factor in informing the relationship between the subject and State.  
This section will outline both forms of these arguments and illustrate the key 
assumption that they both share.  
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I begin with the assumption of the subject as an unencumbered rational actor. In 
Chapter Thirteen of Leviathan Hobbes gives his famous account of ‘man’ in the 
‘state of nature’. This is described as a situation of equality in which there is no 
ruling authority and, as a consequence of this, there exists a constant ‘war’ 
between everyman and everyman. As a consequence of this ‘war of all against all’ 
Hobbes asserts that there can be no arts, or industry, or society, and instead life is 
infamously ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes, 2008:84).  
Nonetheless, in Chapter Fourteen, Hobbes asserts that man may discover through 
his reason the ‘laws of nature’, the fundamental law of which is to ‘seek peace, 
and follow it’ (Hobbes, 2008:87) 26. Thus, we may observe, for Hobbes, reason 
informs the subject that he ought to work towards the establishment of peace to 
escape the horrors of the ‘state of nature’. In Chapter Seventeen Hobbes reveals 
such peace can only be found through the transference of power from individuals 
to one ‘man’ or an ‘assembly of men’. This Hobbes claims amounts to the 
foundation of the ‘commonwealth’, and the generation of the ‘Leviathan’ or 
‘mortal God’ (Hobbes, 2008:114).   
This is admittedly a very brief account of Hobbes arguments pertaining to Book 
One and the beginning of Book Two of Leviathan. Nonetheless, it is sufficient to 
give an initial outline sketch of the ‘assumption of rational subject argument’. 
Hobbes imagines a subject who exists in a hypothetical situation devoid of any 
                                                          
26 For Hobbes’s specific understanding of reason I would refer the reader back to the discussion 
of Hobbes in section one.  
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cultural or historical factors. It is his reason, found in the laws of nature, which 
informs this subject that he is better off in the ‘Commonwealth’, under the 
protection of the State, than he is in a condition of perfect liberty in the ‘state of 
nature’.  Therefore, for Hobbes, the subject obeys the State because it is rational 
to do so; the State provides protection and security absent in the ‘state of nature’.  
We might here also consult the arguments of John Locke as presented in his Two 
Treatise of Government. Locke’s argument is also built upon an understanding of 
an individual subject existing in a ‘state of nature’. Such a subject is understood to 
have a capacity for reason giving him knowledge of the ‘laws of nature’ which acts 
as his guide when making choices and decisions (Locke, 1998:271). This ultimately 
leads the subject to enter into the authority of the commonwealth, as it serves as 
a remedy to the ‘inconveniences’ of the ‘state of nature’. Thus again we see the 
basis of Locke’s argument as built upon the assumption of an abstract rational 
subject and the choices he makes when directed by his reason.  The central 
function reason takes in Locke’s argument is indeed particularly betrayed when, 
in response to would be critics, Locke contends reason is ‘plain on our side’ (Locke, 
1998:336). 
We might also observe the line of argumentation employed in Spinoza’s 
Theological-Political Treatise. Like Hobbes and Locke, we find that Spinoza also 
stresses that it is through reason that the subject enters into the commonwealth, 
and consequently it is ‘reason’ that characterises the relationship between the 
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subject and State. In order to create a political union Spinoza claims that subjects 
must not be directed by their private appetite, which pulls them in different 
directions, but rather by the ‘dictate of reason’ (Spinoza, 2008:198). Similarly it is 
reason that ‘binds’ the subject to defend and obey his government (Spinoza, 
2008:200).  Thus, we may again see illustrated by Spinoza this notion that the State 
is formed by rational subjects, and their relationship to it is consequently 
perceived to be characterised chiefly by reason.   
An important illustration of this argument is also given by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
in his Social Contract. Like Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau discusses the formation of 
the polity and insists that it must be formed by contract or ‘social pact’ (1968:60). 
However, unlike both Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau does not believe that one can 
appoint a sovereign, whether it be a single monarch nor a representative 
parliament. On the contrary ‘free citizens’ must do everything ‘by their own hands’, 
including taking part in the polity’s legislative process (Rousseau, 1968:140-1). As 
a consequence, the polity is directed by the ‘General Will’ of the citizens. This 
‘General Will’, Rousseau insists, is not a mere ‘will of all’ or a ‘will of the majority’ 
but is ‘general’ in that it aims for the ‘common good’ of the polity (Rousseau, 
1968:72-3). If the polity is to survive Rousseau argues the subject must follow the 
dictates of this ‘General Will’ (Rousseau, 1968:63-4).  
One of the effects of following the ‘General Will’ is that the subject is made 
‘consult his reason, rather than study his inclinations’ (Rousseau, 1968:64). This 
59 
 
would be to associate the ‘General Will’ with ‘reason’ and thus again suggest the 
notion that political relations must be conducted on ‘rational grounds’.  
In the Twentieth Century the assumption of an ‘unencumbered rational subject’ is 
most clearly illustrated by John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Here, Rawls argues that a 
society’s principles of justice ought to be constructed from what he calls the 
‘Original Position’. This basically constitutes the construction of a polity’s 
principles from the position of the ‘rational individual’ abstracted from all his 
personal and social conditions. Thus, rationalism forms the very basis of Rawls’ 
conception of the State as he extracts all social and cultural factors from his theory 
and constructs it solely from the position of the disembodied rational actor (Rawls, 
1999:118-30).   
Similarly, Robert Nozick, although disagreeing with Rawls on many issues, 
nonetheless takes as his premises the idea of the unencumbered subject existing 
in a pre-political ‘state of nature’, drawing inspiration from the arguments of Locke 
in particular (Nozick, 1974:10-12). We consequently may see these arguments 
found in Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia as another modern illustration of this 
understanding of politics which begins with the premises of an abstract rational 
subject.  
I have thus illustrated the first manifestation of this argument concerning the 
assumption of a ‘rational subject’. We may firstly observe that its key premise is 
that of a subject abstracted from the context which he inhabits, and consequently 
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unencumbered by any historical or cultural understanding which may influence his 
decision making.  It is subsequently perceived that the choices this imagined 
subject will make are a product of reason alone. It is then demonstrated how the 
subject from this premise will come to form a State with other subjects as they are 
directed by their reason. The nature of this State, and consequently the subject’s 
relationship to it, are thus all understood to arise from an understanding of what 
such an abstract rational subject would choose to do. The content of these 
theories of course differs depending on what thinker is chosen to illustrate this 
understanding: from Hobbes’ State as ‘mortal God’, to Locke’s more limited 
‘neutral umpire’ State, to Rousseau’s participatory republic.  However, what is 
centrally characteristic to them all is that the conclusions about what the nature 
of the subject’s relationship to the State is are reached through an understanding 
of what a subject would do when led by reason.  
I now return to the second argument which illustrates this ‘assumption of the 
rational subject’. Unlike the previous articulation, it will be argued that this second 
from of argument does recognise that the subject exists within a particular context. 
Thinkers I will discuss as illustrative of this approach, such as Hegel, have for 
instance been interpreted as emphasising the significance of the historical period 
in which the subject inhabits27 . However, despite this increased sensitivity to 
context, I will argue that these theorists still understand the subject’s relation to 
                                                          
27 See Scruton’s interpretation of Hegel mention in the introduction.  
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the State as predominantly shaped by his reason. Consequently, I will maintain 
that they share with the arguments concerning the ‘abstract unencumbered 
subject’ the central assumption that the subject in question is ‘rational’, and that 
it is his reason that above all else informs his relationship with the State.  
I will begin my discussion here with the thought of Hegel and his seminal work in 
political philosophy: The Philosophy of Right. Here Hegel does not consider the 
subject as a disembodied being, but rather considers him as embedded within 
social and historical groups, groups such as the family. Indeed, Hegel puts 
particular emphasis on the family, claiming that it is within this societal unit that 
the subject ‘transcends his self-enclosed personality’ and ‘finds himself and is 
conscious of himself in a whole’ (Hegel, 2008:52).  
Nonetheless, one must observe that such societal groups only serve as stepping 
stones in the development of Hegel’s subject, a development which is only 
complete when the subject becomes a rational bearer of rights in the State. 
Consequently, the State, and the subject’s obligation to it, take precedence, 
especially over groups such as the family (Hegel, 2008:52).  
This relationship between subject and State is further perceived to be centred on 
reason. Hegel argues that the rational subject will obey the State as it is only as a 
member of this institution that he can fully realise his potential. This illustrated by 
Hegel’s definition of patriotism as: “the consciousness that my interest… is 
contained and preserved in another’s (i.e. the state’s) interest and end” (Hegel, 
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2008:240). Similarly Hegel claims the State’s constitution is the foundation of the 
subject’s sense of political obligation because it realises, and makes rational, the 
subject’s freedom (Hegel, 2008:239)28.  
Indeed, one can observe a particular hostility Hegel holds for States which do not 
successfully attain to this desired relationship centred on reason. This is 
particularly evident in Hegel’s essay ‘The English Reform Bill’, in which he discusses 
the politics of the British Isles. Hegel for instance remarks that the sectarian issues 
which complicate the politics of Ireland are ‘unprecedented’ in ‘civilised nations’ 
(Hegel, 198:307). Even more revealing he remarks that English national pride, and 
its attraction to pomp, ceremony and tradition, have caused reform in this State 
to ‘fall asleep’. England has consequently failed to develop ‘rational’ institutions 
and laws as have other ‘civilised’ nations (Hegel, 1998:311).  This distaste for the 
custom and tradition of the British Isles, when compared to ‘rational institutions 
and laws’, clearly illustrates Hegel’s belief that reason is the proper means through 
which the subject relates to the State.  
I now turn to consider the philosophy of Green, whose thought I wish to give 
particular attention to. This is not only because he is one of the first to explicitly 
use the term ‘political obligation’ (Horton, 2010:1,70)29, but also because I believe 
                                                          
28 My emphasise  
29 In ‘lectures On political Obligation’ Green defines ‘political obligation’ as: ‘The obligations of 
the subjects to the sovereign, of the citizens towards the state, and the obligations of individuals 
to each other as enforced by a political superior.’ (Green, 1986:13).  
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he gives one of the clearest illustrations of this argument that it is the subject’s 
reason which informs and directs his relationship to the State.    
We can best gain an appreciation of Green’s political thought when we consider 
the synthesis he offers between the thought of Rousseau and John Austin. 
In ’Lectures on Political Obligation’ Green gives an interpretation of Rousseau 
which sees the relationship between subjects and the polity based on the idea of 
a ‘common good’, and the importance of subjects acquiring a higher ‘moral being’ 
through political life30. This idea of political relationships founded on an idea of 
the ‘common good’ of the people Green approves of. Rousseau’s mistake however, 
according to Green, is to believe that that this notion of the ’general will’ can 
actually be at the same time the ‘sovereign power’; Rousseau did not distinguish 
adequately between this notion of an ‘impartial’ and ‘disinterested will’ ‘aimed at 
the common good’ and the actual ‘coercive power’ that is the ‘State’ (Green, 
1986:57).  
                                                          
30 In the Social Contract Rousseau argues that by entering into the commonwealth the subject 
leaves behind his ‘natural freedom’ and gains a higher ‘civil freedom’. This ‘civil freedom’ is 
superior to ‘natural freedom’ as, whilst the latter entailed a lack of restrictions on one’s actions, 
it nonetheless did not consider the origin of one’s actions. Thus, although one may be 
unrestricted, one’s actions were nonetheless dictated to oneself by sources out with one’s own 
will, such as instinct for instance. Conversely ‘civil liberty’ involved following laws that oneself 
took part in the legislation of. Thus, although one is not as unrestricted as one was when in 
possession of ‘natural freedom’, one is nonetheless more free when in possession of ‘civil 
freedom’ as one is following only one’s own will as embodied in the laws one legislated for 
oneself.  As Rousseau presented the argument in the Social Contract: ‘to be governed by appetite 
alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom’ (Rousseau, 
1968:65). Green’s full interpretation of this argument can be found in ‘Political Obligation’ 
(1986:56).   
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Green goes on to contrast Rousseau’s conception of the ‘General Will’ with 
Austin’s understanding of law. Austin’s understanding, to summarise briefly, is 
that a positive law is a command given by a ‘sovereign person’ or a ‘sovereign body 
of persons’. The ‘sovereign’, whether it be ‘one person’ or a ‘body of persons’, is a 
‘determinate human superior’ whom society has a ‘habit of obedience to’ (Green, 
1986:66-7).  Green observes that at first Austin’s doctrine appears wholly opposed 
to Rousseau’s arguments.  This is because Austin firstly recognises sovereignty to 
rest in a determinate ‘person’ or ‘persons’, in contrast to Rousseau’s abstract 
conception of the people’s ‘General Will’. Secondly, Austin locates the ‘essence of 
sovereignty’ in power: the capability of the sovereign to issue laws, and thus in 
effect ‘command’ the people. This is of course in contrast to Rousseau’s belief that 
sovereignty rested in the ‘common will’ of the people (Green, 1986:67).  
Nonetheless, Green maintains that these two positions can be brought into 
synthesis, and it is furthermore in this synthesis that the grounds of political 
obligation can be found. Green observes that Austin conceded that, although 
sovereignty lay in power, this power could only be exercised if the sovereign had 
the ‘habitual obedience’ of the people. Green contends that this ‘habitual 
obedience’ is only given when the sovereign’s commands are directed towards the 
ends that the people desire, and thus their ‘common good’. In effect therefore 
Green synthesises Austin’s notion of ‘positive law’ and Rousseau’s notion of the 
‘general will’ by arguing that the State will only be obeyed when its laws are seen 
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to be in accordance with the ‘common good’ as perceived by the people. Or as 
Green later puts it:  
‘Let this sense of desire- which may be properly called general will- cease to 
operate or let it come into general conflict with the sovereign’s commands, and 
the habitual obedience will cease also’ (Green, 1986:68-9).  
Thus, we can see how Green’s understanding of political obligation, and thus the 
relationship between the subject and State, is rooted in this idea of the ‘Common 
Good’; the subject will only obey the State so long as the State’s laws are in 
accordance with the ‘general will’, understood as the ‘common good’ of the 
people.  
This nonetheless raises a serious concern with Green’s thought: what exactly is the 
‘common good’? This has indeed been an issue of uneasiness for many Green 
scholars. In particular commentators have argued that the conception of the 
‘common good’ is so vague that it can tell us nothing about correct action. Indeed 
criticisms have been levelled that Green’s argument is ultimately circular: ‘moral 
goodness consists in aiming at moral goodness’ (Nicholson, 1990:71). Horton 
identifies this as a particular problem for understanding political obligation. He 
asks for instance how we are to agree on what is the ‘common good’ of a society, 
and how are debates about this supposed to be adjudicated? (Horton, 2010:73). 
A close look at Green’s arguments will however reveal something incredibly telling 
about his idea of the ‘common good’, namely that is frequently associated with 
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‘reason’. Consider for instance Green’s claim that the ‘moral life’ is the ‘possession 
of will and reason’ (Green, 1986:15). Similarly, Green claims the value of the 
institutions of civil life are that they allow one to exercise one’s will and ‘enable 
him to realise his reason i.e. his idea of self-perfection’ (Green, 1986:16). We might 
also observe Green making a similar claim in regards to political rights: rights are 
derived from the possession of ‘rational will’ and are aimed at furthering the 
‘realisation of rational will’ (Green, 1986:27). It is also of interest that when 
discussing the notion of the ‘general will’ Green links it to the notion of ‘pure 
practical reason’ as advocated by Kant (Green, 1986;57).   
This link between the ‘common good’ and ‘reason’ is further evidenced when we 
look beyond ‘Political Obligation’. The link is particularly well sustained in Green’s 
Prolegomena to Ethics. Here Green describes reason as the ‘parent of the law’ 
(Green, 1906:233). He further claims that it is the subject’s capability of reason 
‘alone’ which makes him ‘a possible author’ and a ‘self-submitting subject’ of the 
law (Green, 1906:234).  He argues that reason enjoys this foundational position 
because it is the faculty which allows us to recognise the best for both ourselves 
and others, and thus further enables us to recognise and subject ourselves to the 
laws which enable us to realise these possible bests. Reason is consequently 
perceived as the ‘basis of society’ (Green, 1906:236). He continues that it is reason 
which allows the subject to obey both the laws of his family and, most importantly 
for our discussion here, the State (Green, 1906:252). It is also reason which allows 
for one system of law to be extended over many communities (Green, 1906:252). 
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Finally, Green claims that it is to reason that the law of the State owes its existence 
(Green, 1906:252). 
Thus, we can see the vital function reason has in Green’s conception of the 
‘common good’ and indeed political relationships generally; reason is for Green 
the basis of society and of politics. The end of the subject is to be a moral agent 
which is to be free and rational. It is through the State, and the rights and 
institutions it provides for individuals, that the subject is to attain this rational end. 
It is furthermore the rationality the subject possesses that makes him conscious 
that this is his proper end. It would thus not be too much of a simplification to say 
that the ‘common good’ is that which is rational, nor that the subject obeys the 
State because it is ‘rational to do so’. Green’s conception of politics, and in 
particular the relationship between subject and State, is firmly centred on the 
paradigm of rationality31.   
We can clearly see from this discussion why I hold Green to be a particularly telling 
illustration of this argument concerning the ‘assumption of a rational subject’; 
underneath Green’s discussion of society is the central assumption that the 
subject in question is a rational being and furthermore it is this ability to reason 
                                                          
31 This relationship between ‘common good’ and ‘rationality’ does not however save Green from 
his critics. As Horton observes, disagreements over the ‘common good’ of society are rarely 
settled through appeals to purely ‘rational arguments’ (Horton, 2010:73-4). I would however 
stress that my intentions here are not to defend Green but rather to draw attention to the 
‘rational approach’ as is evident in his arguments. The issue of rationality alone being an 
inadequate means of addressing the relationship between subject and State is an issue I will 
come to, and is indeed a sentiment that I share.  Discussion of this will however need to be 
postponed to section three.  
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which directs his relations in the world and informs his relation to the State. This 
is particularly telling for his understanding of political obligation as it can be 
interpreted that the subject will feel obliged to the State as long as the State’s 
actions and demands fall within this rational understanding.  
We can observe an interesting development in this argument with the thought of 
R.G. Collingwood who, although still seeing the State as formed through a rational 
process, nonetheless acknowledges that certain events can turn subjects away 
from this progression. We may for instance observe that Collingwood accounts for 
the rejection of reason in Germany, by which he is referring to the course of 
German politics from the end of the Nineteenth Century to the rise of Adolf Hitler 
and the Nazi Party,  as a reaction to a ‘peculiar situation’ (Collingwood, 2005:375). 
However, by characterising such phenomenon as ‘Barbarism’, and accounting for 
it as rejection of reason in favour of emotions, it is evident that Collingwood still 
perceives that a ‘rational’ subject will obey the modern State (Collingwood, 
2005:307)32. 
To gain a better comprehension of Collingwood’s arguments we may take a closer 
look at his understanding of reason. Collingwood draws a distinction between two 
types of reason: ‘right’ and ‘duty’33. Firstly, ‘right’ can be understood as universal 
                                                          
32 I will discuss this idea of ‘barbarism’, and the issues it raises for both Collingwood’s thought 
and the ‘rational’ approach more widely, when I consider the limitations of the ‘rational 
approach’ in section three. 
33 Collingwood in fact identifies three types of rational thought: ‘utility’, ‘right’ and ‘duty’ 
(Collingwood, 2005:103). Utility is however considered the lowest form of rationality and need 
not be considered in detail here.  
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rational laws. Collingwood however dismisses ‘right’ as an appropriate guide for 
political conduct as it is too rigid for practical application, and furthermore may in 
practice come into conflict with another absolute ‘right’. He for instance draws 
attention to the problem posed by Kant where an axe murderer appears at one’s 
door demanding to know where his would-be-victim is hiding. This conundrum 
forces one to choose between two ‘universal rational laws’ or ‘rights’: ‘always 
telling the truth’ and ‘preserving human life’. Such universal thinking cannot solve 
this conundrum Collingwood argues, it can only be solved by choosing which rule 
is more appropriate to uphold, and which more appropriate to break (Collingwood, 
2005:116).  
Collingwood thus argues what rule to follow, and thus what action to take, 
depends on one’s situation. As he elucidates through the metaphor of fishing: 
there is a hook which is ‘right for trout-fishing’ but is however ‘wrong for salmon-
fishing’; the question is what fish does one wish to catch? (Collingwood, 2005:117).  
This consideration of what one must do in one’s present circumstance is what 
Collingwood denotes by ‘duty’ (Collingwood, 2005:124). 
Nonetheless, despite this dismissal of ‘universal laws’ and increased attention to 
context, it is fundamental that we recognise that duty is still conceived by 
Collingwood as a form of reason, and thus Collingwood still makes the central 
assumption that the subject in question is rational and this rationality is chiefly 
what ought to direct his actions. Indeed, how closely ‘duty’ is wedded to ‘reason’ 
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is evident by Collingwood’s instance that an action is only to be considered a ‘duty’ 
if it is influenced by reason, and is not considered one if is influenced by passion 
(Collingwood, 2005:220)34.  This again illustrates the core argument of the ‘rational 
approach’ that the subject is presumed as rational and that his conduct is directed 
by this ability to reason35.  
I have thus illustrated the second manifestation of the argument concerning the 
assumption of a rational subject which I sought to elucidate in this section. This 
argument can be understood as built on the premises that the subject in question 
is rational, and that it is this rationality that chiefly informs the relationship 
between subject and State. Thus, although this second argument may not 
conceive of the subject as abstracted from his contextual circumstance, it still 
proceeds from the same assumption that the subject is rational and that his 
political relations and choices are directed by this ability to reason. This 
assumption forms the basis of the second characteristic argument of the ‘rational 
approach’.  
                                                          
34 Collingwood’s exclusion of certain actions, and the implications of this, will again be discussed 
in greater length in section three.  
35 I have so far concentrated primarily on arguments found in ‘idealism’ to illustrate my point 
here. Nonetheless it should be observed that such arguments are not exclusive to idealism, but 
are also found in other philosophical approaches. We may take for instance Mill’s arguments in 
On Liberty. As we observed in section one Mill argued that the proper means by which one 
should consider one’s political relations and dispositions was through one’s reason. This leads 
Mill to stress that the relation between subject and State that he describes, his ‘harm principle’, 
is only applicable for subjects who are ‘in the maturity of their faculties’. This therefore excludes 
children and, more controversially, those ‘backward states of society in which the race itself may 
be considered in its nonage’ (Mill, 2008:14). Thus we see Mill’s argument clearly illustrating this 
central assumption that the subject he is considering is rational, and it is this rationality that 
ought to inform his political conduct.  
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3.  Summary and Limitations of the ‘Rational Approach’  
 
I have thus completed my illustration of what I have termed the ‘rational approach’ 
to understanding the relationship between subject and State. This approach I have 
argued can be understood by two key characteristic arguments.  
The first is that politics should be articulated and understood through reason. In 
this argument the ‘rational approach’ is particularly hostile to forms of political 
understanding such as superstition, religion, and tradition. In the place of such 
articulations it is argued clear principles of reason should be established which 
communicate the relationship between subject and State transparently.   
The second key argument relates to the assumption about the subject and how he 
forms his relationship to the State. This argument can take a number of forms: 
some consider the subject as abstract and unencumbered by social and cultural 
influences, whilst others recognise the subject as located within a historical 
context. Nonetheless, what is common to both these forms of argument is firstly 
the assumption that the subject is rational, and secondly that it is this rationality 
which informs the subject’s decision making process and his consequent 
relationship with the State. This argument can therefore be articulated as the 
assumption that the subject is rational and the belief that he will obey the State 
as long as it is rational to do so.  
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There are obvious benefits to this ‘rational approach’. It for instance tries to give 
a clear articulation of how the relationship between subject and State is formed. 
Indeed particular credit ought to be given for trying to identify how the subject 
makes decisions which form this relationship. Furthermore, by creating an 
archetypical subject from which we may hypothesise subject choices, it enables us 
to form predictions about how subjects may behave.  
Nonetheless, the major problem with this approach is that it is so firmly wedded 
to the idea of rationality that motivations and behaviour which is not perceived to 
conform to reason is either marginalised or excluded36.  
It should be observed that the key argument and characteristic of the ‘rational 
approach’ is the attempt to construct a paradigm for understanding the subject 
and State relationship which is prior to any contextual consideration of the actual 
world. Thus, by its very nature, this approach attempts to construct a paradigm 
which is independent of, or ‘outside’, the world as it exists. In this way the ‘rational 
approach’ is quintessentially illustrative of a ‘removed approach’ as it consciously 
attempts to step back from the existing subject’s perspective and hypothesise his 
relationship through a priori assumption about reason. As a consequence, the 
                                                          
36 I do not want to go too far in depth here about other factors that inform the subject and State 
relationship which the rational approach overlooks.  The reason for this is because such criticisms 
inform the key arguments of what I shall call the ‘contextual approach’ which will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Two. I therefore must delay a discussion of the limits of reason in accounting 
for the relation between subject and State, and the other contextual factors which inform this 
relationship, until the next chapter.  
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actual encounters, experiences, and perception of the subject are always 
overlooked in favour of understanding what would be considered ‘rational’.  
As the ‘rational approach’ expects the subject to act according to its understanding 
of reason, when the subject fails to do so it cannot account for his behaviour. As a 
consequence, it is common for the approach to belittle and exclude such modes 
of behaviour with dismissive and deprecating labels.  
To demonstrate this I will return to Collingwood’s concept of ‘barbarism’. In the 
New Leviathan, Collingwood denotes as ‘barbarians’ those who are ruled not by 
reason but by emotions and passions37. It should be noted that Collingwood draws 
attention to the original Greek understanding of ‘barbarize’ as to ‘behave like a 
barbarian’, or more particularly ‘talk like a barbarian’ (Collingwood, 2005:342). 
Thus we may interpret the very use of the term barbarian as to give an impression 
of unintelligibility38.  
This idea of ‘unintelligibility’ is furthered when we consider Collingwood’ 
discussion of ‘German barbarism’. As I highlighted earlier, Collingwood does claim 
that German ‘barbarism’ was a result of a particular historical circumstance. He 
                                                          
37 It should be observed that Collingwood makes a distinction between ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’, 
the former being only ‘uncivilised’ whilst the latter are particularly hostile towards civilisation. 
Thus, as well as being irrational, a key characteristic of ‘barbarism’ for Collingwood is being 
actively hostile to civilisation (Collingwood, 2005:342).   
38 Jonathan Hall, in his study of Classical Greek ethnicity, has highlighted that the word ‘barbaros’ 
seems to have carried a linguistic connotation and denoted those who could not speak Greek, or 
spoke it poorly (Hall, 1997:45). In general however the notion of the ‘barbarian’ denoted the 
stereotypical image of the ‘exotic, slavish and unintelligible other’ against which Greek identity 
was defied (Hall, 1997:47). Thus we may understand the origins of this term to indicate an 
‘unintelligible’ ‘other’.    
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indeed goes on to highlight one of the important historical events that ‘turned’ 
the Germans towards ‘barbarism’ was the culture, ‘the age’, of Germany under 
Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck (Collingwood, 2005:376). Nonetheless, as the 
discussion progresses Collingwood ceases to try and develop any understanding 
of what led the German people to Nazism, instead becoming increasingly 
dismissive of their behaviour as irrational and unintelligible. Consider for instance, 
and just to cite a few examples: the Nazis ‘thought with blood’ which is faster than 
the ‘old-fashioned way of doing it with your brains’ (Collingwood, 2005:377); ‘I am 
not sure that the Nazis understand what logic is for’ (Collingwood, 2005:377); 
‘therein lies the whole difference between thinking like a sane man and thinking 
like a Nazi’ (Collingwood, 2005:377); that the claims that land outwith Germany’s 
borders belonged to them was ‘childishly boastful’ and ‘a symptom of lunatic 
greed and envy’ (Collingwood, 2005:379); and finally that German nationalists of 
the Nineteenth Century were ‘muddle-headed’ and ‘addicted to self-deception’ 
(Collinwood, 2005:382). There is consequently little attempt to understand the 
circumstances that led to Nazism in Germany. Alternatively we find a systematic 
dismissal of their behaviour as irrational and unintelligible, indeed bordering on 
madness. Thus, we can see that Collingwood, although recognising that historical 
events may make subjects hostile to nation States, cannot account for such 
behaviour and thus must simply exclude it from his rational framework. 
This ‘exclusion’ is indeed rather common across the arguments discussed. Indeed 
interestingly so is the use of the terms ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’ to describe those 
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excluded. Consider for instance the language employed by Green on the subject 
of Temperance. In reply to the statement made by the Bishop of Peterborough 
that he would ‘rather have England free, than England sober’, Green attested that 
if one wanted the freedom to get drunk one ought ‘go back to the naked savage 
to find it’ (Green, 2003:255). We may observe here that that which is not in 
accordance with Green’s notion of the ‘common good’, and thus that which is 
deemed ‘irrational’, is dismissed through association with a more primitive state.  
Hegel similarly argues that those nations who ‘lag behind’ the rational 
development of the State may be considered as ‘barbarians’ (Hegel, 2008:319).  
We have already observed that Hegel looked negatively upon ‘civilised’ States 
which were still attached to notions of tradition and had not yet fully developed a 
sense of political obligation centred on reason, political communities such as 
England. Hegel’s narrowness of perspective, and the subsequent scale of his 
dismissal, is however fully revealed when we consider his views on communities 
which lie outwith the Western European State system, those communities Hegel 
fully considers as ‘barbaric’.  
His claim, for instance, that history passes from East to West, reaching its full 
development in Western Europe, in particular implies that Asian cultures are 
primitive and barbaric, their only importance lying in informing the development 
of more advanced European society (Hegel, 1991:103). Hegel is even more 
dismissive of Africa, claiming that it has no culture and that its religion is a ‘sorcery’. 
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He subsequently dismisses the continent of Africa from his inquires, claiming it has 
‘no historical part of the World’ (Hegel, 1991:99). Similarly the Native inhabitants 
of the Americas are dismissed as ‘inferiors’ ‘in all respects’ who existed, before the 
arrival of Europeans, in a state of ‘rudeness and barbarism’ (Hegel, 1991:81).  
It should also be further observed that this perspective of other cultures does not 
only exclude many alternative articulations of politics and culture from Hegel’s 
consideration, but also justifies their subjugation. In The Philosophy of Right Hegel 
maintains that the rights of barbarians are unequal to those of ‘civilised nations’ 
(Hegel, 2008:319). In the Philosophy of History, he remarks that the English have 
taken up the responsibility of ‘emissaries’ of civilisation as they open up contacts 
with ‘barbarous peoples’ (Hegel, 1991:455). 
Mill also excludes those who were not ‘rational’ from his account of the 
relationship between the subject and State. He insists in particular that his ‘harm 
principle’ was only suitable for those rational subjects who were in full possession 
of their mental faculties, and consequently not those ‘backward states of society 
in which the race itself may be considered in its nonage’ (Mill, 2008:14). Particular 
attention should be drawn to the fact that Mill goes on to use the term ‘barbarian’ 
to refer to such ‘backward people’. In particular Mill states that despotism ‘is a 
legitimate mode of government when dealing with ‘barbarians’, provided the end 
be ‘their improvement’. He continues that, until they are capable of free and equal 
discussion, the principles of liberty do not apply to such people, and instead they 
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should be content in obedience to an ‘Akbar or a Charlemagne’ (Mill, 2008:14-5). 
Again here those who are seen as ‘irrational’ are dismissed through association 
with the primitive and excluded from Mill’s entire conceptualisation of the subject 
and State relationship.  
Similarly, we might observe Spinoza’s claims that many of the ‘common people’ 
are unable to understand the ‘laws of reason’, and consequently have to have their 
relationship towards the polity explained through superstition and myth (Spinoza, 
2008:77). Indeed, Spinoza interestingly closes his preface to the Theological-
Political Treatise by claiming that his work is only for the ‘philosophical reader’.  
He continues that the common people, whom he asserts cannot overcome 
superstition and be governed by reason, should not read his work lest they ‘make 
a nuisance of themselves by reading it perversely’ (Spinoza, 2008:12).   
Finally, we might observe Hobbes’ comments in Behemoth that the English and 
Scottish subjects of Charles I were led into rebellion because they were largely 
‘ignorant of their duty’ (Hobbes 1990:4). Again, here, actions against proper 
reasonable conduct, which for Hobbes is obedience to the monarch, are being 
labelled as ‘ignorant’. It might also be observed that in De Cive Hobbes declares 
that drunkenness is an ‘offence’ to natural law. This is because Hobbes insists one 
should make an effort to maintain one’s ability to reason properly and not partake 
in activities which may destroy or impair one’s rational faculties (Hobbes, 2012:53).  
Thus we observe Hobbes, in an interesting parallel to Green, dismissing the desire 
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for, and consumption of, alcohol as degenerate behaviour affecting the ability to 
reason.  
Consequently, we can see that this approach centred on rationality fails to account 
for many forms of human behaviour. Indeed in the examples shown above we can 
observe a wide range of activity, from Nazism to the consumption of alcohol, 
falling outwith this framework of understanding. Such behaviour is instead 
belittled and excluded through labels such as ‘barbarianism’ and ‘savagery’ which 
allude to them being of a lower order or associated with a more primitive human 
state.  
The two central limitations of the ‘rational approach’ are thus that it firstly expects 
subjects to behave in a certain ‘rational way’, and thus overlooks the experiences 
of subjects who actually inhabit the world and the States contained within it. 
Secondly it cannot account for modes of behaviour which fall outwith this concept 
of reason. It is these central problems that I hope the proposed ‘subjective 
approach’ will avoid.  
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Chapter Two: The Contextual Approach  
 
I will now illustrate what I have termed the ‘contextual approach’ through a 
number of key arguments.  
The first key argument is that abstract reason is an insufficient premises from 
which one can approach the study of politics. This is illustrated by a rejection of 
the idea that reason alone is capable of understanding the relationship between 
subject and State, or indeed reason alone can provide an adequate understanding 
of political relationships generally.  
The second key argument is that the subject’s relationship with the State is formed 
through his experiences and participation in the practices of the community that 
he inhabits. It is consequently an understanding of this context the subject inhabits 
which is sought in order to explain his relationship with the State.  
The final argument I will use to illustrate the ‘contextual approach’ is that we 
should not talk of ‘subjects’ and ‘States’ generally, but rather only of ‘particular 
subjects’ who inhabit ‘particular States’.  This argument stems from the belief that, 
as subjects are bound and shaped by the context they inhabit, there is little point 
in discussing political relations generally, as these will differ depending on the 
context which the subject inhabits. This focus on particularity may seem self-
evident from the dismissal of the ‘abstract rational subject’ and the focus instead 
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on ‘subjects within context’. Nonetheless, as will be shown, theorists who are 
illustrative of this approach often take pains to emphasise this ‘particularity’ in 
their approach, and thus I have isolated it as a key argument on its own.  
These three arguments will constitute sections one, two and three of this chapter.  
Section four will then proceed to summarise this approach and highlight its 
limitations. This will be particularly important for the development of my thesis as 
it will be acknowledged that much of the arguments illustrative of the contextual 
approach are sympathetic to the assumptions of the proposed ‘subjective 
approach’. In particular, it will be observed that both approaches share the desire 
to study particular subjects in relation to particular States. However the main 
difference between the two approaches lies in the fact that the ‘contextual 
approach’ not only seeks to understand particular subjects within particular 
contexts, but typically further attempts to use an understanding of this context to 
explain the subject’s relationships. The ‘contextual approach’ thus gives priority of 
focus not to the subject’s encounters and perceptions but to this ‘context’; the 
‘contextual approach’ steps back from the subject’s perspective to gain a greater 
and more in depth understanding of the historical and cultural context through 
which it seeks to understand subjects’ political relationships. In this way the 
context becomes the ‘lens’ through which the ‘contextual approach’ seeks to view 
the subject and State relationship. 
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The difference between this ‘contextual approach’ and the proposed ‘subjective 
approach’ will be that, whilst both identify the subject as one who exists within a 
particular context, the latter does not seek to comprehend the issue by using the 
context as a ‘lens’, but rather seeks to identify and comprehend the encounters 
the subject has within these contexts. The focus of the ‘subjective approach’ will 
thus be on what perception is attained through these moments of encounter and 
how the subject and State relationship grows from them.   
I would again highlight that in illustrating this approaches I am drawing from a 
wide range of philosophies, from the arguments of the Scottish Enlightenment to 
‘political conservatism’ and ‘communitarianism’. I thus do not in any way wish to 
reduce and conflate these complex ideas or ignore both the nuance and greater 
divergences in each philosopher’s views. Instead, I will focus on what I believe are 
the common arguments these philosophies share, and which I believe are 
common arguments illustrative of the ‘contextual approach’. What I believe is 
common to all the philosophies is the importance they attribute to the subject’s 
context, whether this be in the form of historical traditions or cultural practices. I 
would also similarly highlight that some of the issues and criticisms I will raise in 
this chapter are far more relevant to certain thinkers than others. Consequently, 
when stating the limitations I find in this chapter, it must be born in mind that 
these are conceived of as limitations of the illustrated approach generally, and not 
as limitations of each thinker and philosophy discussed.  
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1. Rejection of the Premise of Abstract Reason  
 
This ‘rejection of the premise of abstract reason’ argument takes two recognisable 
forms. The first is that theoretical systems built of the assumption of a rational 
actor disembodied from historical context, such as the ‘Social Contract Theory’, 
provides an unsatisfactory account of the subject’s relationships. The explanation 
put forward for this is that conclusions derived from purely abstract premises bear 
no resemblance to the actual conditions of the political world. We might 
consequently perceive this criticism as predominantly levied against the ‘rational 
approach’s’ articulation of the subject and State relationship.  
The second argument is that rational principles, devoid of any history or tradition, 
cannot form the foundations of the subject and State relationship. The 
explanation for this is that rational principles cannot cultivate in the subject any 
feeling of affection towards the State. This argument may consequently be 
understood as directed against the more normative claim that we should 
understand and approach politics from rational principles.  
The common proposition contained within these arguments is that reason alone 
is an insufficient means of accounting for the subject and State relationship, thus 
consequently illustrating my first key characteristic of the ‘contextual approach’.  
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I will first begin from the rejection of the ‘rational actor’. A clear illustration of this 
rejection comes from the Scottish Enlightenment, and particularly in the thought 
of David Hume. In his Treatise on Human Nature Hume argued that one’s mental 
faculties are imperfect and prone to error, and consequently reason alone could 
not be considered a reliable guide for organising and understanding human affairs. 
On the contrary, Hume argued that most of our understanding is derived from 
custom and habit (Hume, 1985:231-4).   
The importance of custom and habit will be considered in proper depth in section 
two, where I consider the argument that context shapes the subject’s relationship 
with the State. In the meantime I will rather illustrate from Hume the idea that 
reason alone is an inappropriate means for understanding political relationships, 
and that any understanding built on the assumptions of an ‘abstract rational actor’ 
is unsuitable for understanding real relationships.    
Such an argument is prevalent in Hume’s essay ‘On the Original Contract’. In this 
essay Hume criticises the theory of an ‘original’ or ‘social contract’, as was 
speculated upon by philosophers such as Locke. The reason why Hume believes 
such ‘speculative’ theories are ‘a little unshapely’ is because there is nothing in the 
world that resembles or could warrant the political systems they propose (Hume, 
2008:277-8). The conclusions of these ‘speculative’ theories furthermore are 
‘paradoxes repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to the practice 
and opinion of all ages’ (Hume, 2008:292). Hume continues that if you were to 
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venture such beliefs about politics in most parts of the world you would be 
imprisoned for sedition, that is if your friends did not first ‘shut you up as delirious, 
for advancing such absurdities’ (Hume, 2008:278). Consequently, we may observe 
in Hume the belief that such theoretical systems built purely on speculative reason 
are completely without basis as they bear no resemblance to human societies as 
they actually exits. To speak of them amongst fellow subjects would thus be to at 
worst invite trouble, and at best be considered an idiot.  
Hume thus rejects the idea of the ‘Original’ or ‘Social Contract’ theory as its 
assumptions are devoid of any historical consideration, and consequently its 
conclusions are contrary and irrelevant to political conditions as they actually 
exist39. This illustrates the key argument of the ‘contextual approach’ that one 
ought to reject theories which base their assumptions on pure reason rather than 
contextual consideration40.  
This rejection of abstract speculation can be viewed as characteristic of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. We can for instance observe Adam Ferguson, in his Essay 
on the History of Civil Society, similarly dismissed speculation of ‘man’ as he existed 
                                                          
39 Particular conclusions that Hume identifies as absurd towards the end of the essay is the 
argument that the civil government may not take away any property from the subject without his 
own consent or that of his representative (Hume, 2008:292). This would suggest that Locke is 
indeed the target of Hume’s criticism.     
40 Hume’s criticism of the ‘Social Contract Theory’ is the most explicit in his writings. We may also 
however observe criticisms of other arguments central to the ‘rational approach’. We can for 
instance observe in the Treatise on Human Nature a criticism of the notion of the ‘common good’ 
perceived on a rational basis. Hume argue that it would be easy to imagine two neighbours 
agreeing to drain a meadow they share as the benefits of the project would be easily apparent to 
them.  However Hume thinks it unlikely that a thousand people would be able to deduce the 
good from such an action and agree to it. (Hume, 1985:590). 
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in the ‘State of Nature’ in favour of a more historical approach. Ferguson 
contended that the records of mankind, ‘from the earliest to the latest’, have 
always depicted him as ‘assembled in troops and companies’, and it is the 
membership of these groups that have shaped his relations (Ferguson, 1995:8). 
This remark by Ferguson again illustrates this rejection of rational speculation 
devoid of historical consideration when investigating subjects’  relations; insisting 
instead that we should always consider the subject as embedded within 
historically formed groups.41.  
We may also see the rejection of the premise of abstract reason as present in the 
arguments of more contemporary thinkers, for instance in contemporary 
conservative philosopher Roger Scruton. In The Meaning of Conservatism, Scruton 
criticises the ‘liberal’ idea that imagines the individual as one abstracted from his 
cultural conditions who bases his decisions on pure reason alone, a position he 
associates chiefly with Kant42. Scruton argues that such an abstract position is 
unattainable as it ignores the social practices and institutions that shape and 
constitute the subject, and are consequently what the subject makes choices 
about (Scruton, 2002;112,188).  
                                                          
41 What is presented here is only the briefest possible account of the rejection of abstract reason 
as is present in the Scottish Enlightenment. Nonetheless is was sufficient as to illustrate my 
central point. An excellent account of the Scottish Enlightenment, and in particular its take on 
‘reason’ and ‘history’, can be found in Alexander Broadie’s seminal work The Scottish 
Enlightenment (2011), particularly in the chapter on ‘History and Enlightenment’.  
42 One may here recall the account of Kant’s attempts to establish an a priori account of morality 
in Chapter One.  
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This argument is also illustrated by what has come to be known as the 
‘communitarian’ critique of liberalism43. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift have 
argued that what is common to the ‘communitarian’ position is the rejection of 
the notion that the subject is able to make rational decisions from a position 
removed from his cultural and historical context, and that the implications of such 
decisions can be used to make political maxims which can apply cross-culturally. 
This criticism can be further regarded as a criticism of liberalism in general, as well 
                                                          
43 What has been called the ‘communitarian approach’ is a philosophical approach associated 
with thinkers such as Amitai Etzioni, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and 
Michael Walzer. It should be noted here that there is an initial difficulty when discussing 
‘communitarianism’ as, with the exception of Etzioni (1996), none of the thinkers mentioned 
here actually self-identify as ‘communitarians’. MacIntyre has in particular rejected the title of 
‘communitarian’, and indeed self-identifying communitarian Etzioni has even labelled MacIntyre 
a ‘conservative’ (Etzioni, 1996:15). There is also the division, made by commentators such as 
Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, between ‘philosophical communitarianism’, as is found in 
thinkers such as Sandel and Taylor, and the more explicitly ‘political communitarianism’ as 
advocated by Etzioni (Mulhall and Swift, 1996:xiv). Nonetheless Mulhall and Swift have argued 
that there is a set of core arguments around which we can understand the ‘communitarian 
approach’. This is firstly situated around a general criticism of liberalism, and ‘Rawlsian liberalism’ 
in particular. The second is the emphasis on cultural context and community in informing and 
structuring the subject’s decisions and the subsequent relationships built from these decisions 
(Mulhall and Swift, 1996:162-3). The presence of these arguments within MacIntyre’s work is 
why he is associated with ‘communitarianism’ by such commentators as Mulhall and Swift 
(1996:71). It should be noted that Mulhall and Swift are not alone in associating MacIntyre with 
‘communitarianism’ in this way. See for instance Derek Phillips’ account of ‘communitarianism’ 
Looking Backward; A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought, where he groups MacIntyre, 
along with Sandel and Taylor, as ‘communitarians’ because they hold the community as a 
‘normative ideal’ (Phillips, 1993:10). In his assessment of the ‘communitarian critique of 
Liberalism’ Allen Buchanan similarly groups MacIntyre with Sandel and Taylor, arguing that in 
their work ‘communitarianism’ achieves its ‘most powerful expression’ (Buchannan, 1989:852). 
Also, in his discussion of the significance of the ‘communitarian-liberal’ debate for international 
relations, David Morrice also lists MacIntyre, along with Taylor, Sandel, and Walzer, as ‘leading 
communitarians’ (Morrice, 2000:234). Thus we may see that it is common practice to associate 
MacIntyre, along with Sandel, Taylor, and Walzer, with communitarianism. Nonetheless neither is 
it my purpose to here to try and give a full or extensive account of these thinkers’ arguments nor 
to try and define ‘what’ or ‘who’ is and is not a ‘communitarian’.  My purpose, as always, is to 
discuss such arguments as illustrate what I have termed a ‘contextual approach’. Consequently 
when one of these thinkers displays an argument illustrative of this approach I will endeavour to 
address them by name and their particular work. I will only use the term ‘communitarian’ when 
discussing a general position characteristic of communitarianism which illustrates my argument.  
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as a specific criticism of the liberalism presented by Rawls in A Theory of Justice 
(Mulhall and Swift, 1996:158-60). In the interest of brevity I will concentrate 
primarily on these ‘communitarian’ thinkers critique of Rawls.  
In After Virtue, MacIntyre first criticises Rawls on the account that the decisions 
his ‘rational’ subject comes to from ‘behind the veil of ignorance’ are decisions 
that only a rational agent behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ would make (MacIntyre, 
2007:247). In other words, the principles and laws which Rawls prescribes from 
his ‘original position’ would only appear acceptable to such a disembodied agent 
removed from his cultural context. However MacIntyre insists such a position is 
unrealistic as subjects are never behind a ‘veil of ignorance’; they are in fact always 
imbedded in cultural and historical contexts (MacIntyre, 2007:249)44.  
In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer recognises that rational beings behind Rawl’s 
‘veil of ignorance’ would likely agree to a political situation as Rawls describes. 
Nonetheless, Walzer insists that this helps little with understanding how actually 
existing subjects, who are aware of their culture and heritage, will make political 
choices. He continues that, in a world of diverse and competing cultures, there is 
                                                          
44 It should be observed that Macintyre’s point here is a preliminary to a larger critique on the 
debate between Rawls and Nozick over the subject of ‘desert’. MacIntyre argues what is 
perceived as ‘good’ for both the subject, and the community as a whole, can only be formulated 
within the context of that community. Furthermore it is only by living in and participating in the 
practices of the community that subject’s come to recognise and identify with these goods. 
Consequently a purely abstract conception of politics cannot account for desert as it can neither 
account for what is desired nor who deserves what is desired. Such an understanding can be only 
achieved when we examine the issue from the context it is imbedded in and gives it value 
(MacIntyre, 2007:250). Nonetheless the brief outline of why MacIntyre initially rejects Rawls’ 
abstract rational position is sufficient to illustrate my argument.   
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no one understanding derived from an abstract ‘original position’ which would be 
applicable universally (Walzer, 1983:79). 
We may also find a forceful criticism of Rawls in Michael Sandel’s Limits of 
Liberalism. Sandel rejects the idea that an individual reduced solely to a 
unencumbered rational actor could in fact make any choices at all because it is 
precisely factors such as culture that allow him to make life choices in the first 
place (Sandel, 1998:179). 
There are thus two slightly different criticisms of Rawls that we might observe in 
these arguments. Firstly Sandel rejects the idea that subjects abstracted from their 
historical and cultural context would be able to make political decisions, for they 
would be deprived of a standard against which they could base their choices. 
MacIntyre and Walzer however do not necessarily challenge the ability of subjects 
behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ to make choices, but rather reject the notion that 
what choices they could make would have any relevance or bearing to reality. 
Nonetheless what they all share in common is a dismissal of Rawls’ method in 
attaining principles of justice from an abstract rational standpoint, and instead 
insist context must be given crucial significance when investigating such matters.  
I now turn to the second form in which this argument against abstract reason may 
be observed. This is namely the belief that reason, or ‘rational principles’, cannot 
alone form the basis of the subject and State relationship. In order to illustrate this 
we may turn to the thought of Edmund Burke. We may first observe that Burke, 
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like Hume, was critical about the premises of such theories as the ‘Social Contract’. 
In Reflections on the Revolution in France for instance Burke remarks that the State 
is not like some trade agreement concerning tobacco, but was the great primeval 
contract linking one generation to the next. Thus, the State was no ahistorical 
edifice constructed from reason, but was an organic structure evolving from 
history and tradition (Burke, 2004:194-5). 
Burke in particular levies his arguments against the activities of the French 
Revolutionary Government. He for instance draws attention to what he claims was 
an attempt to make the French State’s domestic structure more inherently 
rational, and citizenship more equal and universal, by dissolving France’s provinces 
and establishing an alternate system of localities based on geometrical design. 
However Burke argues that such a plan, instead of making all Frenchmen ‘universal 
citizens’, will deprive them of any country at all. He justifies this claim by arguing 
that nobody can feel any bond of affection or a sense of pride in a ‘square 
measurement’; ‘he never will glory in belonging to Chequer, No 71,’ (Burke, 
2004:315). Key to Burke’s argument is that the relationship between subjects’ and 
their State is formed by an emotional attachment, an emotional attachment which 
cannot be cultivated by a purely rational articulation of the State.  
We may observe similar sentiments expressed by French Counter-revolutionary 
thinker Joseph de Maistre. In Considerations on France Maistre is cynical about the 
use of abstract reason, describing it as ‘a deceptive shadow rather than the truth’ 
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(Maistre, 2006:76). Unsurprisingly, Maistre finds the French revolutionaries’ 
attempts to constitute a new State on rational principles a foolish enterprise. In 
particular, addressing the revolutionaries, he remarks; ‘your republican 
institutions have no roots… they are simply sitting on the soil in regards to their 
predecessors… It took an axe to fell the latter; a breath will sweep away the other 
and leave no trace’ (Maistre, 2006:87).  
Thus we can observe that reason is an inadequate means of articulating the 
subject and State relationship as it cannot inspire the affection and sense of 
attachment that the older historical articulations could. This rational articulation 
just does not, to borrow from the language of Maistre, have the necessary ‘roots’.   
I have given two examples of this rejection of the premise of abstract reason which 
is characteristic of what I have called the ‘contextual approach’. The first example 
argued that political approaches based on a ‘rational subject’ abstracted from his 
cultural and historical context was an unrealistic premise which resulted in 
arguments contrary and irrelevant to political realities. The second example 
argued that rational principles were insufficient grounds for founding the basis of 
the relationship between subject and State. What we can thus see as common to 
both these arguments is a rejection of the notion that abstract reason alone is a 
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sufficient means by which one may understand the subject and State 
relationship.45  
 
 
2. Focus on Context  
 
In this section I will illustrate the second key argument of the ‘contextual 
approach’: that it is the historical and cultural context which constitutes the 
relationship between subject and State. Consequently, if one is to understand this 
relationship, it is this context which must become the focus of one’s study.    
To understand the importance of context we may return to Hume. In the Treatise 
Hume remarks that, if you were to ask the ‘greater part of the nation’ if they 
consented to their government, they would ‘Be inclin’d to think very strangely of 
                                                          
45 One might also draw attention to a third form of this rejection. This is namely a hostility to the 
belief that a statesman should, or is capable of, moulding society according to a ‘rational plan’. 
Examples of this would include Adam Smith’s criticism of the ‘man of systems’ in his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. Here Smith criticises such a figure for attempting to reform society according 
to a rational plan as to do so is to adopt an arrogance and overconfidence in regards to one’s 
own abilities, and neglect the greater stock of collective wisdom as is found in the traditions of 
society. Thus he asserts the good statesman ought to consult and work alongside the polity’s 
traditions, and not engineer society according to his own rational vision (Smith, 2009:275-6).  
Such an argument is also evident in Michael Oakeshott’s criticism of the rational politician in his 
essay ‘Rationalism in Politics’ (1991). Like Smith, Oakeshott insists that the politician must not try 
and engineer society according to rational plan or vision but rather must rely on the traditional 
practices and knowledge of politics to guide his conduct. Nonetheless, although both these 
arguments do provide illustrations of a rejection of abstract reason as an appropriate means 
through which to approach politics, they are however directed more towards the conduct of the 
statesman, as opposed to understanding the relationship between the subject and State. 
Consequently I have not given them extensive treatment in this thesis.  
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you: and wou’d certainly reply that the affair depend not on consent, but that they 
were born to such obedience’ (Hume, 1985:599).  
This remark first of all reveals Hume’s contention that principles arrived at from 
abstract rational premises seem absurd when applied to the realities of political 
existence.  However, it also reveals a second key argument in Hume’s 
understanding of the relation between subject and State: that the former obeys 
the latter because he was ‘born to’. In ‘On the Original Contract’ Hume makes 
another similar claim: ‘Obedience of subjection become so familiar, that most men 
never make an enquiry into its origin or cause, more than about the principle of 
gravity’ (Hume, 2008:218).  
Underpinning this argument is the belief that in reality subjects do not make 
speculative enquiries into their relationship with the State, rather they are just 
born into a State which they are expected to obey and overtime become 
accustomed in doing so. Hume does give examples of institutions and practices 
that help accustomize the subject into obedience to the State, such as the 
succession of hereditary princes (Hume, 1985:610). We need not however concern 
ourselves with particular examples for the moment.  What is key to recognise is 
the argument that it is the customs the subject is brought up and lives in which 
cultivates in him an obedience towards the State. Consequently, when 
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understanding the subject’s relationship with the State, it is this context which we 
must consider46.  
This notion that the environment the subject inhabits is conducive to positive 
relationship to the State is further evident in the writings of Burke. We may indeed 
return to his discussion about affection to localities. In Reflections, Burke remarks 
it is a familiarity and love of the localities which we have been brought up in that 
cultivates in us a love of our country and its government. It is through its ‘inns and 
resting places’, Burke claims, that we come to love and have affection for the land 
we inhabit (Burke, 2004:315). Thus, Burke argues it is through experiences with 
the features of the locality one lives in which cultivates an affection for one’s 
country and State. Scruton captures such a sentiment with his term oikophilia; the 
                                                          
46 One might observe that Hume nonetheless often states that the origin of the State lies in 
utility. This is perhaps made nowhere clearer than in the Treatise where Hume maintains that the 
origins of civil duty lie in ‘nothing but self-interest’ (Hume, 1985:595). In light of this we might 
wonder if Hume, with this understanding of the State founded out of utility, does not share views 
in accordance to Bentham and thus by extension the ‘rationalist approach’.  To respond to this 
one might observe that Bentham not only believed that the State’s origin lay in utility, but that 
this understanding could be composed into a rational principle which could convey more clearly 
to subjects the nature of their relationship with the State. As we have seen however, Hume was 
highly sceptical about the subject’s capacity to reason, and thus insisted that it was rather 
through habit that the subject’s relation to the State must be cultivated. The importance Hume 
attributed to such customs and traditions led him to the conservative view that these must be 
preserved (Hume, 2008:310).  Bentham, having more confidence in the power of reason, 
conversely insisted they must be reformed, indeed abolished, as to be replaced with more 
rational principles.  Thus to summarise, although Bentham and Hume may share the view of the 
State as founded by utility, on the question of how the subject relates to the State these two 
thinkers differ significantly. Bentham believed that this relationship ought to be constructed on a 
clear rational understanding whilst Hume, sceptical about the ability of the subject to reason, 
instead insisted this relationship needed to be founded on habitual obedience as is cultivated 
through traditions. This crucial difference makes each a position a clear illustration of the 
‘rational’ and ‘contextual’ approach respectively.   
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belief that humans are animated by a ‘love of home’ and the peoples and features 
that give this ‘home’ significance (Scruton, 2015:24-5).  
As well as this focus on context we might also observe in Burke and Scruton’s 
arguments a particular focus on passions. They for instance characterise the 
subject’s relationships here not through ‘reason’ but rather ‘love’. This passion is 
understood to derive from the subject’s experiences in his environment and 
context. We consequently may understand the subject’s relationship to the State 
to be based upon passions as are cultivated in the context that he inhabits.    
I have thus illustrated how, on this contextual account, familiarity with one’s 
‘home environment’ cultivates a positive bond between the subject and State. 
Nonetheless, to fully understand the importance of context, I must illustrate more 
clearly how actual practices and traditions help constitute this relationship.  The 
authors we have discussed do provide plenty of examples of this. We have for 
instance already noted how Hume believed the succession of hereditary monarchs 
over time induced in the subject a habitual obedience to the State.  
Nonetheless, Scruton’s discussion of the British Monarchy in The Meaning of 
Conservatism gives a particularly illustrative example of the role played by a 
tradition in informing the relationship between subject and State. Scruton argues 
that the British Monarch gives the State ‘ceremonial presence’. The ‘ceremony of 
the monarchy’ allows subjects to participate in the political customs and traditions 
of the State, consequently making them aware of their obligation to it (Scruton, 
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2002:29-30). Scruton latter clarifies that the particular genius of monarchy is that 
it manages to embody the State in the fragile body of a human person. This allows 
for the notion of obligation to be transformed into affection for a given person; 
this affection Scruton argues is a far better grounding for political obligation than 
an abstract notion or rational argument (Scruton, 2002:193).  
What we may understand from this is that, by giving the State a ‘presence’, the 
British Monarchy allows it to take a concrete form which the subject can 
consequently relate to. Furthermore, its ‘presence’ as a particular person, a 
‘fragile body’, allows for the possibility of subjects forming an affection for it, in a 
way that would be impossible if it was left only in the form of an abstract concept.  
The ‘ceremony’ of this monarchy further allows subjects to actively participate in 
the traditions of the State, and through this participation they are taught affection 
and allegiance to the monarch and, by extension, the State. Thus, to summarise 
concisely: the British State takes concrete form in the person of the Queen whom 
subjects are then trained to feel affection and obligation towards.   
 We might similarly observe here again a focus on ‘passions’: it is not because it is 
‘rational’ to obey the State that the British subject feels obliged to his polity, but 
rather it is due to an emotional attachment he feels to the person of the Queen. 
This ‘emotional pull’ the subject feels is a product of his experiences within the 
traditions and culture of the British polity.  
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I have so far focused predominantly on the way in which the traditions and 
institutions of State inform its relationship with the subject. I must however also 
consider how the experience of the community and culture more generally inform 
this relationship. To understand this I again turn to what has been called the 
‘communitarian argument’. In order to understand this we must briefly consider 
how such thinkers understand the ‘human self’, and how their understanding of 
political relationships stem from this.  
A clear illustration is found in the thought of Charles Taylor. In Ethics of 
Authenticity, Taylor asserts that ‘human life’ is fundamentally ‘dialogical in 
character’ (Taylor, 2003:32-3). What Taylor means by this is that human beings do 
not define their identity in isolation, but rather identity is shaped through 
conversation and in reference to significant others in a subject’s life, people such 
as the subject’s parents (Taylor, 2003:34-5)47. In the same way Taylor also claims 
we define ourselves in dialogue with the cultural framework we inhabit. Such a 
framework gives a ‘background’ which represents ‘who we are’ and ‘where we 
have come from’, and thus makes our identities and decisions intelligible. Taylor 
later terms this ‘background of intelligibility’ the subject’s ‘horizon of significance’, 
which he claims subjects must refer to when understanding themselves and when 
making decisions (Taylor, 2003:37). We consequently must recognise the 
                                                          
47 Indeed Taylor stresses that even a reclusive hermit or a solitary painter must have an 
interlocutor whom they identify their identity against: in the former Taylor argues the 
interlocutor is God and in the latter it is the audience to whom the painting is addressed (Taylor, 
2003:34-5) 
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importance of cultural context in Taylor’s work as it is precisely this context, or as 
Taylor labels it ‘horizon of significance’, which frames and makes intelligible the 
subject and his choices.  
Taylor argues that this importance attributed to identity, and in particular identity 
shaped by a particular cultural ‘horizon’, leads to a political demand for 
‘recognition’ of one’s identity. This he claims has been an important driving force 
in modern politics, particular amongst nationalist movements (Taylor, 1994:25). 
In the ‘Politics of Recognition’ Taylor argues that this political drive for recognition 
has manifested in two different ways. Firstly, there is the drive for universal ‘equal 
recognition’, which arises out of the need for every subject to be recognised as 
having equal worth and dignity. There is then the second drive for the recognition 
of particular cultures and communities, which entails a demand for the 
recognition of the ‘difference’ between subjects and groups. These two demands 
for recognition consequently find themselves in conflict with one another. This 
conflict arises from the fact that a politics of ‘universal equal recognition’ demands 
a certain homogeneity amongst subjects; it demands that all are treated the same. 
This however runs the danger of marginalising and supressing the differences 
between subjects and communities which the second argument wishes to see 
recognised (Taylor, 1994:43).  
A full discussion of this conflict between ‘equal recognition’ and the ‘recognition 
for differences’, and the solutions Taylor recommends, is beyond the remit of this 
98 
 
thesis48. What is however important to acknowledge is how this understanding 
informs how political relations are conceptualised. We have seen how, for Taylor, 
culture is seen as of paramount importance in the informing of the subject’s self-
understanding. This in turn results in a demand for this distinctiveness of this 
cultural understanding to be given due political recognition. Problems however 
occur when political bodies such as the State fail to give proper recognition to 
these cultural identities, or even try and diffuse cultural distinctiveness in the 
pursuit of achieving equality amongst its citizens. The result of this would be a 
conflict between subject and State over the matter of cultural recognition. What 
one may observe from this is that cultural identity can be viewed as central to 
informing the subject and State relationship. This is because subjects will seek 
recognition of this identity from their polity, and the State risks the danger of 
alienating its subjects if it fails to recognise these demands.  
Taylor gives an example of such a conflict in his discussion of the politics of Quebec. 
According to Taylor, being a Francophone Quebecker is central to many citizens of 
Quebec’s self-understanding. They consequently look to the Canadian 
Government to grant political recognition of their distinctive cultural identity. This 
however often comes into conflict with the Canadian Government’s attempt to 
give equal recognition and rights to all its citizens. What is important to recognise 
here is how this example illustrates the way in which context forms the basis of 
                                                          
48 Extensive discussion of this problem can be found in Taylor’s ‘Politics of Recognition’ (1994).  
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the relationship between subject and State; it is their cultural understanding, as 
derives from the contextual fact of inhabiting Quebec, which predominantly 
informs the citizens of Quebec’s relationship with the Canadian State (Taylor, 
1994:58-61).49 
 It is worth also considering here a debate that has become prominent in the early 
Twenty-First Century. This is namely the debate concerning the idea of an 
‘Associative Theory of Political Obligation’.   I wish to give particular focus to the 
arguments of ‘Associative Political Theory’ as have been articulated by Horton50. 
Central to Horton’s understanding of ‘political obligation’ is that it is ‘non-
voluntary’ and ‘particular’.  
                                                          
49 I have here focused predominantly on Taylor as I believe he gives a clear illustration of how 
cultural context shapes the subject’s understanding of self, and how this understanding then 
effects his political relations. I might however highlight that such an understanding can also be 
illustrated by other thinkers which have been associated with the ‘communitarian argument’. 
One for instance might consider Walzer’s understanding of justice as that which is faithful to the 
‘shared understanding’ of the members of the community (Walzer, 1983:313).  
50 Like all the theories discussed in this chapter, ‘Associative Political Obligation’ is a rich and 
complex theory which is expressed by a number of thinker. I have selected to focus particularly 
on Horton’s articulation as, according to Bas van der Vossen, it represents a ‘thick membership 
view’ of ‘Associative Political Obligation’. Such a position comprehends obligation to the polity, 
not just through formal association of a group, but through a more complex and ‘thicker’ ‘ethical’ 
understanding deriving from the cultural and historical context the subject inhabits and how this 
defines both the subject and his relations with others (Vossen, 2011:481). I have thus chosen to 
focus on this particular strand of argument as it is most illustrative of what I have termed a 
‘contextual approach’. For other articulations of ‘Associative Political Obligations’ see Vossen’s 
account in ‘Associative Political Obligations’ (2011) and ‘Associative Political Obligations; Their 
Potential’ (2011). It should be further noted that many scholars have highlighted the close 
relationship between theories of ‘Associative Political Obligation’ and ‘Communitarianism’, even 
going as far to describe the latter as ‘communitarian theory’. Nonetheless, as Vossen argues, 
equating associative and communitarian theories is too simplistic (Vossen, 2011:478). I do not 
here wish to elaborate on the differences between the two theories.  It will be sufficient to say 
that I did not conflate these two theories because it would be an injustice to the nuance and 
complexity of ‘Associative Political Obligation’ and to those scholars who have laboured to make 
explicit the distinctness of this theory (Horton, 2006; Horton, 2007; Horton and Windeknecht, 
2014).  
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Horton gives an illustrative account of how subjects come to acknowledge these 
obligations which are non-voluntary, and how the subject consequently relates to 
the State. In ‘Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part Two’ he gives 
particular attention to the nature and use of ‘shared narratives’. Such narratives 
have the effect of connecting the existence of the particular subject with the 
history, actions, and future, ‘in general… fate’, of the polity and its Government 
(Horton, 2007:13). Horton cites for instance how the narrative of Britain’s ‘Dunkirk 
Spirit’ is not only evoked in times of political crisis, but are also utilised in more 
familiar and routine situations. The effect of this is to relate the subject’s actions 
to the larger narrative of the polity as a whole, and thus cultivate a bond between 
the two (Horton, 2007:13-4). Thus, we may understand on this account the 
relationship between the subject and the State as cultivated through the cultural 
practices and stories which the subject is born into and brought up in. 
I have given enough examples to clearly illustrate how the cultural context that 
the subject inhabits informs his relationship with the State. This argument is built 
largely on the premise that the subject never chooses to obey the State, but rather 
learns to do so as loyalty and affection is cultivated in him over time and he is 
habitually brought into a condition of obedience. We have seen examples of how 
such traditions and practices are interpreted as working to this effect. It was 
argued that institutions such as the monarchy allow the subject to feel affection 
towards the State, and how participation in this tradition trains him in obedience 
towards it. We have also seen the argument that cultural narratives further 
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influence the subject in feeling affection towards the State and help him identify 
with it. Finally we have also seen the claim that the community shapes the 
subject’s identity, and that this cultural identity is a central background and drive 
in the subject’s understanding of his political relationships. Common to all these 
arguments we may therefore recognise is the belief that it is the historical and 
cultural context the subject inhabits, and importantly the traditions and practices 
that constitute this context, that form the foundations of his political 
understanding. This clearly illustrates the second key argument I said was 
characteristic of a ‘contextual approach’: it is the context which the subject 
inhabits that informs his relationship with the State.      
 
3. Particularity of Approach  
What I mean by the ‘particularity’ of approach is the argument that one must not 
consider political problems generally, but rather must always examine them in a 
particular historical context. Thus, one should not consider ‘the relation between 
the subject and State’, but the relation between particular subjects and the 
particular State they inhabit.  
This argument for particularity is perhaps made nowhere clearer than by Maistre 
in his Considerations on France. In response to the concept of the ‘universal 
subject’ Maistre writes:  
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‘there is no such thing as man in the world. In my lifetime I have seen 
Frenchmen, Italians, Russians etc.; thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one 
can be Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him; if 
he exists, he is unknown to me’ (Maistre, 2006:53)51. 
Evidently contained in Maistre’s statement is his rejection of the ‘abstract subject’, 
whose existence he denies. However, also contained in this statement is the belief 
that subjects exist only as found embedded in their particular communities. He 
thus proceeds, not only to reject hypothetical abstract accounts of politics, but to 
insist that politics must be conducted with an eye to the particular circumstances 
in which subjects dwell. He continues to argue in particular that a ‘real constitution’ 
is one that addresses and considers the specific circumstances in which the 
subjects one wishes to address are situated (Maistre, 2006:53).  
Therefore, in Maistre’s statement we do again see illustrated the rejection of the 
abstract subject and the insistence that we must consider the historical and 
cultural context the subject inhabits, and therefore the first two key characteristics 
of a ‘contextual approach’.  However, we also can observe particular emphasis on 
the belief that, if one is to address or consider politics, one must focus on a 
particular group of subjects in a particular context. This clearly illustrates the third 
key characteristic of the ‘contextual approach’ that one must consider particular 
subjects who inhabit a particular State.  
                                                          
51 Emphasis in original.   
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We may also observe this ‘particularity’ as evident in Scruton’s articulation of 
conservatism. In The Meaning of Conservatism for instance Scruton remarks there 
can be no ‘universal’ conservative policy (Scruton, 2002:1). Similarly, in How to be 
a Conservative, he highlights that his own arguments are addressed to an ‘English-
speaking world’ and to a readership which share his own understanding of civil 
society (Scruton, 2015:viii). We may consequently observe in this a self-conscious 
awareness by Scruton of the particular nature of his own of approach to politics, 
thus illustrating very well this particularity of focus characteristic of the ‘contextual 
approach’.   
Such particularity in approach is also illustrated in the thought of the so called 
‘communitarian thinkers’, especially in Walzer’s reference to the idea of the 
‘philosopher and the cave’. In the ‘preface’ to Spheres of Justice, Walzer remarks 
that the original way of beginning a philosophical enterprise was to ‘walk out of 
the cave, leave the city, climb the mountain’, so that one may fashion an objective 
universal standpoint. On the contrary, Walzer states that he intends to ‘stand in 
the cave, in the city, on the ground’ (Walzer, 1983:xiv). In this remark we once 
again may observe a criticism of the ‘abstract position’ favoured by such thinkers 
as would wish to base their political understanding on the assumption of an 
abstract unencumbered agent. Nonetheless, in signifying his intentions to do 
philosophy ‘in the cave’, Walzer also lays emphasises on this ‘particularity of 
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approach’52 . This is illustrated further by the understanding of justice Walzer 
presents in the text. ‘Justice’, Walzer claims, is always relevant to the ‘social 
meanings’ of the particular community under discussion (Walzer, 1983:312). 
Consequently he asserts ‘every substantive account of redistributive justice is a 
local account’ (Walzer, 1983:314). This focus on relevance to specific social 
practices and meanings, and the insistence that justice must be done at a ‘local 
level’, again illustrates this argument that we must always focus on a particular 
community and the particular relations of its particular subjects.  
It must also be observed that this need to be particular in one’s approach to 
political relations is also a claim made explicitly by ‘associative theorists’ such as 
Horton. As I mentioned previously, one of the key characteristics of ‘associative 
political obligations’ Horton identifies is that it is ‘particular’ in its approach. We 
may for instance observe in ‘In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part 
One’, Horton puts particular emphasis on the need to understand the particular 
bond ‘we have with our polity’ (Horton, 2007:10) 53. This requirement Horton lays 
out thus emphatically illustrates this focus on particularity which is illustrative of 
a contextual approach.    
I have thus identified the third key argument to what I have called the ‘contextual 
approach’. This argument holds that, given that there can be no general abstract 
                                                          
52 Walzer is likely parodying here Plato’s ‘Simile of the Cave’ from the Republic, in which it is 
argued that the philosopher must ascend from the ‘shadows’ of the cave as to see things as they 
truly exist under the ‘true light’ of the sun (Plato, 2007:241-8).  
53 Emphasis in original.   
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understanding of political relations and that the relation between subject and 
State is informed by the context the subject inhabits, we cannot discuss the issue 
generally but must focus on its particular manifestations within particular contexts.  
 
4. Summary and Limitations of Contextual Approach 
 
I have thus completed my illustration of what I have termed the ‘contextual 
approach’. This approach I have argued can be understood through three closely 
related arguments.   
The first argument was that abstract reason is an insufficient means of 
understanding political relations. This took the form both of the rejection of the 
‘unencumbered rational actor model’, and of the belief that rationality or ‘rational 
principles’ could form a sound basis for the relationship between subject and State. 
This first argument was made on the basis that the ‘unencumbered rational actor’ 
was a false premise which derived conclusions inapplicable to real life situations.  
The second argument was based on the claim that reason could not inspire in the 
subject an affection or loyalty for the State. What we may therefore identify as 
common in these arguments is the belief that abstract reason is not a sufficient 
basis for understanding the relationship between subject and State.  
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Having rejected the use of abstract reason, the second key argument illustrated 
how the ‘contextual approach’ did understand the relation between subject and 
State. Again, we may identify two arguments here. The first is that the subject is 
cultivated in obedience and affection for the State through participation in its 
ceremonies and traditions. Secondly, it was argued that the subject’s 
understanding is shaped by the cultural context he is born into and inhabits, and 
consequently it is this cultural understanding that informs his relationship with the 
State. We may therefore understand common to these arguments is the assertion 
that it is the context the subject inhabits, as constituted by its traditions and 
cultural practices, which informs the relationship between subject and State.  
Finally, I drew attention to the third argument that investigations into political 
relationships must focus, not on general questions, but on particular issues 
relevant to particular circumstances. Thus, when we address the question of the 
relationship between subject and State we must not ask ‘how the subject relates 
to the State’ but ‘how particular subjects relate to a particular State’.  
We may thus summarise the ‘contextual approach’ as an approach which rejects 
universal or general questions of political relationships and instead seeks to 
understand how a particular context informs the relationship between subject and 
State.  
The ‘contextual approach’ has clear strengths in comprehending the subject and 
State relationship. In particular it gives considerable attention to the historical 
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traditions and cultural practices that shape the subject’s relationships. It also 
consequently avoids the generalities of the ‘rational approach’ and offers a more 
detailed and contextually sensitive appreciation of how different subjects may 
relate to different States within different contexts.  
It has also been acknowledged that this particularity of focus and historical 
sensitivity is something that the ‘contextual approach’ shares with the proposed 
‘subjective approach’; both approaches recognise the subject not as an abstract 
being but as a person who is embedded within a particular context and wish to 
consider how such particular subjects relate to a particular States within these 
particular contexts.   
Nonetheless, beyond this recognition of the subject as one ‘historically and 
culturally embedded’, the ‘subjective’ and the ‘contextual’ approaches must part 
ways. This is because the ‘contextual approach’ seeks to understand the subject 
through an appreciation of this context he is embedded in. ‘Context’ consequently 
become the ‘lens’ through which the subject and State relationship is surveyed. 
Thus, it is the context the subject inhabits, and not the subject and his encounters 
and perceptions, which become the primary focus of this approach; it steps back 
from the subject’s position as to gain a more expansive and  detailed appreciation 
of his history and culture in order to better fashion this ‘contextual lens’. In this 
way the ‘contextual approach’ takes the position of a ‘removed’ lens based 
approach.  
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This focus on better understanding of the ‘context’ is illustrated in many of the 
thinkers we have discussed. Horton and Windeknecht for instance argue 
‘Associative Political Obligation’ is less concerned with how the subject gets into 
relationships than ‘the nature of these relationships themselves’ (Horton and 
Windeknecht, 2014:911). This is made further apparent when Horton and 
Windikenecht quote at length the feminist Nancy Hirschmann, whose approach 
they claim to share: ‘[This] orientation requires inquiry into the contextual 
conditions surrounding an obligation and obligated person as to understand the 
context of an obligation’ (Horton and Windiknecht, 2014:911). This focus is 
considerably illustrative of the ‘removed nature’ of the approach as a conscious 
decision is made to stand back from the subject’s perspective as to gain a greater 
appreciation of his context. 
This ‘removed nature’ is further encapsulated in Roger Scruton’s depiction of the 
‘conservative thinker’. In the Meaning of Conservatism, Scruton remarks that 
‘conservatives resemble functionalist anthropologists, in their concern for the 
long-term effects of social customs and political institutions’ (Scruton, 2002:186). 
Thus again we find illustrated this idea that the ‘contextual approach’ stands back 
as to gain a wider and deeper appreciation of the context, its ‘long-term effects’, 
as opposed to exploring the particular encounters that subjects have within this 
context.  
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This committed focus on historical and cultural context can indeed cause problems 
and result in limitations in the ability of the ‘contextual approach’ to properly 
account for the subject and State relationship. It for instance can give the 
expectation that subjects’ behaviour and beliefs are normally orientated by the 
culture they happen to inhabit, and is furthermore not always very 
accommodating or understanding when they do not. To illustrate this let us return 
to the example of Taylor and Quebec. Taylor assumes that the political orientation 
of Francophile Quebecers will be shaped by this culture they inhabit, and does not 
give much consideration to those subjects who might feel otherwise. 
Commentators such as K. Anthony Appiah have consequently argued that Taylor’s 
arguments here ‘cross a line’. In particular Appiah argues that expecting one to 
orientate one’s life around one’s ‘culture’ is equivalent to expecting one to 
orientate one’s life around one’s ’sexuality’ or ‘race’ (Appiah, 1994:163) 54.    
Thus after identifying the importance of the historical and cultural context that 
Quebecer subjects inhabit, the ‘contextual approach’ then retreats from the 
subject’s perspective in order to gain a deeper and more expansive appreciation 
of this context, in order to use it as a ‘lens’ for surveying their relationships. The 
danger this poses is that it assumes that subjects’ political standpoints and 
                                                          
54 This is indeed of particular concern when we consider Taylor also gives a nominative argument 
that ‘group rights’, taking the form of laws hindering the freedom of trade and determining which 
schools certain subjects can attend, should be established in order to preserve this culture 
(Taylor, 1994:52-3,61).   
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behaviours will be orientated by this history and culture. It also further 
marginalises subjects who are not chiefly orientated by this cultural context.  
This also can make the ‘contextual approach’ overtly hostile and unappreciative to 
views which oppose the current historical situation. We may here consider the 
arguments of Hume.  We may recall in ‘On the Original Contract’ Hume dismissed 
the notion of the ‘Social Contract’ as ‘absurd’ because it did not correspond to 
historical realities, and further claimed that anybody who expressed these views 
in public would be perceived as mad. The first limitation with this view is that it 
refuses to consider perspectives which differ or offer alternatives from conditions 
as they currently exist. This consequently would limit the horizons of political 
discussion and opportunities to question, challenge, or change the political status 
quo.  
It also fails to understand any perspective which would seek to offer an alternative 
to political conditions as they historically exists, or indeed why subjects may be 
attracted to arguments that challenge current historical conditions. We have for 
instance observed how Hume dismissed ‘Social Contract’ arguments, such as 
Locke’s, as absurd on the basis that they are contrary to historical reality. He thus 
does not make any effort to actually consider the merits of Locke’s argument.  
Hume, furthermore, does not make a conscious attempt to try and understand 
why Locke’s arguments may be attractive to certain subjects. Indeed this is no 
small oversight considering that, despite Hume’s claims that one would be 
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perceived as mad for expressing such views, Locke’s arguments have proved 
hugely influential and were embraced by a great many subjects. Why this was the 
case is something Hume’s approach fails to consider or appreciate.  
We might observe similar limitations in Burke’s thought. As we saw, Burke 
believed historical traditions were vital in cultivating a positive relationship 
between subject and State. It is thus unsurprising that Burke did not comprehend 
why French subjects had chosen to reject these traditions in the Revolution. In 
Letters to A Member of the National Assembly for instance Burke expresses his 
bewilderment that the French people would abandon the traditions of their 
ancestors. He in particular declares himself perplexed as to why they would 
forsake these traditions for the arguments of a man such as Rousseau (Burke 
1791:309-10). Indeed, Burke exhorts venomous criticism against Rousseau in 
particular; he dubs him the ‘insane Socrates’ of the National Assembly who he 
claims has bewitched the French public, not through thoughts and arguments, but 
by the example of his ‘perverse lifestyle’ (Burke, 1791:306-7). Thus, we find Burke 
unable to appreciate why subjects would chose to reject the traditions and 
historical culture of their polity and embrace an alternative understanding as is 
offered by thinkers like Rousseau. He also illustrates a particular unwillingness to 
understand the standpoint of these ‘alternative’ thinkers, instead dismissing them 
as ‘insane’ or ‘perverse’.  
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It should however not be read here that I am arguing that the ‘contextual approach’ 
is denying the subject the possibility of free choice. On the contrary, I am taking 
issue with the particular way in which this approach uses ‘context’. I am arguing 
that this approach takes the ‘context’ as something which can be used as a tool to 
better understand the subject’s behaviour; it treats it as a background one can 
relate the subject’s action to, or a ‘lens’ through which it may be appreciated. In 
this way the ‘subjective approach’ uses context to examine these issues from a 
largely ‘removed’ or ‘objective’ standpoint.  
This, I argue, is fundamentally different from how the proposed ‘subjective 
approach’ will tackle the issue. In particular I intend the ‘subjective approach’, not 
to use context as a ‘lens’, but to examine how the institutions and  traditions that 
make up this ‘context’ appear to the subject at the existential level, and 
consequently how, and in what way, he may encounter them. The difference 
between my proposed approach and the ‘contextual approach’ is thus primarily of 
positionality: I do not stand from a removed position and use ‘context’ as a ‘lens’, 
but rather attempt to uncover how the contents of this context manifest before 
the subject in a manner in which he may encounter them. I wish to understand 
how such traditions and institutions appear before the subject; what message they 
present to him in such an encounter; and how such encounters shape his 
understanding of self and environment.  
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I may make this clear with one final example form MacIntyre’s After Virtue. 
MacIntyre asks us to imagine a man digging a hole in his back garden. On this 
information alone what the man is doing is unintelligible, and he could indeed be 
interpreted to be partaking in a vast variety of activities: he could be ‘gardening’; 
‘taking exercise’; ‘pleasing his wife’; or indeed he may be ‘preparing for the 
German invasion’. To truly understand his actions we must locate this behaviour 
within the social context he is acting in. If we, for instance, relate his behaviour to 
his marital history, we may understand he that he wishes to keep his spouse happy, 
and that she has recently been dismayed by the condition that the garden has 
fallen into. Thus, when located in this context, we can understand how the man’s 
actions are directed by his desire to please his wife. If we relate it against the 
history of his health we may uncover that the doctor has warned him about his 
weight, and advised him to take more exercise. Thus we may understand this task, 
not just to be ‘pleasing his wife’, but also to be ‘taking exercise’. Indeed, if we 
similarly discovered that the subject had a history of psychotic breakdowns in 
which he believed he was living in 1942 his actions would also become intelligible 
as ‘preparing for a German invasion’; his actions are made intelligible when related 
to the historical context of his poor mental health.  What is however important 
here is that the subject’s actions only become intelligible when related to context, 
or rather the context is used as a lens by which the man’s actions become 
intelligible to we who are observing them (MacIntyre, 2007:206).    
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What is important to draw attention to here is how context is used. Context is used 
as a lens to make the actions clear to the external observer: the context of the 
subject’s marital history makes clear to the observer how his actions can be 
understood to be ‘pleasing his wife’, or the context of his poor mental health 
makes clear how his actions may be understood as ‘preparing for the Germans’. 
The ‘contextual approach’ is thus firmly taking the position of a removed observer 
trying to understand the actions of the subject it observes from a removed 
position. What it does not however consider is how these issues appear at the 
subject’s level; it does not consider the encounters which made him aware of his 
situation and informed his choices.  
The ‘subjective approach’, rather than taking the context as a whole and 
attempting to understand the subject through it, will instead seek to identify and 
understand the particular encounters which informed the subject of his situation 
and shaped his decisions, the encounter for instance with his wife or with his 
doctor. It would ask how these people appeared to the subject; what message 
they communicated to him and in what type of language; and would consider how 
these messages resonated with the subject’s understanding of existence. It thus 
does not attempt to gain a deeper understanding of context through which one 
may examine the subject’s relations, as does the ‘contextual approach’, but rather 
identifies and analyses the particular encounters which made the subject aware 
of his situation and informed his choices.  
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This I believe will help address some of the issues I raised with the contextual 
approach above. As I stated, I do not argue that the ‘contextual approach’ denies 
the subject freedom to act in a contrary fashion to what is expected in his 
particular context, rather I argue that it is not best placed to understand why a 
subject might make such a decision. This is because the approach seeks to 
understand the subject by gaining a deeper understanding of his context, and thus 
when the subject acts in a way contrary to this he falls outwith this paradigm of 
understanding. On the contrary, the ‘subjective approach’ will not seek to gain a 
deeper understanding of context as to form a ‘lens’, but rather it will seek to 
examine and dissect the encounters the subject had with the State within this 
context. In this way, if a subject acts contrary to how the traditions of the State 
sought to encourage, the ‘subjective approach’ will seek to examine what 
encounters may have led to this; what encounters with the State’s traditions may 
have offended the subject rather than cultivate a feeling of affection and 
obligation, and why this may have occurred. This approach will thus seek a more 
intricate understanding of how the subject and State relation is constructed and 
functions, as opposed to one that seeks to understand it by removed observation 
using a particular lens.  
We might therefore understand the ‘subjective approach’ to primarily be a 
different kind of approach to the ‘contextual’: rather than using an objective and 
broad lens based approach, the ‘subjective approach’ seeks to examine particular 
encounters the subject may have with the State, and, by scrutinising the message 
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and image conveyed in these particular encounters, seeks to build a more detailed 
appreciation of how the subject relates to the State. It will seek to do so by 
focusing, not on getting a greater appreciation of the context as a whole, but on 
the particular encounters the subject has with the State within these contexts, and 
the effect these encounters have in informing and shaping the subject and State 
relationship. This is not to say that context is not important to my exploration, and 
indeed a consideration of context will be vital for understanding the subject’s 
encounters. However, context will not be used as a ‘lens’. Indeed, in contrast to a 
lens based approach, I have proposed my ‘subjective approach’ as more akin to a 
sharp instrument which explores the possibility of ‘cutting into’ the relationship to 
excavate and analyse its key components, most notably the ‘encounter’. In light of 
this one may maintain that, despite a similar attention to the subject as embedded 
in context, the proposed ‘subjective approach’ does not wish to gain a better 
understanding of this context but rather will explore the encounters the subject 
has within this context and the perspective he gains of the State from these. In 
this way it can be said to be a different approach in kind to the ‘contextual 
approach’.  
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Chapter Three: The Critical Approach  
 
In this chapter I intend to illustrate what I shall term the ‘critical approach’ to 
understanding the relationship between subject and State. Nonetheless, in 
illustrating this approach and terming it critical, it will be observed that I will come 
across two difficulties. The first is in regards to the ambiguity of the title ‘critical’. 
The second is in regards to how distinctively different the approach offered is from 
the ‘contextual approach’ outlined in the previous chapter.   
Firstly, let me turn to the difficulty in regards to title. It may be observed that the 
title ‘critical’ is rather ambiguous as it could involve a wide range of differing 
approaches and philosophies. It could for instance refer specifically to the ‘Critical 
Theory’ of the Frankfurt School, or it could refer more broadly to a wide range of 
theories that may be described of as ‘critical’ such as Marxism, Poststructuralism, 
and Feminism.  This ambiguity is increased by the fact it is not instantly clear what 
I mean by ‘critical’; what is it that I am saying these approaches are critical of? And 
why?  
The second difficulty pertains to the content of this argument. Many of the 
thinkers discussed in this chapter (predominantly Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) 
focus on the contextual circumstances in which the subject and State relationship 
is embedded. As a consequence, we may find that the arguments offered by a 
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‘critical approach’ often share common ground with those offered by the 
‘contextual approach’. It therefore may not be immediately apparent what makes 
a ‘critical approach’ distinctive from a ‘contextual approach’.  
I would first argue that what is distinctive about the ‘critical approach’ is that it is 
critical of the traditions and cultural practices that constitute the subject’s context. 
In particular this approach argues that traditions and culture do not inform the 
subject about his relationship with the State; traditions and cultural practices on 
the contrary misled him and veil the true nature of this relationship.  
Consequently, what I shall argue to be the first distinctive characteristic of the 
‘critical approach’ is a critical view towards the traditions and culture which 
constitute the context the subject inhabits. In particular it believes such practices 
manipulate the subject and veil from him the true nature of his relationship with 
the State.  
This leads to a second key argument which I will contend is illustrative of the 
‘critical approach’. This is that the true nature of the subject and State relationship 
is one of ‘oppression’. It is in particular typically argued that the State is used as a 
mechanism to oppress and ‘hold down’ the majority of its subjects, usually in the 
interests of a dominant ‘class’ or ‘caste’. This approach consequently assumes that, 
if a subject exists within the modern State, then he is in a condition of ‘oppression’. 
This notion of ‘oppression’ consequently become the ‘lens’ through which the 
‘critical approach’ surveys the subject and State relationship.   
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One may thus contend that, by making an assumption about the subject’s 
condition and using this as a lens to survey his relationship, the ‘critical approach’ 
becomes another instance of a ‘removed approach’. As a consequence, it makes 
the same mistakes other ‘removed vantage point’ approaches are typically guilty 
of making; it overlooks the subject’s actual experiences and perception. In 
particular I will argue that, by using this ‘lens of oppression’  to survey the subject 
and State relationship, the ‘critical approach’ obscures and dismisses many 
perspectives and behaviours that do not correspond with this understanding, 
subjects for instance who do not believe they are being ‘oppressed’ by the State. 
Such perspectives are typically dismissed by attributing to them the deprecatory 
label of ‘false consciousness’ 55 . This notion of ‘false consciousness’ indeed 
discredits alternative understandings in the same manner as ‘barbarism’ and 
‘savagery’ did in the ‘rational approach’56.  
                                                          
55 The term ‘false consciousness’ can be understood to denote the historically embedded 
subject’s inability to recognise the true nature of the institutions he inhabits and is a part of. 
Nonetheless it should be observed that this term has its controversies.  As Terry Eagleton 
observes, although the term is associated with Marx, the phrase ‘false consciousness’ is never 
used by him. Rather the first articulation of the concept must be attributed to Marx’s long-term 
collaborator Friedrich Engels.  The idea of ‘false consciousness’ is also heavily related to the 
Marxist notion of ideology, that is ideology understood as a body of thought used to conceal the 
‘truth’ of class society (Eagleton, 2007:88-9). It is beyond the remit of this thesis to explore the 
debates pertaining ‘false consciousness’, or to try and come to a proper definition of the concept. 
Good discussions are provided in both Eagleton’s work Ideology: An Introduction (2007), and 
Michael Rosen’s On Voluntary Servitude (1996). For my purposes I will use the term ‘false 
consciousness’ firstly when it is explicitly used by the author under discussion. Secondly I will use 
it generally as a means of encapsulating the central idea of the ‘critical approach’ that the subject 
has been misled by culture and tradition and is consequently unaware of the true nature of his 
relationship with the State.  
56 Interestingly Rosen has highlighted that the idea of ‘false consciousness’ predates the Marxist 
usage. In particular it had previously been associated with ideas such as ‘rationalism’, where the 
one with ‘false consciousness’ was the one perceived as ‘irrational’. In particular Rosen 
demonstrates that in Ancient Greece ‘false consciousness’ was associated with the inability of the 
120 
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to illustrate what I have termed the ‘critical 
approach’ and demonstrate its limitations in understanding the relationship 
between subject and State. In order to achieve this aim I will split this chapter into 
three sections. Section one will outline the first key characteristic argument of the 
‘critical approach’: tradition and culture are used to mislead and manipulate the 
subject and veil the true nature of his relationship with the State. The second 
section will then illustrate the second key argument: the true nature of the subject 
and State relationship must be understood through the notion of ‘oppression’. 
Section three will then introduce my criticism of the ‘critical approach’ pertaining 
to its nature as a ‘removed approach’57.  
 
1. Criticism of Tradition and Culture   
 
I begin by examining the arguments of Marx 58 . In the ‘Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right’, Marx argues that the subject is ‘no abstract being squatting 
                                                          
subject to live up to the standards of ‘rationality’ (1996:10). The origins of the idea of ‘false 
consciousness’ are beyond the remit of this thesis, however this is worth highlighting in that it 
furthers the similarity between the ‘rational’ and ‘critical’ approaches.     
57 Before beginning my illustration of the ‘critical approach’, I might again highlight that there are 
a wide range of diverse theories and philosophies to whom the term ‘critical’ may be justly 
attributed. Nonetheless the purpose here is not to give an extensive history of political thought. 
Consequently in what follows I will not analyse all the approaches which could be described as 
‘critical’, but rather shall focus attention on those arguments that most clearly illustrate what I 
have outlined as the ‘critical approach’ above.   
58 This is of course not to say Marx was the ‘first’ to give a ‘critical account’ of political traditions 
and cultures. Thomas Paine had for instance argued in the Eighteenth Century that the traditions 
of the British State were designed to mask and maintain a system of domination and oppression 
that had been established by the Norman Conquest. Thus the State’s traditions he argued were 
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outside the world’, and consequently we must always consider him embedded 
within a particular historical context (Marx, 1992:244). This argument initially 
sounds very similar to the arguments of the ‘contextual approach’ as discussed in 
Chapter Two. However, what I contend is different in Marx’s approach is that this 
argument is not advanced in order to support those traditions and cultures that 
make up the subject’s historical context, but rather as a basis to launch a criticism 
of them.   
Marx’s arguments in the ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ must be 
understood as part of a critique of religion, indeed as a critique of ‘German 
Philosophy’s’ preoccupation with religion. To elaborate, Marx acknowledged and 
agreed with the arguments of certain contemporary German philosophers, most 
notably the ‘Young Hegelians’, that ‘man’ makes religion and God59. However this 
argument did not go far enough for Marx. This is primarily because it did not pay 
due attention to the fact that man does not construct religion from an abstract 
position, from a position ‘squatting outside the world’, but from a historical 
position ‘within the world’. The influence and impact of the subject’s historical and 
                                                          
designed to maintain ‘the authority of the dead over the rights and freedoms of the living’ (Paine, 
1985:42). During the English Civil War we may also observe similar arguments being articulated. 
‘A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens’, a text which appeared in London bookshops in 
1646, for instance maintained that the English Monarchy had been established through the 
Norman Conquest, and that ideas such as ‘kingship’ had been designed to ‘charm’ subjects into 
obedience to this oppressive regime (2007:3). Nonetheless my intention here is not to provide an 
exercise in intellectual history, but rather to provide an illustration of certain approaches. I have 
thus chosen to begin with Marx, not because I believe him to be the first to give what can be 
interpreted as a ‘critical approach’, but because he gives one of the clearest illustrations of such 
an approach.      
59 That Marx’s criticism of ‘German philosophy’ was aimed predominantly at the ‘Young 
Hegelians’ is made explicitly clear in The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 2007:35).  
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material conditions had on his religious beliefs, and indeed his thoughts and ideas 
generally, had consequently not been properly examined. To continue the critique 
of religion, Marx argued, one must consequently examine the historical and social 
context which caused ‘man’ to produce it (Marx, 1992:243-4).  
Following this line of investigation, Marx proposed that religion is only an illusion 
used to veil and ease the suffering caused by the material and economic conditions 
that the subject inhabits, in particular the capitalist means of production. Religion 
was thus the ‘opium of the people’; the release subjects sought from the miseries 
of their historical and economic situation (Marx, 1992:244).   Thus, Marx insisted 
that one should not criticise the idea of religion but rather attack the material 
conditions that forced subjects to alleviate their pain by inventing this imaginary 
future bliss; in order to ‘abolish religion’ one has to abolish the ‘condition that 
requires illusions’ (Marx, 1992:244). As a result, the criticism of religion gave way 
to a larger criticism of the political, social, and economic conditions of society; ‘the 
criticism of heaven turns into a criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the 
criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics’ (Marx, 
1992:245)60. We may thus interpret Marx’s focus on the context as a prerequisite 
for a critique of existing historical and material conditions.  
What we can also however see displayed clearly in this argument is the belief that 
institutions, such as religion, are used as a means to alleviate and veil the real 
                                                          
60 Emphasis in original.   
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structural problems inherent in the context that the subject inhabits. 
Consequently behind this ‘veil’ lies the true means of oppression and exploitation 
which Marx wishes to expose and put to criticism. This illustrates the first key 
argument of the ‘critical approach’ that traditions and cultural practices veil the 
true nature of the subject’s relations.  
This line of argument is further illustrated in The German Ideology, which Marx 
wrote in collaboration with Engels. Here again it is stressed that we must 
understand the subject as embedded within a historical context. In particular, 
Marx and Engels argue that the relations and ideas of subjects originate out of the 
historical and material conditions which they inhabit; ‘Life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life’ (Marx and Engels, 2007:47).  
Nonetheless, once more Marx and Engels not only establish the importance of 
context but also stress that this context misguides subjects in regards to the truth 
about their situation; once more the focus on historical context leads to a critique 
of historical context. This is most clearly illustrated in the chapter ‘Ruling Class and 
Ruling Ideas’.  Here Marx and Engels stress that the ideas and understanding of 
the community are determined by the ideas of the class who hold power; ‘the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time the ruling 
intellectual force’ (Marx, 2007:64)61.   
                                                          
61 Emphasis in original.  
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To elucidate, Marx and Engels understood that this class who had control over the 
material means of production would also have control over the mental means of 
production. This ‘dominant class’ could enforce their ideas and values on those 
who lacked the means of producing their own ideas, namely the ‘subservient class’. 
As a consequence one finds that the value system of the ‘dominant class’ is the 
one that pertains to the ‘epoch’ they control. Thus, during the ascendency of 
feudal aristocracy, ideas such as ‘loyalty’ and ‘honour’ were those which 
characterised relations, and during the dominance of the ‘bourgeoisie capitalist’ it 
was those of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ (Marx and Engels, 2007:65).  
What is important to recognise is that the effect of this ‘hegemony’ of ideas is to 
make the lower class conform to the rules of the class which is in control. To 
explain, as the lower class are led to believe that they share the same values as 
their masters they do not recognise the distinction between their existence and 
their ‘masters’. Consequently, they view the rulers of the polity, not as the 
representatives of just the ruling class, but the representatives of them all. This 
further means that they do not recognise that the order the ruling class establishes 
is a means of maintaining class oppression, but rather are fooled into believing this 
order is in the interest of all. Thus, the overall effect of this is to create a hegemony 
of values which blurs the awareness of class distinctions and veils the fact that 
political institutions are established to serve the interests of a ruling elite (Marx 
and Engels, Marx, 2007:60-8).   
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Thus, despite its claims to be in the universal interests of all, Marx and Engels argue 
that the State’s function is to serve and maintain the ascendency of the 
bourgeoisie. As they emphatically state in the Communist Manifesto; ‘The 
executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engels, 2002:221).  
Marx and Engels thus maintain that traditions and values inherent in the world 
originate in the interests of the ruling class. As a consequence, the nature of 
institutions of the State are distorted, and instead the subject is led to believe that 
such institutions uphold and maintain his interests and values. We may observe 
this as illustrative of the ‘critical approach’ as it argues that the tradition and 
culture that the subject inhabits mislead and deceive him in regards to the true 
nature of his relationship with the State62.   
                                                          
62 It should be noted that Marx often considers the idea of the ‘individual subject’ who is ‘free’ 
and has the capacity of choice is an illusion. Instead Marx argues that the reality of the subject is 
rather expressed in his class. In the German Ideology Marx and Engels explain that, although one 
in a bourgeoisie society may consider himself to be a free individual, in reality his behaviour and 
actions are predetermined by the ‘class’ he was assigned to at birth (Marx and Engels, 2007:82). 
The State, being the political manifestation of bourgeoisie superiority, thus upholds this illusion 
through its institutions. This predetermining of subjects by class can only be addressed when the 
current system is overthrown and replaced with an order in which there are no class 
antagonisms, such as in the post-bourgeoisie society where private property has been abolished 
and the means of production are shared by all. This is why Marx insists that subjects should not 
resist the State and seek freedoms as ‘individuals’ or through pursuits of ‘individual rights’, which 
are again perceived as a bourgeoisie illusion, but as a ‘group’ or ‘class’ (Marx and Engels, 
2007:83). This interpretation must also be understood against Marx’s understanding of 
‘alienation’ as advanced in the ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’.  Here Marx argues that 
‘man’ is alienated from ‘man’ and from his ‘species being’. To elucidate, Marx claims that what 
separates man from other animals is that he will continue to produce beyond the compulsion of 
physical need. As a result man is able to refashion nature and recognise himself objectively in his 
creation. It is as such a producer that man may realise his ‘species-being’ and such work is 
considered ‘species life’ (Marx, 1992:329). However, in the current economic system nearly all of 
man’s work is taken up in providing for his subsistence and is not employed in this creative 
activity. As a consequence he does not live a ‘human life’, that is according to his ‘species being’, 
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It should also be drawn to attention here that Marx and Engels’ belief that 
tradition and culture mislead the subject lead them to the normative claim that 
the aim of critique should be to overthrow these illusions and reveal the true 
nature of the subject’s relationships. In the ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ 
Marx insists the purpose of his critique is to cast off the subject’s illusions and 
reveal to him the true nature of his existence (Marx, 1992:244). Similarly, Marx 
and Engels, in the ‘Preface’ to The German Ideology, make clear the text’s 
intentions of ‘debunking myths’. More precisely, they intend to reveal that the 
ideas of their age are not ‘universal’ but are rather a product of the German middle 
class (Marx and Engels, 2007:37). Thus, as an accompaniment to this argument 
that contextual circumstances mislead the subject in regards to his true relations, 
                                                          
but rather an animal life of mere survival. He is consequently alienated from his ‘species being’ 
(Marx, 1992:329). Furthermore as a consequence of this the subject does not observe other men 
as in accordance to the ‘species being’ either. On the contrary, being trapped in the current 
economic system, the subject will recognise the ‘other’ as is determined by the economic 
situation.  Consequently the ‘worker’ will see the other as a ‘capitalist’. Thus Marx asserts that 
man is also alienated ‘from man’ as when seeing another person he does not recognise him as a 
‘human’ who shares his ‘universal species being’ but as an antagonist set against him. The only 
way to overcome this antagonism and alienation is to abolish the system that propagates it, 
namely private property and the State (Marx, 1992:330-2). What is clear here is that for Marx the 
idea of a ‘free individual’ within the contemporary State is an illusion. One can only be free with 
the abolishment of the capitalist system and the reconciliation with of man with his ‘species 
being’. This further illustrates both characteristics of the ‘critical approach’. Firstly that present 
culture is an illusion that masks the true nature of the subject and State relationship in his 
criticism of the bourgeoisie ideas of ‘individual freedom’. Second that the true nature of the State 
is to oppress the subject, as it manifests from the alienation caused by the present economic 
system. Finally it also reveals the limitations of the Marxist approach as a ‘removed approach’. 
This is as a result of the fact Marx approaches the problem from what he understands as the 
‘universal species being of man’. His inquiries are consequently directed by this assumption of 
what is essential to man, dismissing forms of behaviour which do not correspond to this model as 
‘alienation’.  
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so comes the normative instance that such illusions need to be criticised and 
exposed. I will return to this normative idea in section two.   
Subsequent forms of ‘Marxism’ similarly draw attention to how tradition and 
culture mislead and manipulate the subject. This is evident in the Critical Theory 
of the Frankfurt School. Scholars such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
demonstrated how mass culture, or ‘the culture industry’, could be used by 
governments to control their subjects (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997:165). 
Indeed, Adorno’s study on Fascist propaganda and Freudian Psychoanalysis draws 
specific attention to how the Nazi regime used mass culture to supress subjects 
and turn them into an ‘irrational mass’, a conversion which made governing them 
more straightforward (Adorno, 2001:135).  
In One Dimensional Man Herbert Marcuse similarly discusses how the Nazi State 
veiled its true purpose to its subjects. In particular, he highlights how the highly 
rational and efficient technical apparatus of the Nazi State made its actions appear 
rational and justified, thus concealing the repugnant and irrational philosophy it 
truly served; the rationality of the system ‘served to make individuals incapable of 
seeing “behind” the machinery those who used it, those who profited from it, and 
those who bought it” (Marcuse, 2002:194). However, Marcuse argues it is not just 
the subjects of the Nazi State who are deceived in such a manner but also the 
subjects of the industrial capitalist State. In particular, he argues that the capitalist 
system creates ‘false needs’ which deceive subjects into believing they need the 
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system and must obey its institutions. In One Dimensional Man Marcuse cites 
numerous examples of such dependency on ‘false needs’, such as the ‘typist’ who 
requires make up to feel as beautiful as her boss’s daughter and the man who feels 
he can ‘find his soul’ in an automobile, but nonetheless the purpose of these ‘false 
needs’ is always to veil the true nature of capitalist society and trick subjects into 
dependency and feelings of obligation towards capitalist society (Marcuse, 
2002:10-11).  
Similarly, when conceptualising the relationship between subject and State, 
Antonio Gramsci claimed the State educated the subject to a point where he could 
be put to productive use in order to benefit the hegemonic class (Gramsci, 
1971:258). Gramsci, in particular, built upon the notion that the Bourgeoisie State 
maintains its power by creating hegemony of values. As Richard Bellamy and 
Darrow Schecter explain, Gramsci argued that the modern State diffused its values 
through institutions ranging from local government and schools to mass media 
and trade unions. This ‘diffusion of values’ had the effect of socialising subjects 
into obedience to the State (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993:129-30).   
Common to all these arguments can be seen the view that contextual practices 
are used to manipulate the subject into obedience towards the State, thus 
illustrating the core argument that tradition and culture are used to veil the 
relationship between subject and State whilst manipulating the former into 
obedience to the latter.  
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We may see the argument that tradition and culture manipulate, or ‘condition’, 
the subject towards obedience illustrated also by Friedrich Nietzsche. Like Marx 
and Engels, Nietzsche also stressed that we should not take the values we 
currently have as ‘given’, and rather argues they veil the true nature of our 
relations.  A ‘critique’ of these values is the particular task Nietzsche sets himself 
in the Genealogy of Morality.  
In the ‘Second Essay’ of the Genealogy, Nietzsche argues that ‘culture’ has been 
used to shape the subject into an ‘individual’ suitable for life in society. ‘Man’ had 
to be transformed from an impulsive ‘wild animal’ into something more 
predictable and easily manged. This, Nietzsche assures us, was achieved through 
the use of ‘custom’. Traditional and cultural practices were used to mould the 
subject by establishing in him the habits and behaviour that would render him 
suitable for life in society. This was not achieved without cruelty. In the Genealogy 
Nietzsche gives graphic depictions of methods of punishments and enforcement 
which were used to breed a docile creature which could be easily managed 
(Nietzsche, 2007:35-7).  
The most important features culture ‘bred’ into the subject was, firstly, an ability 
to keep promises, and secondly an idea of debt. The ability to keep promises was 
conditioned through severe tortures and punishments which used fear to teach 
the subject the consequence of breaking them (Nietzsche, 2007:36-7). This, 
secondly, installed in the subject the idea of the ‘creditor and debtor’ relationship, 
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for knowing that he ‘promised’ something to the other the subject is aware he is 
in his debt. Acts of torture used to ‘punish’ the subject when he fails to fulfil his 
debts further cultivate in him the belief that to not give what is owed is wrong. 
This breeds a sense of ‘guilt’ into the subject along with the notion of debt 
(Nietzsche, 2007:39-40).  
This is particularly important when it comes to the relationship between the 
subject and the State. Nietzsche argues that the subject is taught to believe that 
he owes the community for the sheltered and peaceful life he enjoys. 
Consequently, the subject also feels a debt to the community and supposes 
himself obliged to obey it (Nietzsche, 2007:46-7). The main orchestrator and 
beneficiary of this ‘breeding’ process was none other than the State. Thus, we may 
understand that the subject is led to believe he ‘owes’ the State for his security 
and protection, and subsequently the notions of guilt and fear of punishment 
ensure that the subject remains obedient to the State as to fulfil this debt.  
We can thus see that Nietzsche held that the State used culture and tradition to 
mould its subjects into obedience. Thus, Nietzsche subsequently contends that 
any feeling of obligation the subject may feel toward the State is an illusion 
cultivated through this sense of debt and guilt. This illustrates the first key 
argument of the ‘critical approach’ that traditions and culture cultivate in the 
subject a false perception of his relationship to the State.   
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Nietzsche’s account of how culture ‘shaped’ the subject into obedience is both 
graphic and cryptic. It is also a deal more ‘imaginative’ and ‘abstract’ than the 
historical analysis of Marx and Engels. Nonetheless, it still illustrates this 
characteristic argument of the ‘critical approach’: tradition and culture are used 
to manipulate the subject in order to make him obedient to the State. As Nietzsche 
claims: custom is the subject’s ‘social straightjacket’ (Nietzsche, 2007:36).  
A more historically focused account of how obligation is ‘bred’ into the subject 
may be found in the works of Poststructuralist thinkers63. Michel Foucault, for 
instance, has explored the history of State institutions, and in particular the effect 
these institutions have in cultivating subjects in political obedience. In Discipline 
and Punish Foucault focused his attention on the evolution of the prison and 
                                                          
63 It is worth here outlining the self-conscious distancing of themselves from Marxism that 
Poststructuralists often make. Gilles Deleuze has claimed that poststructuralism differs from 
Marxism in that it does not look for one area of contestation with dominant structures, such as 
‘class’, but rather highlights the ‘innumerable’ points of contestation in such power-relations’ 
(Deleuze, 1988:22-3). Michel Foucault similarly distances himself from Marxism. Foucault 
critiques the central Marxist assumption that all forms of domination have at their basis an 
economic explanation, thus denouncing the notion of a ‘superstructure’ which can explain all 
political relations (Foucault, 2004:14). This criticism is also linked to Foucault’s larger criticism of 
‘science’. ‘Science’ Foucault understands as a particular power practice in the West which 
empowers certain discourses and those who speak them, and subsequently excludes those which 
fall outside the ‘scientific paradigm’. Thus when criticising Marxism for trying to be ‘scientific’, 
Foucault is accusing Marxism for attempting to assert one interpretation of political relationships 
is correct, ‘to put it on the throne’, and exclude and devalue all forms of knowledge and 
discourse which fall outside its paradigm (Foucault, 2004:10).  Consequently we observe Foucault 
criticising Marxism for constructing one ‘meta-theory’ about political relationships, and its 
subsequent subjugation and exclusion of other understandings. Thus Foucault sees the task of 
much of his work to ‘reactivate local knowledge’ against the ‘scientific hierarchicaliziation of 
knowledge’ (Foucault, 2004:10). Specifically in regards to political relationships Foucault attempts 
to examine the ‘multiple subjugations that take place and function within the social body’ 
(Foucault, 2004:27). We may observe here Foucault highlighting the same key difference 
between his approach and Marxism that Deleuze identifies; whilst the former focuses on one 
form of subjugation, the latter seeks to identify and examine multiple.   
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discussed how its disciplinary techniques fashion subjects into an ‘automatic 
docility’ and make them more suitable for political control (Foucault, 1977:169)64. 
To summarise: the first key argument of what I have denoted the ‘critical 
approach’: it is contended that subjects are misled in regard to their relationship 
with the State by the culture and traditions of the context which they inhabit. 
Examples of this include fooling the subject into thinking that the ruling class 
serves the interests of all and not just themselves, the creation of ‘false needs’, 
and techniques of domination which cultivate and mould the subject into political 
obedience.  
I have also highlighted in this approach a normative argument that, given that the 
relationship the subject believes he has to the State is a delusion, philosophical 
critique ought to concern itself with removing this illusion. This critique 
consequently leads me to the second key argument of the ‘critical approach’: what 
is perceived as the ‘true nature’ of the subject and State relationship.  
 
 
 
                                                          
64 Across Foucault’s thought he offers many examples in which the culture and institutions the 
subject inhabits fashion him towards a certain way of being. It is not however necessary to 
describe each of these in detail as what I am rather attempting to provide is ‘snapshots’ of these 
arguments as aid me in illustrating the ‘critical approach’.  
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2. ‘Oppression’ as the True relationship between Subject and 
State  
 
To illustrate this second key argument I again turn to Marx and Engels. As we 
saw in section one, in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels claimed that 
the State was tasked with managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie (Marx and 
Engels, 2002:221). We may infer from this that the State is predominantly a 
tool used to maintain the hegemon of the bourgeoisie. Consequently, the true 
nature between the subject and State, or at least of the proletariat subject, 
was that of oppression; the State serves to oppress and ‘hold down’ the 
subject in order to maintain the hegemony of the dominant ‘class’.  Thus, it 
follows that if the subject exists within a ‘State’ it can be assumed he exists in 
a condition of ‘oppression’; it is this notion of ‘oppression’ which consequently 
must constitute the lens through which we must consider his relations.   
This can be further illustrated when we consider Engels’ investigation into the 
origins of the State in The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State. 
Engels argues that the State has its historical origins in antagonisms that arise 
between two classes. He maintains that the State was initially intended to keep 
such antagonisms in check. Nonetheless, except in certain ‘special 
circumstances’, the State more often than not falls under the control of the 
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most dominant class (Engels, 2010:210) 65. As a consequence it serves to hold 
down and exploit the oppressed class. Thus Engels asserts, in history;     
‘The ancient State was, above all, the state of the slave owners for holding 
down the slaves, just as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for 
holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern 
representative state is an instrument for exploiting wage labour by capital’ 
(Engels, 2010:210). 
Thus what we may see illustrated here is the belief that the ‘true’ nature of the 
relationship between subject, or at ‘least the proletariat subject’, and State is 
one in which the latter holds down and exploits the former in the interest of a 
dominant class. Thus, understanding of the relationship between subject and 
State is centred upon an understanding of the State as a mechanism of 
oppression.  
This understanding of the State as a mechanism of class oppression is also 
notable in the writings of later ‘Marxist’ revolutionaries. Vladimir Lenin, in The 
State and Revolution, describes the State as ‘a special machine for suppression’. 
This also leads Lenin to insist that, if man is to be emancipated, then a violent 
revolution is required to ‘smash’, ‘break’ and ‘shatter’ the ‘machine’ (Lenin, 
                                                          
65 Engels asserts that these ‘special circumstances’ arise when the strength between the two 
classes is so equal that the State gains an independent existence as mediator between the two. 
Such historical instances he cities as examples of this are the French Absolute Monarchy in the 
Seventeenth Century, the ‘Bonapartism’ of the First and Second French Empire, and the German 
Empire under the governance of Otto Von Bismarck (Engels, 2010:210).  
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1992:81, 96). Thus, we may observe the argument that the State is a 
mechanism for class oppression leading to an argument that the State must be 
destroyed if oppression is to be ended.  
I should also draw attention to other arguments which, although they do not 
maintain the economic class analysis of Marx and Engels, nonetheless still 
claim that the subject and State relationship is characterised by oppression. 
We may recall for instance in section one I highlighted Nietzsche’s argument 
that the State used culture to condition the subject for obedience. In the 
Genealogy Nietzsche proceeds to state that, although he uses the word ‘State’, 
it is obvious he in fact means ‘some pack of blond beasts of prey; a conqueror 
and master race’ (Nietzsche, 2007:58). Nietzsche goes on to claim that these 
‘beasts’ were able to subject the people to their rule and then mould them 
into obedience. ‘States’ thus originate from conquest and the creation of a 
‘structure of domination’ to maintain the conquering caste’s rule (Nietzsche, 
2007:58-9). Again, this argument illustrates the assumption that the 
relationship between subject and State is primarily one of oppression. 
Consequently, it is again assumed that if a State exists then a class of subjects 
must be under the conditions of oppression, and it is consequently through 
this lens of oppression that we must consider subjects’ relationships66.  
                                                          
66 In my illustration here I have focused predominantly on oppression as takes the form of ‘class’. 
However it should be observed that ‘class’ is far from the only form that ‘oppression’ has been 
identified in. Increasingly there has been a focus on ‘gender oppression’. In her seminal work in 
feminist theory Simone de Beauvoir for instance drew attention to the relation of oppression 
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3. Summary and Limitations of the ‘Critical Approach’  
 
I shall now summarise my account of the ‘critical approach’. The first key 
argument of this approach is that the traditions and cultural practices which 
constitute the subject’s context misdirect him and veil the true nature of his 
relationship with the State. Furthermore, such practices not only mislead him, 
but in fact actively manipulate him and ‘shape’ him for political obedience. 
Perceiving such misdirection and manipulation in political practices and 
institutions, the ‘critical approach’ consequently insists that these illusions 
must be lifted so that the ‘true’ nature of the subject and State relationship is 
revealed.  
This leads to the second key argument of the ‘critical approach’: the true 
nature of the relationship between subject and State is one of ‘oppression’. It 
is argued that the State attempts to repress and ‘hold down’ the subject, 
typically in order to maintain the dominance of one ‘political elite’ or ‘class’. 
Thus, it is assumed that if a State exists then subjects must be in a condition of 
                                                          
between ‘man’ and ‘women’ (Beauvoir, 2009:9). Out of such thought has come the argument 
that institutions such as the State do not just oppress a certain class but also a certain gender. 
Ann Tickenr has for instance highlighted how feminist scholars maintain that States ‘promote and 
support policy practices primarily in the interest of men’ (Tickner, 2001:21). Nonetheless it will be 
recalled that the purpose of this chapter is to give an illustration of the ‘critical approach’, and 
not to give all-encompassing comprehensive survey or history of such an approach. I therefore 
chose to focus on the cases where oppression by ‘class’ was featured most predominantly purely 
because I found it most illustrative of this approach.  
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oppression, and subsequently it is this understanding of oppression that must 
be used as a lens to survey the subject and State relationship.  
The use of this lens nonetheless results in the ‘critical approach’ adopting a 
‘removed vantage point’. In particular, the approach comes to the question of 
the subject’s relationship with the State from its assumption that the State 
‘oppresses the subject’. It consequently sets itself the task of ‘unmasking’ this 
system of oppression. Thus this approach does not focus primarily on the 
subject, but rather attempts to demonstrate the ’truths’ of his situation which 
transcend him. Consequently, this approach must step back from the 
perspective of the subject where tradition and culture are taken as they 
appear, and consequently their ‘underlying truths’ are hidden, and instead 
take a ‘removed vantage point’ from which these ‘underlying truths’ may be 
observed and identified. This is perhaps best illustrated by Marx and his 
attempts to explain the relationship between subject and State using 
economic metatheory and historical materialism67.  
This ‘removed perspective’ in Marx’s thought is particularly evident in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’, where Marx turns his attention towards the particular 
political issue of Jewish Emancipation. As we saw earlier, religious belief for 
                                                          
67 Nonetheless we may observe even approaches such as Foucault’s, which claim to examine 
‘localised power’ and study power at its ‘external face’, nonetheless still focus not on the subject 
but on the ‘techniques and tactics’ of domination. It is consequently a removed historical 
perspective, one from which he may observe the different forms of subjugation: how they 
function, and the connections between them, that Foucault takes (Foucault, 2004:34). 
138 
 
Marx was a result of the material conditions which the subject inhabited. 
Consequently, solving such issues for Marx became a matter of exploring the 
material and historical conditions of oppression and seeking means to 
emancipate the subject from them. Marx therefore argues that the answer to 
this question cannot be found by giving the Jewish population certain rights. 
On the contrary, as political relationships and religious beliefs are a 
consequence of the oppression inherent in the capitalist economic system, 
one must look to emancipate all mankind from this system as a whole. Once 
such emancipation is achieved these other forms of oppression will 
subsequently disappear.  Thus, Marx argues, using the term ‘Judaism’ as a 
symbol for capitalism as a whole: ‘Jews should not seek emancipation, but the 
world must seek emancipation from Judaism’ (Marx, 1992:241).  
What is clear here is that Marx never attempts to understand what it means 
for the subject to ‘be a Jew’; he never considers the experiences that led to the 
subject’s faith, nor how the subject understands this faith himself and how it 
informs his relations with others.  On the contrary, Marx asserts that the 
subject’s religion is the consequence of a meta-economic structure and insists 
that this problem can only be elevated by addressing this superstructure. Thus 
Marx can be said to view the problem from a ‘removed vantage’ point where 
the subject’s relationships are explained through superstructures. He does not 
take into consideration the subject’s experiences or consider his perspective. 
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Consequently, whatever the subject himself may understand or feel about his 
faith, Marx holds that the ‘truth’ behind it is always oppression68.  
The consequence of this ‘removed approach’ is that the subject’s actual 
encounters, and the perspective he gains from these, are overlooked as the 
‘critical approach’ attempts to explore and ‘unmask’ the forms of oppression 
which it contends constitutes the ‘truth’ of this relationship.  In this way it has 
similar limitations to the ‘rational approach’; as it bases its approach on a prior 
assumption made about the subject the ‘critical approach’  overlooks the 
actual experiences and perception of subjects who inhabit the State.  
The comparisons between the ‘rational’ and ‘critical’ approaches do not 
however end with the making of prior assumptions. It will be recalled in 
Chapter One I contended that when a subject’s perspective or behaviour did 
not correspond with the ‘rational approach’s’ assumption of the subject as 
rational it was dismissed as ‘ignorant’, and often had depreciatory labels 
attached to it such as ‘barbarism’ or ‘savagery’. In the same way, when the 
                                                          
68 There of course other examples of such thinking. We might for instance observe Gramsci, 
especially in his ‘pre-prison’ writings, accounts for such behaviour as paying football and taking 
cocaine as particular by-products of the capitalist economic system.   He for instance argues that 
popularity of cocaine is a result of the capitalist system creating ‘people’ who have no worries or 
scruples (Gramsci, 1994:72). Football he argues is also a product of ‘capitalist individualism’ 
which seeks to accompany its ‘economic and political freedom’ with a sense of ‘freedom of spirit’ 
and ‘tolerance of the opposition’ (Gramsci, 1994:74). This is in contrast the Italian card game 
Scopone, whose opaque rules often result in confusion and violence, which originates in 
countries which are economically, politically and spiritually ‘backward’ (Gramsci, 1994:73-4). 
What we can observe here is that Gramsci seeks to explain such behaviour by relating it to 
underlying economic and political orders that lie beyond the subject’s consciousness. Thus the 
subject’s encounters and experiences with say drug addiction or sport are overlooked as 
explanation for them is sought in greater forces which subjects are themselves unaware of.   
140 
 
subject does not behave or perceive himself as ‘oppressed’, the ‘critical 
approach’ claims this is because he has been deceived by the culture and 
institutions which veil the true nature of the State. Subsequently those who 
do not share the ‘critical approach’s’ central assumption that the subject is 
being oppressed are said to be suffering from a ‘false consciousness’.  
Thus, for Marx, the person who believes in the possibility of Jewish 
emancipation within the State is ignorant to the ‘truth’ of the problem. The 
subject who does not believe that his ‘social superiors’ oppress him is similarly 
deluded. We may for instance observe Marx lamenting at the deluded nature 
of British subjects who cannot recognise that ‘aristocrats’ such as the Duchess 
of Sutherland oppress and abuse their tenants in exactly the same way as the 
American slave owner oppresses his slaves (Marx, 2007:119)69. We have also 
observed how, for Marcuse, behaviour ranging from Nazism to the desire for 
cars and make-up was perceived as a ‘false consciousness’ cultivated in order 
to ensure the dependency of the subject on society.  We might similarly 
observe Nietzsche dismissing political obligation towards the State as ‘idol 
worship’ and a symptom of ‘herd-mentality’ (Nietzsche 2003:75-7) 70.  
                                                          
69 Marx is commenting on what he believed was the hypocrisy of the ‘Stafford house assembly of 
Ladies’ commentating on the issue of slavery in the Southern States of America. Marx finds this 
hypocritical as the president of the assembly was the Duchess of Sutherland who he claims made 
her fortune from exploiting her Scottish tenants before forcefully evicting them from her land. 
Such exploitation is the same for Marx as the direct exploitation of the salve owner. However the 
traditions and culture of Britain veil this fact (Marx, 2007).  
70 Another particularly interesting illustration of this comes from the philosophical anarchist A.J. 
Simmons. Simmons in particular contends that the feeling of belonging we have for one’s country 
of birth can be understood as a form of ‘false consciousness’ (Simmons, 1996:264).   
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Thus I contend that the limitations of the ‘critical approach’ stem from its 
assumption that the subject who exists within a State must be oppressed, and 
that we must use ‘oppression’ as the lens through which to survey his 
relationship with the State. The actual experiences and perspective of the 
subject are subsequently overlooked as primacy is given to understanding and 
unveiling systems of oppression. Furthermore, those subjects who do not 
believe themselves to be oppressed are dismissed on the basis that they have 
been deceived; beliefs that do not share the ‘critical approach’s’ central 
assumption that a subject existing within a State is oppressed are explained 
away as instances of ‘false consciousness’.   
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Part II  
 
Chapter Four: Interpreting Kierkegaard - 
Encounters and Choice 
 
I have now completed my survey of the three predominate approaches to the 
question of the subject and State relationship and highlighted their limitations. I 
will now proceed in part two of this thesis to explore the proposed ‘subjective 
approach’.  
Nonetheless, before I proceed I will need to summarise what I argued in Part One 
as to identify what, in particular, I will need to investigate in Part Two in order to 
explore the ‘subjective approach’.  
I argued that the limitations of the three approaches discussed arose from their 
nature as ‘removed approaches’. A removed approach I denoted as an approach 
which steps back from the subject’s experiences and perception in order to gain a 
perspective from which it might survey the subject and State through its preferred 
lens.  
The approach that was perhaps most illustrative of a ‘removed approach’ was the 
‘rational approach’. I contended that this approach considered the question of the 
subject and State relationship, not from how it was formulated ‘within the world’, 
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but on the basis of a priori conception of reason. As a consequence, it was not the 
subject who actually inhabited and experienced the State who was given priority 
of focus, but rather this assumed ‘rational being’. One of the further troubling 
limitations which resulted from this was the ‘rational approach’s’ failure to 
conceptualise behaviour and orientations which fell outwith the lens of 
‘rationality’. Such orientations and positions were consequently marginalised and 
dismissed as ‘unintelligible’ and ‘ignorant’, and depreciative term such as 
‘savagery’ and ‘barbarianism’ were used to describe them.  
The second approach I illustrated was the ‘contextual approach’. In Chapter Two I 
argued that the ‘contextual approach’ did share some common ground with the 
‘subjective approach’ I intend to explore. This common ground was the focus on 
particular subjects as they relate to particular States within a particular context. 
However, beyond this point my aspirations for the ‘subjective approach’ diverge 
with the ‘contextual’. This is because, having identified the subject as one who 
exists within a particular context, the ‘contextual approach’ then proceeds to try 
and use this context as a lens to explain the subject’s relationship. It subsequently 
steps back from the subject and his particular experiences as to gain a more 
expansive and in depth understanding of the context from which it may develop 
its ‘contextual lens’. As a consequence of this, the subject, his encounters, and the 
perception he gains from these encounters, is overlooked. Thus my proposed 
‘subjective approach’ must here part ways from the ‘contextual’ as I do not wish 
to step back from the subject to gain a better perspective on his historical context, 
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but rather move in towards the subject as to explore the particular encounters he 
has with the State, and to further explore how these encounters shape and inform 
their relationship.    
The third approach I examined was the ‘critical approach’. I contended that, like 
the ‘rational approach’, the ‘critical approach’s’ limitation derived from the priori 
assumption it carried forth into its examination of the subject and State 
relationship. In particular it maintained that culture and traditions were used as 
veils to deceive the subject as to the ‘true nature’ of his relationship with the State. 
The ‘true nature’ of this relationship was contended to be one of oppression; it 
was maintained that the State was primarily a mechanism used to oppress 
subjects and maintain the hegemony of a dominant ‘class’ or ‘caste’. Consequently, 
it was assumed that if the subject inhabits a State he exists in a condition of 
‘oppression’, and thus this notion of ‘oppression’ became the lens through which 
the subject and State relationship was surveyed. The consequential limitations of 
this approach were firstly that the subject’s experiences and perceptions were 
overlooked as this approach focused on the mechanisms of oppression.  Secondly, 
perspectives that did not correlate with this assumption of ‘oppression’, that is 
subjects who did not believe they were oppressed, were dismissed as ‘false 
consciousness’.  
To summarise: my investigation of these three approaches I may say that, 
although each is unique and brings something different to the investigation, a 
145 
 
central limitation of each approach lies in the fact that they take a ‘removed 
approach’ to understanding the subject and State relationship. They make certain 
assumptions about the subject and the State: that the subject is rational; can be 
understood to act according to the context he exists in; or is oppressed by the 
State, and from this construct a lens with which to examine the relationship 
between the two. The first problem inherent in such an approach is that it 
overlooks the subject’s actual experiences and perception as attention is 
concentrated on developing and using the preferred lens. The second problem is 
that, whilst these lenses may bring into focus certain aspects of the relationship, 
they fail to recognise others. Subject orientations or behaviour which 
consequently fall outwith this lens are dismissed through the attribution of labels 
such as ‘barbarism’ or ‘false consciousness’.    
It follows from this that a recommendation in devising an alternate approach to 
the subject and State relationship would be to avoid making a priori assumptions 
about the subject, State, or the relationship between the two. However, a criticism 
could be levied against such a suggestion that, if one was to make no assumptions 
at all about the nature of the subject, one would have a very intangible and 
ambiguous notion of the issue one was exploring. If for instance one proceeded to 
argue that one cannot assume that the subject is rational, informed by his cultural 
context, nor ‘oppressed’, what can one assume about the subject? Such a lens 
which made no assumptions might not exclude any orientations or forms of 
behaviour, but nevertheless would shed very little light on the relationship.  
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This is however to mistake my intention in exploring a ‘subjective approach’. I do 
not intend for instance to explore a ‘subjective approach’ with the hope of 
introducing a ‘fourth lens’. On the contrary with the ‘subjective approach’ I want 
to explore a different method with which one may investigate the subject and 
State relationship; an approach which does not focus on the selection of lenses. 
Instead, what I want to explore with the ‘subjective approach’ is a particular 
moment shared between the subject and State. I want to explore what this 
moment entails and how the relationship between subject and State is effected 
by this moment. This particular moment I wish to explore is the moment of ‘the 
encounter’: the moment in time in which the subject encounters the State that he 
inhabits.  
This is what I mean by the desire to ‘step into’ the relationship, for I do not literally 
mean to ‘step into’ a particular existing subject’s perspective as such a feat is 
physically impossible. Rather, I wish to isolate and examine this moment of the 
encounter. I wish to ‘step in’ in the sense that I want to explore how the State 
manifests itself existentially in a manner which the subject may encounter it. I wish 
to ask ‘what does the State convey to the subject in this encounter?’ I want to 
further explore how the subject receives this message, how does he respond, and 
ultimately how does the relationship between himself and the State grow out of 
this encounter.  
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Indeed, rather than a ‘broad lens’ through which one  may stand back and observe 
this relationship, one might imagine the ‘subjective approach’ as a sharp and 
delicate instrument, like a surgeon’s knife, with which one may cut into this 
relationship and excavate this key moment of the encounter.  By then 
investigating the nature of this ‘encounter’, I subsequently hope to open up the 
exploration of an alternate way of understanding the subject and State 
relationship.  
Exploring the possibility of ‘subjective approach’ is thus the intention of Part Two 
of this thesis. Chapter Four will begin by providing an interpretation of the key 
concepts which will be used in this exploration from the philosophy of Kierkegaard. 
Chapter Five will then provide a reinterpretation of these concepts so as to render 
them more suitable for the more ‘political’ nature of my investigation. Chapter Six 
will finally build upon this reinterpretation to begin an exploration of the subject’s 
encounters with the State.  
 I will thus in this chapter begin gathering and investigating the concepts which will 
guide me through the exploration of a ‘subjective approach’. In the introduction I 
explained that my understanding of ‘subjective’ was inspired by the thought of 
Kierkegaard. It will consequently be to Kierkegaard’s though that I shall turn to 
gather my materials. I will in particular seek to render an interpretation of his 
‘encounter’, as it is the particular moment the subject ‘encounters’ the State 
which will be at the centre of my exploration of the ‘subjective approach’. I will 
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however not only need to consider the ‘encounter’ but also the effects this 
encounter has on the subject. I will also need to consider Kierkegaard’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘self’. Thus, it is to gain an interpretation of these 
concepts from Kierkegaard which will be the main focus of this chapter.  
This chapter will be split into five sections. Section one will begin with a short 
intellectual biography of Kierkegaard, as to introduce the figure and provide some 
background.  
Section Two will then examine Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the theory of 
recollection. The reason for this is that the attention Kierkegaard gives to the 
‘external encounter’ appears to arise from what he saw as the inability of Platonic 
recollection to account for external factors and experiences in the development 
of the human self. As much of Kierkegaard’s thought in regards to the ‘encounter’ 
stems from this criticism, it is consequently the best debarking point for my 
investigation.  
I will then proceed in section three to investigate Kierkegaard’s alternative theory 
of human understanding and development as is found in his concept of ‘repetition’. 
Due to the obscurity of ‘repetition’, and its close relationship to Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the ‘self’, I will carry out my investigation by primarily focusing 
on Kierkegaard’s understanding of ‘self-development’. This investigation of 
‘repetition’ and ‘self’ will be the focus of section two.  
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Section four will then turn to address a tension in Kierkegaard’s thought. This 
tension it will be argued exists between his concepts of the ‘encounter’ and of ‘self’ 
in regards to the subject’s capacity to make free choices. Consequently, section 
three will primarily focus on Kierkegaard’s understanding of freedom and attempt 
to reconcile this tension.  
Having thus explored Kierkegaard’s concepts of the ‘encounter’ and ‘self’, and 
further addressed the tensions between the two, I will then turn to consider a 
‘failed encounter’. Thus section five will explore the ‘failed encounter’ as is found 
in Kierkegaard’s concept of ‘offence’.  
Finally, in the ‘Summary and Conclusion’, I will bring these aspects together to 
provide an interpretation of Kierkegaard and his concept of the encounter which 
I will be able to carry forward into Chapter Five, where I will begin to construct my 
own concept of ‘subjective understanding’71.     
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 My approach to interpreting Kierkegaard will be textual. Nonetheless in the following chapter a 
number of secondary commentators will also be drawn upon. This reason for this is to firstly aid 
in achieving clear interpretation of some of Kierkegaard’s more obscure passages. Secondly it will 
show that my interpretation of Kierkegaard has strong support in the secondary literature.  
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1. Kierkegaard: A Short Biography  
 
Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen in the spring of 1813. He would spend the 
majority of his life in the city and would die there in 1855. After a sheltered 
childhood, Kierkegaard enrolled at the University of Copenhagen at the age of 
seventeen to study theology. During his university years Kierkegaard lived a rowdy 
existence, something which would cause tension between himself and his deeply 
religious father. Nonetheless, despite this wild face he presented to the world, in 
his journal Kierkegaard would record a deep sense of depression. This melancholy 
he claimed had existed since his early childhood, and would haunt him until his 
death (Lowrie, 1943:3; Anderson, 2000:4). 
Kierkegaard passed his theological examinations in 1840 and finished his doctoral 
dissertation the next year.   At the same time he became engaged to Regine Olsen, 
whom he professed was the love of his life. Nonetheless, just after winning her 
hand, Kierkegaard suddenly broke off the engagement. Why he chose to do so is 
unclear: it has been interpreted from his journals that he believed he could only 
be committed to Olsen or God, and decided on the latter (Anderson, 2000:7-8). 
However he also reported that he felt it would be unfair to subject her to his 
crippling depression, and had subsequently felt guilt over his involvement with her 
(Lowrie, 1943:137).  
The breaking of his engagement to Olsen caused a scandal in Copenhagen, and 
Kierkegaard subsequently left the city. He went to Berlin where he attended the 
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anti-Hegelian lectures of Friedrich Schelling, along with other notable future 
intellectuals such as Mikhail Bakunin and Friedrich Engels. Kierkegaard however 
found these lectures hugely disappointing. It was also during this time he began 
work on his first pseudonymous work Either/or. He returned to Copenhagen four 
months later (Lowrie, 1943:144; Anderson, 2000:9).  
Either/or was published in early 1843. Six more major pseudonymous works would 
follow in rapid succession: Repetition (1843), Fear and Trembling (1844), The 
Concept of Anxiety (1844), Philosophical Fragments (1844), Stages on Life’s Way 
(1845) and finally the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) (Anderson, 
2000:11). In the posthumously published Perspective on Authorship, Kierkegaard 
claimed that the intention of these works was to indirectly communicate to his 
contemporaries how to truly become a Christian (Kierkegaard, 1998:43).  
To understand this intention one must consider the intellectual context in which 
Kierkegaard wrote. Denmark, and indeed much of Europe, was dominated by the 
philosophy of German Idealism generally, and Hegelianism particularly. Idealism 
maintained that God could be understood rationally, and Christianity was 
subsequently brought into the philosophical system. In his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, Hegel argued that God could be reconciled with humanity 
through philosophy and reason (Hegel, 2007:347). This argument however is 
largely in conflict with the fundamental teachings of Christianity: that one cannot 
comprehend one’s relations to God by one’s own efforts and reason, instead one 
is dependent on the revelation of Christ.  
152 
 
Consider for instance the teachings of St Paul.  Paul warned the Greeks: ‘Beware 
less any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of 
men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ” (Colossians, 2:8). 
Nonetheless, he acknowledged that these Greeks were hesitant in accepting this 
message as they stubbornly believed in their own philosophy and human wisdom. 
Nonetheless, Paul insisted, it was only ‘Christ Crucified’, and not any intellectual 
exercise on their own part, which could reveal to them the ‘foolishness’ of this 
standpoint and bring them to salvation in Christ  (Corinthians 1, 1:20-3).  
Thus the Bible can be interpreted to argue that one must abandon one’s worldly 
wisdom and accept the revelation of Christ. Hegelianism however, in its belief that 
humanity could be reconciled with God through philosophy and the human 
intellect, subverts such Christian teachings. Indeed it may be interpreted as 
moving away from traditional Christian teachings towards an alternative 
standpoint, one which champions the human intellect and philosophy, a position 
similar to that of the Greeks before conversion by Paul.  
 Kierkegaard consequently interpreted this rational religion as an attempt to ‘go 
further’ than faith and transform religion into a rational philosophical system. Such 
a movement would however remove the dependency on Christ, a dependency 
which was central to Christian belief, and return them ‘back’ to the Greek position. 
To illustrate this, in Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard compares the Hegelian 
philosophers to the pupil of Heraclitus. Heraclitus famously argued that one 
cannot cross the same river twice, an argument intended to disprove the Eleatic 
153 
 
denial of motion.  Heraclitus’ pupil however, in an attempt to ‘go beyond’ his 
teacher, insisted that one cannot even cross the same river once. However, rather 
than improve Heraclitus’ argument, the pupil’s statement once again denies 
motion, and thus, instead of ‘going beyond’, takes him back to the position of the 
Eleatics. Similarly, Kierkegaard maintains, when the Hegelians attempted to ‘go 
beyond’ Christianity by attempting to render it rational, they in fact fell back to 
the previous ‘Greek position’ before the teachings of Paul (Kierkegaard, 2003:146-
7). 
It should however be observed that this interpretation was not only held by 
Kierkegaard, but also many of his contemporaries. In particular the ‘Young 
Hegelians’ maintained that the idealist attempt to give a rational articulation of 
God was an important step towards undermining Christianity. This would lead to 
the realisation that religion was but the invention of ‘man’, and subsequently the 
abolishment of religion and triumph of atheism. As Bruno Bauer remarked, in his 
satirical work Hegel the Antichrist, Hegel had ‘became Grecian, and so became 
human once again’, and consequently ‘the Greeks are victorious, the Church 
collapses’ (Bauer, 1989:157-9). The issue of atheism and the Young Hegelians 
would indeed prove a considerable concern for Kierkegaard when writing his 
pseudonymous works. His close friend, Hans Brøchner, later recalled that 
Kierkegaard frequently discussed and referenced Ludwig Feuerbach, one of the 
most influential of the Young Hegelian group, during the period in which he wrote 
his pseudonymous works (Brøchner, 1996:233).  
154 
 
Kierkegaard’s concerns about Hegelianism appear more poignant when we 
consider its influence of the Danish Church. In particular Hegelian philosophy had 
been gradually introduced into the Danish Church as a means to bridge the gap 
between traditional Christian practices and the rationalism of the Enlightenment. 
This was pioneered in particular by Hans Martensen, the dominant figure in Danish 
theological circles (Elrod, 1981:33). It would certainly appear that Kierkegaard saw 
Martensen as responsible for introducing Hegelianism into Germany; in his journal 
he claims that Martensen ‘returned from his foreign travels’ brining back to 
Denmark with him ‘the newest German philosophy’.  (Kierkegaard, 1985:226). It 
should also be observed that Kierkegaard had a personal relationship with 
Martensen. Martensen had been Kierkegaard’s tutor when the latter was a 
theology student and would later sit on the examining board of Kierkegaard’s 
doctoral thesis, actually casting the deciding vote which would see it passed 
(Thompson, 2009:230,233). Kierkegaard would continue to follow Martensen’s 
career closely and attentively when writing his pseudonymous works. Scholars 
such as Curtis Thompson have subsequently argued it was primarily in response, 
and to combat, Martensen’s Hegelianism that Kierkegaard wrote his 
pseudonymous works (Thompson, 2009:257).  
One might consequently conclude that there were three contextual factors which 
influenced Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous authorship: the dominance of 
Hegelian philosophy, which Kierkegaard believed undermined traditional Christian 
beliefs; the arguments of the Young Hegelians, who sought to bring Hegelianism 
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to what they believed where its logical atheist conclusions; and finally the 
introduction of Hegelian philosophy into the Danish church.   
After finishing Postscript it would seem Kierkegaard planned to retire from writing 
and had ambitions to become a parish minister. However retirement would 
escape him as, at the close of 1845, he entered into a public feud with the satirical 
magazine Corsair.  Kierkegaard would come off worse from this feud, being 
reduced by the summer of 1846 to a figure of public ridicule (Hannay, 1982:6-7). 
He would however continue to write. The most significant of works written in this 
period, and perhaps Kierkegaard’s most influential work of all, was the 
pseudonymous Sickness Unto Death written in 1848 (Anderson, 2000:13).  
In 1854 Kierkegaard launched a direct attack on the Danish church and Martensen, 
who had succeeded Jacob Mynster as primate of the Church.  Kierkegaard would 
receive a particular personal blow in this struggle when his elder brother Peter, an 
ordained minister and theologian in his own right, openly defended Martensen 
and the church against his brother’s attacks (Lyby, 2009:202-3). On the 11 
November 1855, a stressed and overworked Kierkegaard collapsed in the street. 
He died in hospital on the 11th of November (Hannay, 1982:8).  
Murray Rae has argued that Kierkegaard’s greatest contribution to theology was 
to urge Christian theology and practice back to its traditional roots and to the bible 
(Rae, 2010:171). Although this did not make much impact on his contemporaries, 
Kierkegaard would receive more attention in the Twentieth century, as a result of 
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its more sceptical and sombre mood resulting from the catastrophe and horror of 
the First World War (Rae, 2010:177-6).  
Arguably Kierkegaard’s most influential legacy would however be in philosophy, in 
particular ‘continental philosophy’ where he is frequently perceived as the ‘father’ 
of the philosophical tradition of existentialism. This is particularly as a 
consequence of his rejection of all-encompassing philosophical systems and focus 
on freedom and lived experience.  Kierkegaard’s notion of freedom would for 
instance be particularly influential on Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of ‘angst’, a 
founding idea of his own existentialist philosophy (Sartre, 1993:119-20). I will 
discuss the relationship between Kierkegaard and the existentialist notion of 
freedom more in section four of this chapter.  
   
2. Recollection 
 
In the dialogue Meno, Socrates answered Meno’s controversial claim that it is 
impossible for a man to search for either what he knows or what he does not know. 
Socrates explains the claim as follows: a man could not search for what he knows, 
as he already knows it, and he could not search for what he does not know, as he 
would have no idea what he was searching for. Socrates’ answer to this claim is 
that all learning is in fact recollection; we perpetually contain within us the ‘truth’ 
about the world around us but, through existing within the world, we have 
forgotten it. Consequently when we ‘learn’ information we are not in fact 
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acquiring any new knowledge but rather are recalling these innate truths (Plato, 
2009:113-4).  
However, if all learning is ‘recollection’, it raises the issue of what exactly is the 
role of a teacher? If all the student is doing is recalling information he is not 
learning anything new, and thus the teacher is not in fact ‘teaching’ him anything. 
Interestingly, Socrates strongly rejected the label of a ‘teacher’, indeed when 
Meno asks him to ‘teach’ something about recollection Socrates takes great 
offence and perceives it as a trick (Plato, 2009:114). Instead of the mantel of a 
teacher, in the Theaetetus, we find Socrates describing himself as a ‘midwife’ in 
that he supervises the ‘labour of men’s minds’ (Plato, 2004:27). We may 
understand this as Socrates’ questioning prompted the subject to recall the 
forgotten information, and thus help ‘deliver’ ideas from the recesses of the 
subject’s mind out into the open. Consequently, Socrates attested that he did not 
teach his students anything but was rather responsible for the delivery of their 
ideas which came from within students themselves (Plato, 2004:28).   
It is this image of the ‘Socratic midwife’ that Kierkegaard finds problematic. In 
Philosophical Crumbs, Kierkegaard argues that if a teacher was only a midwife who 
‘delivered’ ideas he would lose all significance; the teacher would be reduced to 
nothing more than a memory prompt. It would thus not matter if it was Socrates 
or Prodicus, or indeed if it was ‘the parlour-maid’, who prompted this recollection 
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as long as the pupil remembered what he had forgotten72. Similarly, just as the 
teacher becomes irrelevant, so does his teachings; it would not matter what the 
teacher was communicating to the student as long as it was cause for him to 
remember the innate ‘truth’ (Kierkegaard, 2009:90-1). Consequently, Kierkegaard 
highlighted that the theory of recollection deprived both the teacher and his 
teachings of any real significance. This also culminated in what Kierkegaard called 
the ‘vanishing’ of the ‘temporal point’. To explain, as the moment in which we 
encountered our teacher has only significance in so far as it caused us to 
remember innate truths, it can be discarded or forgotten about as soon as the 
information is recalled, thus our significant life moments and events are stripped 
of meaning and ‘vanish’ as time goes on (Kierkegaard, 2009:89).    
It should be observed here that Kierkegaard was primarily concerned with how 
the subject could gain knowledge of God and become a Christian. The theory of 
recollection was thus highly problematic for Kierkegaard as, if it was applied to 
Christianity, then Christ himself would be stripped of all significance; for if 
knowledge of God could simply be ‘recalled’ then Christ would become a mere 
‘Socratic midwife’ and the incarnation an unimportant ‘vanishing’ moment 
(Kierkegaard, 2009:90-6).  
                                                          
72 Prodicus was a contemporary of Socrates and a Sophist who charged money for philosophy 
lessons. Prodicus and his lessons were the object of one of Socrates’ ironic remarks in Cratylus 
(Plato, 1998:1-2). Socrates’ opponent Prodicus and the figure of the ‘parlour-maid’ are examples 
chosen by Kierkegaard in Crumbs to dramatically draw attention to the insignificance the teacher 
has in the theory of recollection (Kierkegaard, 2009:90).   
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Consequently, in order to comprehend how one could become a Christian, the 
theory of recollection had to be replaced with a theory which could account for 
the significance of the subject’s encounters with external actors and events. To 
achieve this Kierkegaard had to discard the idea that all truths were contained 
within the subject and instead contend with the idea that encounters were able 
to bestow knowledge upon the subject, knowledge which he previously lacked. 
Indeed, in the case of the ‘truth’ of God, Kierkegaard insisted the subject would 
have to owe his external teacher ‘everything’ (Kierkegaard, 2009:96). 
 By this Kierkegaard means that the truth must be something that the student 
could not get on his own, for if he could then there would have been no need for 
the teacher and we would consequently fall back into recollection.  Thus the pupil 
must be dependent on the teacher, not only for the truth, but for the ‘condition 
for understanding the truth’. In this way Kierkegaard insists that such an 
experience changes the subject’s very ‘mode of being’ as it gives him the condition 
for understanding truth. Indeed Kierkegaard compares this change to a transition 
from ‘non-being’ to ‘being’ and calls it a ‘rebirth’ (Kierkegaard, 2009:92-6).  As a 
consequence of this, Kierkegaard insists that the temporal moment in which one 
gains the truth must be incredibly significant, indeed it must mark a vital point in 
the development of the subject’s life which is never forgotten (Kierkegaard, 
2009:91,95).  
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Kierkegaard’s terminology and argumentation here may at first sound confusing, 
for instance his claim that upon receiving the conditions of truth the subject is 
fundamentally ‘changed’. I will however have to leave an explanation of this for 
later in the chapter. What is important to recognise at present is that, in order to 
overcome the problems of recollection, Kierkegaard laid the basis for an 
alternative epistemological approach. In this new approach the subject had to be 
able to attain new knowledge from the teacher, and thus a source outside of 
himself, and that the moment he received this knowledge had to be one of crucial 
significance in his life.   
It may be worth pausing here to note that, although Kierkegaard’s problem is 
overtly theological, his observations have much broader implications.  In particular, 
they demonstrate that, if we are to base our epistemological understanding on a 
theory of ‘recollection’, then temporal events lose all significance. To recover the 
importance of temporal and external events a new epistemological basis is 
required in which knowledge does not come from within but is bestowed upon 
the subject through an encounter with something external. Thus we must 
understand knowledge to be transferred to the subject through these encounters.  
It is also worth considering how Kierkegaard’s rejection of Socratic recollection 
positions him in regards to the tradition of western thought. Certain scholars, such 
as T.H. Sprigge, have argued that Kierkegaard’s critique of ‘recollection’ must be 
read as a critique of Hegel (Sprigge, 2006:169). T.H. Croxall also reads the passage 
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on ‘recollection’ as a criticism of both Plato and Hegel, as both hold that ‘truth 
dwells internally within man’ (Croxall, 1956:167). Merold Westphal has gone 
further, claiming Kierkegaard’s discussion of recollection sets up the critique of 
Hegelian Speculation found in Postscript, and therefore, despite the Platonic 
reference, must be read as directed against Hegel (Westphal, 2014:111). James 
Collins similarly attests that much of the argument contained both in ‘Crumbs’ and 
Postscript have little interest to the modern reader beyond the historical, as they 
focus on primarily the fine points of the ‘post-Hegelian’ controversy (Collins, 
1954:119). 
Alasdair Hannay however insists that, although Hegel is Kierkegaard’s main target, 
he only is so in that he is an exemplar of the wider tradition of ‘science’. Key to 
understanding this is to recognise in what manner Kierkegaard claims works such 
as Postscript are ‘unscientific’. ‘Science’ crucially did not denote the more 
restricted practice based on rigorous method and procedure that we associate 
with the term today; the term ‘science’ was rather understood as scholarly work 
presented as ‘a whole’ or as a ‘system’ (Hannay, 2012:xix-xx).  
We can appreciate this more through the German term for science: ‘Wissenschaft’. 
The term Wissenschaft originates from the German for knowledge: ‘Wissen’. By 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries onwards Wissenschaft was commonly 
being used in place of the Latin term ‘scientia’, which denoted an organised 
cohesive body of knowledge. This term was applied not just to the ‘natural world’, 
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but also to any systematic study, whether it be of religion, art, history, or ethics.  
Hence it was natural to regard any body of knowledge, as long as it was systematic, 
as ‘Wissenschaft’ (Inwood, 1992:265). Kierkegaard can thus be understood to be 
attacking ‘human science’, and indeed quite generally any systematic or objective 
approach to the ‘truth’ of the human being (Hannay, 2012:xx). Thus Kierkegaard’s 
criticism may be interpreted not just as an attack on ‘Socratic recollection’ or 
‘Hegelian speculation’, but on the objective approach to the study of the human 
being in the Western philosophical tradition.  
Throughout his pseudonymous writings Kierkegaard insists that the new 
philosophical category required to replace recollection can be understood as 
‘repetition’. In the next section I will proceed to examine this concept and its 
relation to Kierkegaard’s understanding of the human self. 
 
 
 
3. Repetition and The Self    
 
Kierkegaard scholars have been apt to point out that ‘repetition’ is one of the most 
difficult concepts in Kierkegaard’s thought, indeed it is legendary for being almost 
completely unintelligible. Pat Bigelow for instance has gone as far as to argue that 
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the concept is incomprehensible by design, a representation of the unintelligibility 
of existence (Bigelow, 1987:167). Nonetheless, despite the concept’s incredibly 
complex and opaque nature, it is vital to Kierkegaard’s philosophy. It is thus 
crucially important that I render here an interpretation of this concept.     
The concept of ‘repetition’  gets its fullest attention in the small text Repetition 
which, despite its pseudo author Constantine Constantius’ ultimate failure to 
comprehend the concept, gives a series of insights into the nature of this ‘new 
category’. Through the guise of Constantius, Kierkegaard describes ‘repetition’ as 
the same movement as recollection, but directed forwards instead of back. He also 
associates it with the ‘new’, using such similes as ‘discarding old clothes for new’ 
(Kierkegaard, 2009:3). This idea of ‘repetition’ being a ‘progression forward to new 
things’ can also be found in Postscript, in which Kierkegaard describes ‘repetition’ 
as central to the concept of motion (Kierkegaard, 2009:61). In Repetition 
Constantius also remarks that for ‘repetition’ to be successful it requires an ‘act of 
will’ (Kierkegaard, 2009:4). We may also observe in The Concept of Anxiety it is 
remarked that ‘repetition’ is not a ‘simple consequence’ but a ‘new leap’, again 
suggesting that it is not a product of necessary continuation but of a free decision 
or act of will (Kierkegaard, 1980:113). We also find it stressed in Anxiety that 
genuine ‘repetition’ must also contain ‘the eternal’ (Kierkegaard, 1980:149). From 
this we may gain an initial sketch of what Kierkegaard meant by ‘repetition’. First 
of all it is a forward movement towards something new. Secondly this movement 
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requires an act of will by the subject. Thirdly this movement must contain an 
element called the ‘eternal’.       
Nonetheless, if we are to gain a full appreciation of ‘repetition’, we first need a 
better understanding of Kierkegaard’s conception of the human ‘self’. In The 
Concept of Anxiety it is stated that the ‘self’ is a synthesis of body and psyche which 
is sustained in ‘spirit’ (Kierkegaard, 1980:43). However, it is not until the later 
Sickness Unto Death that Kierkegaard fully fleshes out this understanding of what 
it means to be a ‘self’. In the opening of the text Kierkegaard tells us that to be a 
‘spirit’ is to be ‘a self’, before proceeding to give the infamously cryptic definition 
of a self as ‘a relation which relates to itself’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:43). Kierkegaard 
also states in the text that the ‘self’ is said to equate with ‘freedom’ (Kierkegaard, 
2004:59). As well as this, Sickness Unto Death also expands the simple synthesis of 
‘psyche and body’ into a triumvirate of syntheses; ‘infinite and finite’, ‘possibility 
and necessity’ and ‘eternal and temporal’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:43).  
I begin my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s concept of ‘self’ with these syntheses. 
Sickness Unto Death first posits the synthesis of ‘infinite and finite’. The term 
‘infinite’ is associated with the ‘fantastic’ and ultimately with the imagination. 
Imagination is further defined as the ‘infinitizing reflection’, and the means by 
which the subject ‘presents himself to himself’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:60-1). Thus we 
may understand the ‘infinite’ pole of the synthesis as the imagination which in 
particular is responsible for how the subject conceives of himself within his mind. 
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In other words, it is the part of the subject which imagines how, or how he would 
like, himself to be. Consequently, a subject who leans too heavily towards the 
‘infinite’ pole gains a ‘fantastic’ image of himself which is far removed and inflated 
from the person he actually is (Kierkegaard, 2004:61-2). Conversely, we may 
understand ‘finite’ as the facticity of the subject’s existence, or how he actually 
does exist in the material world. Consequently, when the synthesis leans overly 
towards ‘finitude’, the subject is characterised by ‘confinement’, ‘narrowness’, 
and an inability to imagine his life in any other way than it currently is (Kierkegaard, 
2004:63-4). The healthy balance of this synthesis is thus a subject who is aware of 
the realities of his current existence, but still has enough imagination to conceive 
of alternative possibilities to this situation.     
This leads us directly to the second synthesis of ‘possibility and necessity’. 
Kierkegaard states that once the synthesis of ‘infinitude and finitude’ has been 
posited so comes the ‘possibility’ to ‘become’ as is reflected through the ‘medium 
of imagination’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:65). We may interpret that, once the subject 
has imagined he can be different to how he currently is, he becomes aware that 
he could actually realise this alternative. Consequently, we may understand 
‘possibility’ as the subject’s ability to realise or ‘become’ the alternative person he 
has imagined. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard insists that ‘becoming’ is a movement 
which must take place from ‘where one is’. This ‘where one is’ is what is called 
‘necessity’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:66). We understand that the subject may be able to 
become something different to what he presently is, but nonetheless can only do 
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so from the limitations of the position he currently holds. This synthesis is 
therefore out of balance in favour of ‘possibility’ when the subject desires to 
become something which is impossible from his current situation, for instance a 
subject who believes he will become a pilot despite lacking the intellectual ability 
or sharp eyesight required for such an occupation. Conversely, the synthesis is out 
of balance in favour of ‘necessity’ when the subject believes that his life is so 
restricted, or that existence is so pre-determined, that there is no possibility to 
become anything other than what he currently is, for instance a subject who 
believes he is so restricted by his inner-city working-class background that he turns 
down any opportunity to change this.  The synthesis is balanced when the subject 
realises he has the ability to change his life, but is aware that he must do so from 
within the restrictions imposed by his current circumstance.   
From this analysis of the first two syntheses we may concur with Marc Taylor that 
the terms ‘infinitude’ and ‘possibility’ represent the subject’s ability to act and 
change his being, whilst ‘finitude’ and ‘necessity’ convey that he can only do so 
from the position of his factual determination and the restrictions this imposes. As 
Taylor articulates it: the subject always exists within a historically bound period 
which restricts his possibilities, nonetheless these conditions do not completely 
determine the subject’s existence and he always maintains the ability to act and 
to choose his life path (Taylor, 1975:111).  We may therefore understand 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of ‘self’ in the opening of Sickness Unto Death, which 
is ‘a relation that relates to itself’, as: the subject who relates the ‘person he 
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imagines’ or ‘wishes to be’ with the ‘self he actually is in facticity’ and brings these 
together through the free act which realises his possibility to become this 
alternative self. In the same way, the ‘self is freedom’ in the sense that this 
synthesis is realised when the subject freely acts and realises his possibilities.  
I now turn to the more conceptually difficult synthesis of the ‘eternal’ and 
‘temporal’.  Admittedly the term ‘temporal’ does not at first seem to raise any 
immediate difficulties. Following from our definitions of ‘finite’ and ‘necessity’ we 
are able to logically deduce that ‘temporal’ would once again represent the 
subject’s finite existence. However, interpreting what Kierkegaard designates by 
‘eternal’ is a far more challenging prospect.  Difficulty arises mainly due to the fact 
that Kierkegaard uses the term ‘eternal’ in a vast variety of ways. Confusion is 
further caused by the fact he also uses the term in discussion of both God and 
human beings, this is despite adamantly insisting that the two are infinitely 
different. It is therefore first worth making clear that the nature of God does not 
concern us here, so when talking of the eternal we are speaking only of humans. 
Now, when talking of humans there is a consistency in Kierkegaard’s usage, 
namely it is always used in relation to two attributes: ‘unchangeability’ and 
‘possibility’ (Taylor, 1975:91). By unpacking these two attributes we can therefore 
deduce what Kierkegaard denotes by the ‘eternal’ in the self-synthesis.  
We begin with unchangeability. In order to understand the importance of this 
attribute we must look back to the ancient Greek tradition from which Kierkegaard 
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derives the terms ‘temporal’ and ‘eternal’. In the Greek philosophical framework 
‘temporal’ was often associated with worldly phenomena. This world of 
phenomena was furthermore believed to be a realm of continual change or ‘flux’ 
(Taylor, 1975:91-4). This definition is therefore in line with our understanding of 
‘temporal’ as the conditions of the subject’s finite existence, only we may add to 
this that such conditions are conceived to be constantly changing. In contrast, the 
‘eternal’ was believed to be that which is stable and ‘unchanging’, or rather that 
which remains self-identical; that which remains the same throughout the process 
of change. Furthermore, these two terms were considered to be dialectically 
opposed to each, it was held that in order to understand one of these terms we 
must comprehend both; we can only understand how something has changed if 
we have an ‘unchanged’ or ‘self-identical’ concept of that which undergoes change 
in order to measure change against (Taylor, 1975:91-4).  
We may therefore concur with Taylor that, when talking about the ‘eternal’ in the 
self, Kierkegaard is referring to that which remains unchanged and self-identical 
within the subject, and thus furthermore that standard by which we may 
understand the ‘temporal’ changes in his existence (Taylor, 1975:94). We can 
indeed find Kierkegaard arguing as much in the Postscript when he proposes that, 
if existence is motion, then there must be something ‘continuous’ which is ‘holding 
it together’. He goes on to argue that the problem for one who exists is being able 
to give his life this sense of continuity (Kierkegaard, 2012:61). The question thus 
becomes what precisely is it in the ‘eternal’ which can be said to be unchangeable?    
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To help explore this question we may once again consider Plato. In the Phaedo 
Socrates identifies the human soul as ‘immortal’, ‘uniform’, ‘unvarying’ and 
‘constant in relation to itself’. Conversely, the body is ‘mortal’, ‘multiform’, and 
‘never constant in relation to itself’. Thus, we may say that the soul is understood 
to be the eternal substratum of the subject that stays constant whilst the body 
goes through change in the temporal world. Indeed Socrates argues that, after the 
body dies, decays and decomposes, the soul still remains constant and unchanged, 
thus giving a point of continual existence to the subject even beyond death (Plato, 
2009:31-2).  
Kierkegaard however takes issue with this conceptualisation, arguing that it places 
the eternal ‘behind the subject’ and forces him to ‘enter it backwards’. He 
compares it to a man walking down the road without positing his steps, so that his 
journey only appears as the ground he has traversed (Kierkegaard, 1980:90).  
To appreciate Kierkegaard’s objection to Plato we must again consider this 
argument in light of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Platonic recollection73. It will be 
recalled that according to the theory of ‘recollection’ the student could not learn 
anything new but could only recall things he had forgotten. Thus attention to 
external experiences were given little importance beyond serving as mere 
prompts to remember what one knew in the past but has since forgotten.  Equally, 
                                                          
73 It should be observed that the theory of recollection plays a vital role in Plato’s argument for 
the existence, and immortality, of the soul. As Socrates states in the Phaedo: ‘that [recollection] 
would be impossible, unless our souls existed somewhere before being born in this human form; 
so this way too, it appears that the soul is something immortal (Plato, 2009:21).   
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as the subject is presumed by this theory to know everything implicitly, it negates 
the possibility to learn anything new. Thus, the student of Platonic recollection 
resembles Kierkegaard’s walking man; neither give attention to current or future 
experiences as all concentration is focused on what has come before.  
When such an understanding is used to identify what is continuous in the self it 
consequently locates it ‘behind the subject’ as it searches in the past; it tries to 
‘recall’ the eternal substratum which the subject has forgotten exists. It similarly 
‘enters it backwards’ as one looks back to one’s past history rather than 
considering how one might project oneself into the future. Again, like the walking 
man the subject thinks only of himself as he ‘has been’ and not where he is, what 
he currently experiences, and what he might become in the future. This is 
problematic for Kierkegaard as he wishes to precisely conceptualise the 
significance of one’s current experiences, notably the encounter with Christ, and 
what one may become in the future, namely a Christian. Thus Kierkegaard requires 
an alternative conception of what is continuous that does not ‘look only to the 
past’ but rather gives priority to current encounters which can reveal possible 
future selves, and thus project the subject continuously into the future.      
Thus what Kierkegaard proposed was ‘eternal’ in the subject was not a substratum 
which could be recalled but rather the future possibilities which the subject could 
realise. We may here be reminded of what I said earlier in regards to the subject’s 
possibilities: despite being restricted by historical conditions the subject always 
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retained the ability to make choices. We also may recall that the ‘temporal’ is 
associated with these historical conditions, denoted by ‘finitude’ and ‘necessity’. 
From this we may consequently interpret that the ‘eternal’ is associated with the 
ability to act, as denoted by ‘infinitude’ and ‘possibility’. Thus, we may see that, 
although the subject exists in the continual flux of the temporal world, what 
remains constant overtime is his ability to make choices; what is ‘eternal’ and 
‘unchangeable’ is his ability to freely choose. Crucially, such an understanding 
‘looks forward’ rather than ‘backwards’ as it considers what the subject may 
become in the future rather than trying to recall what he knew in the past, as 
Kierkegaard believes Plato’s epistemology and philosophy of self does. In 
summary we may say the temporal/eternal synthesis represents the subject’s 
continually changing existence within the flux of time and his constant unchanging 
ability to always act freely and make choices within it.  
Before proceeding it is worth once again considering Kierkegaard’s relation to 
Hegel. As was observed in the previous section, Kierkegaard’s critique of 
recollection can be read as aimed at Hegel, as the latter is seen as an exemplar of 
an ‘objective approach’. However, this does not mean that Hegel had no positive 
influence on Kierkegaard, and indeed, in this identification of the continuous 
factor in the subject as the ability to act, we must observe that Kierkegaard owes 
a huge debt to Hegel. It was Hegel who, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, challenged 
the concept of God as static substance, instead offering the alternate notion of 
God as ‘subject’ or as a ‘free actor’; God was thus not perceived as a substance 
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‘behind time’ but an active agent operating freely within it (Hegel, 1977:9-10). The 
significance of this for Kierkegaard’s concept of self is evident as it is the free act 
that gives unity to his individual subject, just as in Hegel’s account of God. There 
is indeed a striking similarity between Hegel’s understanding of self in the 
Phenomenology, described as ‘the sameness and simplicity that relates itself to 
itself’, and Kierkegaard’s depiction of the self as a ‘a relation that relates to itself’ 
(Hegel, 1977:12; Kierkegaard, 2004:43). 
I have now given an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s concept of ‘self’. The self 
represents a synthesis of physical and psychical. The ‘physical’ is the subject’s 
necessary finite existence which limits him and constitutes the situation from 
which he must make decisions. The psychical is the subject’s continuous ability to 
always imagine alternatives to this situation and make choices based on these 
alternative possibilities. We may consequently understand the subject as a being 
who exists within and is limited by his historical material conditions, but 
nonetheless always retains his ability to act and make choices within this. 
I here consider how this understanding of ‘self’ helps clarify Kierkegaard’s cryptic 
account of ‘repetition’. First of all we saw that ‘repetition’ involved moving 
forward and becoming something new, such as in the simile with new clothes. This 
corresponds to our understanding of the self who actualises his possibilities and 
moves towards the alternate self he imagines. We also saw the concept of 
‘repetition’ involved an act of will to move forwards. This again corresponds with 
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my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s ‘self’ as the subject can only move forward and 
actualise his possibilities by making the choice to realise a possibility. ‘Repetition’ 
can also be said to contain the ‘eternal’ when we consider that the ‘eternal’ 
denotes this act of choice. Thus ‘repetition’ corresponds with the concept of self 
in that the subject moves forward and changes his being through the actualisation 
of his imagined possibilities.  ‘Repetition’ can thus be interpreted as the means by 
which the individual relates ‘himself to himself’ and moves through existence by 
the process of making free choices74.   
                                                          
74  It may be observe that this understanding of the ‘self’ also gives Kierkegaard a unique 
understanding of time. Kierkegaard believed that the understanding of time presented throughout 
the tradition of western philosophy was inadequate for comprehending human existence. The 
theory of time Kierkegaard was criticising here may be understood as ‘spatialized time’ (Taylor, 
1975:82). We may turn to Aristotle’s Physics to better comprehend this. Aristotle declares that 
time is a certain number which is furthermore a measurement of ‘motion’ (Aristotle, 2000:86-7). 
We can interpret that central to this understanding of time is the perception of an object which 
travels through space. By this standard the ‘past’ is understood as what is behind the object, the 
future that which is in front, and the present where the object currently is. This theory also gives a 
primarily quantitative understanding of time, perhaps unsurprising as Aristotle does define time 
as a certain ‘number’ (Aristotle, 2000:87).  We may understand ‘time past’ as the number of 
moments that the object has passed through in its forward motion. As Taylor elucidates, we could 
imagine time as a visualised graph divided into successive points, each of which represents 
successive ‘presents’. Time is thus measured by how many of these points the object has passed 
as it traverses the graph (Taylor, 1975:83).  
Kierkegaard criticises this notion of time claiming that it can only be understood if the moment is 
‘spatialized’; if we ‘stop’ time and make a visual representation of the procession of the object 
(Kierkegaard, 1980:85). The problem with this is firstly that we are removing ourselves from time 
in order to gain a position where we can view both the present position of the object and the 
successive points of past and future. We are further ‘pausing’ time as we need the object to remain 
in the ‘present’ as we count the points behind in order to calculate ‘time past’. This is for 
Kierkegaard an abstract conception which does not correspond to reality. 
Nonetheless, what makes ‘spatialized time’ most unsuitable for measuring the development of the 
subject is its quantitative nature. Examining time as a successive series of equal points to be 
calculated strips each of these moments of any qualitative value.  This is not a concern when 
measuring the progress of an inanimate object traversing a graph but is problematic when 
considering the life progression of a human being, for the moments which influenced a subject’s 
life decisions will clearly have more qualitative worth than those which did not.  In Anxiety 
Kierkegaard alludes to this problem by citing the example of the Hindu line of kings stretching back 
seventy thousand years. Although this number gives a quantitative knowledge of the Hindu 
Kingdom, Kierkegaard insists that, as nothing is known about any of these kings, it does not actually 
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We may also observe here how this interpretation of the self and ‘repetition’ 
answers many of the issues Kierkegaard raised with recollection. First of all we can 
understand how the subject goes through change or ‘is changed’ as he realises the 
possible existences he imagined; by choosing to become a Christian the subject is 
changed as his decision has transformed him from ‘non-Christian’ to ‘Christian’.  It 
also ‘looks forward instead of back’ as it focuses on the possibility of realising 
different options in the future as opposed to trying to remember what one has 
forgotten in the past.   
Nonetheless, there is still tension in this interpretation of Kierkegaard’s thought. 
This tension primarily centres on the dependence the subject has on external 
actors and experiences. We saw in section one that Kierkegaard insisted that it is 
external experiences that are most significant in the subject’s development, and 
in particular it was to the external teacher to whom he must owe everything. 
Conversely, in this section far greater prominence was given to the subject’s 
                                                          
tell us anything about the kingdom or its development (Kierkegaard, 1980:86). To interpret this in 
regards to the subject we may say that the quantitative measurement of time since his birth may 
tell us his age, but it tells us nothing about who he is or anything about his personal development.  
In Anxiety Kierkegaard regards that if the ‘present moment’ in time is to be properly understood 
we must find a ‘foothold’ in the continuous succession. This ‘foothold’ he further insists must be 
the ‘reflection of the eternal’ (Kierkegaard, 1980:85-9). Now, as we have discussed, the ‘eternal’ 
can be understood as the subject’s continuous ability to freely act. Thus the ‘foothold’ can be 
interpreted as the moment of free decision. Consequently what interrupts the continual flow of 
time is the moment in which the subject makes a free choice.  
Kierkegaard’s notion of time can also be observed here to be in line with his self-synthesis; we may 
understand the ‘past’ as the finite and necessary existence the subject has come from, the ‘future’ 
is the imagined ‘possible’ self that the subject can become, and finally the present is the moment 
in which he makes a free decision to move from one stage to the other. This present moment 
furthermore has not quantitative but qualitative significance as it signifies the subject making a 
choice and defining what he wants his existence to be.  
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freedom and his own ability to realise the possibilities he imagines. Addressing this 
tension is also highly important as an understanding of it is required in order to 
grasp how Kierkegaard addressed his main concern with Platonic recollection: its 
neglect of the importance of external encounters.   
There therefore appears to be a tension in my interpretation between the 
subject’s dependency on external influences and his own freedom to act and make 
choices. It is to address this tension that I will now turn to in section three.  
 
4. Freedom and the Encounter  
 
We here return to Kierkegaard’s definition of the ‘self’ in Sickness Unto Death: ‘a 
relation which relates to itself’. We have understood this to mean that the subject 
relates his existing self with the possible self he imagines and, through a free 
choice, realises this possibility. However, we should observe that Kierkegaard 
proceeds to add that, when ‘relating to itself’, the subject also ‘relates to 
something else’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:43).  We may interpret from this that, in the 
process of acting and realising one’s possibilities, the subject is dependent on a 
third external relationship. Later in the text Kierkegaard indeed warns against the 
subject who ignores this dependence on the external and, seeing ‘no power over 
itself’, desires to construct a self entirely of his own choosing. First he warns that 
such an enterprise is akin to ‘building castles in the air’, for the desired self is not 
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based on anything ‘firm’. Secondly, he attests that a subject who attempts this can 
have no further development as, by considering nothing outside of his self, he 
cannot do more than duplicate what he already is (Kierkegaard, 2004:100-1).   
What we may infer from this is that, for the subject to make choices about who he 
wishes to become, he must first have some knowledge or understanding on which 
to base this decision; in order to make a choice he must have options from which 
he may choose. Furthermore, such options he cannot provide himself but must 
rather come from an external source. This is firstly because if he was to ‘dream up’ 
possibilities which did not conform to reality he would be unable to actually realise 
them. Secondly, without external experiences the subject would not be made 
aware of alternate possibilities which he may choose from. Consequently we may 
understand that in both cases the lack of external experiences closes the 
opportunity for change.  
In Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard proceeds to argue that this ‘something else’ 
must be that which ‘established the whole relation’, alas God (Kierkegaard, 
2004:44). In Crumbs Kierkegaard insists knowledge or the ‘truth’ of God can only 
come from the encounter with Christ (Kierkegaard, 2009:96-7). Thus, this external 
‘something else’ that the subject must relate to is his encounter with Christ. One 
may therefore argue that for Kierkegaard the subject is completely dependent on 
the encounter with Christ in order to receive this ‘truth’.  
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Nonetheless, despite this, in Crumbs Kierkegaard also appears to stress the powers 
of human agency in attaining ‘truth’, for instance stressing that in order to attain 
‘truth’ the subject must ‘will it’ (Kierkegaard, 2009:94). Consequently, it is not yet 
clear what precisely the relationship is between this dependency on external 
encounters and the subject’s capacity for free action; whether he is dependent on 
the encounter to attain truth or if he attains this by an act of his own will.  
To understand this fully we must recall what exactly Kierkegaard meant by ‘truth’. 
As we observed in the introduction, the ‘truth’ Kierkegaard was primarily 
concerned with was not ‘objective truth’, that is the empirical truth of phenomena 
as they exist, but rather a ‘subjective truth’, that is ‘how’ one may become 
something. Thus when Christ brought the ‘truth of God’ to the subject he was not 
bringing the objective truth of God’s existence, but rather the ‘true form of 
Christian life’, or an understanding of how one may possibly become a Christian. 
As Benjamin Daise observes, the ‘truth’ which Christ brings to the subject is the 
model of life according to the teachings of Christ which allows the subject to live 
in proper relation to God (Daisie, 1992:3-4). Thus, we may understand this ‘truth’ 
that is brought to the subject is knowledge concerning how one might become a 
Christian, and thus a possible way of life that the subject may choose to adopt.  
From this we may therefore interpret that what the subject is dependent on is the 
encounter which reveals to him the ‘true’ ‘Christian life model’. Nonetheless, 
although our subject has received knowledge of this ‘life model’, it is still not yet 
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the ‘truth’ for him, it has not become his ‘subjective truth’. Rather, he still must 
adopt this way of life and choose it as a model for his existence.  Thus, he must 
also ‘will the truth’; he must make the decision to live the true Christian life as was 
revealed in his encounter with Christ. Thus, in order to attain to the ‘truth’ the 
subject is reliant on this life model being revealed to him by Christ in the encounter. 
However, if he is to ‘realise’ this truth he must also make the choice to adopt the 
Christian existence as his own.  
We may consequently understand the subject’s self-development as a two-step 
process: first, the subject must have encounters in order to be able to conceive of 
alternative existences to the one he is currently living. However, once this 
information has been received, it is up to the subject to act and make choices in 
order to realise the alternative mode of existence which are revealed. In this way 
dependency and freedom exist in a symbiotic relationship: in order to act and 
realise our possibilities we are dependent on an external encounter to reveal such 
options; however the knowledge we gain through our encounters further requires 
our ability to freely act in order to bring such possibilities into existence. In 
Kierkegaard’s example of Christianity the subject is dependent on the encounter 
with Christ in order to gain knowledge of a true Christian existence and to be able 
to imagine himself living such a life; nonetheless in order for such a possibility to 
be realised the subject must freely act upon such knowledge and choose to adopt 
the Christian life.   
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This process is further illustrated when we consider Kierkegaard’s concept of the 
‘moment’, that is the significant point in the subject’s existence when he ‘relates 
himself to himself’ and makes a choice. The actual Danish word Kierkegaard uses 
for ‘moment’ is Øjeblikket, which means literally ‘in the blink of an eye’. Victoria 
Harrison nonetheless observes that this concept becomes troublesome because 
Kierkegaard uses Øjeblikket to denote a variety of things. At times the term is used 
to signify the Incarnation, however at other times the term is used to symbolise 
the acceptance of Christ’s ‘truth’ by the subject, and thus the moment which he 
decides to become a Christian. Also confusingly Øjeblikket, when italicised, is used 
to refer to both of the above events taken together (Harrison, 1997:458). 
Harrison however observes there is a system in the English translations of 
Kierkegaard that allow us to comprehend this75. First, we can understand the 
‘Moment’, in uppercase, as the Incarnation. We can then understand ‘moment’, 
in lowercase, as the subject’s appropriation of the truth of the Incarnation. Finally, 
Moment italicised can be understood as the two former terms taken together. 
(Harrison, 1997:459)76. What is fundamental to recognise here is the symbiotic 
relationship between the ‘Moment’ and ‘moment’ in Kierkegaard’s argument. The 
Incarnation is required for the individual to grasp the truth, and thus there is a 
relationship of dependence of the ‘moment’ on the ‘Moment’. However, the 
                                                          
75 Harrison acknowledges that this system was developed by the D F. Swenson translation 
(Harrison, 1997:458). 
76 Harrison supports this interpretation by highlighting that Moment is first introduced in Crumbs 
as unitary term, Kierkegaard then moves on to account for ‘Moment’ and ‘moment’ as the 
comprising parts of this initial concept Moment (Harrison, 1997:461).  
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significance of the Incarnation can only be fully comprehended when the truth is 
appropriated by the subject, so the ‘Moment’ also becomes dependent of the 
‘moment’ (Harrison, 1997:461). Thus, the Moment can be understood as the 
interdependent relationship between the receiving of the ‘truth’ of Christ and the 
subject’s decision to appropriate and act upon this truth in his becoming a 
Christian. This is of course reminiscent of my interpretation of the 
interdependency between the subject’s external encounters and his life choices:  
the subject is dependent on encounters with external influences in order to be 
able to conceive of alternative possible existences; but these existences can only 
be actualised by the subject’s own free will and choice. Thus, the subject’s self-
development can be understood as a two-step process by which he has 
encounters with the external world before making life choices based on these 
experiences.  
We may clarify this understanding by giving a more ‘secular’ example of this 
process, as opposed to Kierkegaard’s overtly theological arguments about 
Christian ‘truth’. Take for instance a subject who wished to be a farmer. This 
subject cannot become, or indeed wish to be, a farmer before he has any 
knowledge in regards to what a ‘farming existence’ entails. Consequently, he must 
have external experiences, or ‘encounters’, with farmers and farming before he 
can imagine himself as a farmer. Nonetheless, although he now has a conception 
of himself as a farmer, such knowledge does not yet make the subject a farmer. 
He can only become a farmer by acting upon this conception and choosing this 
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existence for himself. Crucially, we may acknowledge the two step process and 
symbiotic relationship between freedom and dependency: the subject is 
dependent on encounters with the external world to give him knowledge upon 
which he may base his decisions; it is then up to the subject to make these 
decisions and realise the possible modes of existence which were revealed by his 
encounters.  
To further link this back to Kierkegaard’s objections to recollection in sections two 
and three, we may observe that this gives both the subject’s external experiences 
and his life choices crucial significance. We can see that in the moment the subject 
chooses to be a farmer his existence is changed as he goes from ‘non-farmer’ to 
‘farmer’. In this way this moment of decision has qualitative value within the 
subject’s life as it marks the significant point in which he chose to make this 
transition. Furthermore, as the encounter with farming is what this process is 
centred upon, this external encounter gains central significance as it bestowed 
upon the subject the knowledge required for him to make this life choice. He can 
thus never forget his encounters on the farm as it was these experiences which 
revealed to him the possibility of a farming existence.  Consequently, this 
understanding allows us to appreciate the significance of the external encounter 
in the development of the self which recollection, Kierkegaard maintained, failed 
to achieve.  
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I will now consider how this understanding of freedom, and its relation to the 
external ‘encounter’, compares to the Existentialist philosophy it is claimed 
Kierkegaard inspired. We must primarily observe that this dependence on external 
encounters makes Kierkegaard’s theory of freedom rather different from that of 
thinkers such as Sartre. Sartre argued that human beings are ‘radically free’ and 
unconditioned by their situation and history (Taylor, 1975: 112-3). He 
consequently holds the first principle of Existentialism to be that ‘man is nothing 
else but that which he makes of himself’ (Sartre, 2013:30). However, as has 
become evident, for Kierkegaard the subject is not able to construct his identity as 
he sees fit, but is rather dependent on the external world and the historical reality 
that conditions his existence. In his Papers and Journals, Kierkegaard makes clear 
that, for him, ‘abstract free will’ is a complete fantasy as no subject has a continual 
abstract possibility outwith a historical state of affairs; a subject’s ability to act is 
always dependent upon, and conditioned by, his historical surroundings, the 
actual world he encounters (Kierkegaard, 1996:524-5).   
One will observe that this understanding of freedom appears much closer to the 
thought of Hegel than it does to Existentialism. As Hegel argued in The Philosophy 
of Right: all humans have freedom in their ability to ‘freely choose’, however this 
freedom is dependent on the existence of an external object ‘to choose’. In this 
way our radical freedom negates into complete dependency (Hegel, 2008:37-8).  
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To illustrate this on might imagine a subject who is completely free to drink a cup 
of coffee. However, in order for him to be able to drink a cup of coffee, there must 
be a cup of coffee that exists. His freedom to drink coffee can therefore be 
understood to be completely dependent on an external world where the cup of 
coffee exists.  
The difference between Hegel and Kierkegaard is in how they address this issue. 
Hegel looks for something implicit in the subject that can become an object of the 
subject’s will, and thus avoid the dependency on something external. This he finds 
in the subject’s will itself. Thus to overcome his dependence on the external 
objects, Hegel insists the subject must not will something external to himself, but 
rather will his own ‘free will’. The subject thus becomes free as he is no longer 
willing something which requires external dependency, but rather something 
internal (Hegel, 2008:46). To return to the coffee: to overcome his dependence on 
its external existence, Hegel changes the object of the subject’s will from the 
coffee to the desire for free will.  
The first objection Kierkegaard might raise is that, by overcoming his external 
dependence by relating to his idea of free will, Hegel is falling back on Socratic 
recollection: he is no longer relating himself to himself in regards to ‘something 
else’, but is just ‘relating himself to himself’. Secondly Hegel, although advancing 
dialectically in his mind, is making no movement in actual existence. As Collins 
explains: Kierkegaard’s problem with speculative Idealism was that, although it 
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allowed subjects to proceed towards a more ‘enlightened frame of mind’, it did 
not cause any actual physical movement: it did not prompt the subject to take any 
action or make any choices in existence, he instead remains statically speculating 
about the predicament (Collins, 1954:118-9). In the coffee example, Hegel’s 
speculating about freedom in his mind may make him more enlightened about the 
‘idea of freedom’, but it does not help him make any movement towards attaining 
his goals in existence: he remains thinking about the coffee rather than actually 
drinking it.  
Kierkegaard would rather posit that we must recognise this dependence on the 
external world which we encounter, and then act upon it. To put it into 
Kierkegaardian terminology: my ideal self may picture me drinking coffee whilst 
my actual self does not possess the coffee. This conundrum cannot be resolved by 
abstract speculation but only through existential action; to actualise the possibility 
of drinking coffee one must make the choice to physically pick up the coffee and 
drink it. 
What may be gleamed from this is that Kierkegaard maintained that one must 
recognise the symbiotic relationship between our freedom and dependency on 
the world. To speculate on a way to circumnavigate this would be futile, as such a 
path does not generate any existential action. However to simply assert one’s 
freedom unconditionally is to create a false conception of the human being and 
his capacity for choice; no human makes choices completely freely and is rather 
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always conditioned to a degree by contextual factors. It will consequently be vital 
to my task of reinterpreting Kierkegaard, if I am to give a faithful political 
reinterpretation of his philosophy, that I maintain this symbiotic balance between 
the subject’s ability to make choices and his dependency on encounters with the 
external world.  
I have thus explored Kierkegaard’s concept of the ‘encounter’ and how it relates 
to his notion of ‘self’, and given an interpretation of his thought on this matter. 
Nonetheless, before I conclude and summarise, there is one small aspect I have 
yet to consider. This aspect is one of a ‘failed encounter’; when a subject, rather 
than accepting the mode of existence he encounters, is affronted by it and 
promptly rejects it. This notion can be found in Kierkegaard’s argument concerning 
‘offence’77. 
 
 
                                                          
77 It should be observed that Kierkegaard does not believe that the subject makes choices 
nonchalantly but rather does so with great difficulty. In particular Kierkegaard argues that this 
possibility of having a choice in regards to the future induces in the subject a condition of 
‘anxiety’. This is due to the fact that the subject recognises he may make a choice over his future, 
but as a consequence may choose poorly and make his situation worse than it currently is. This is 
made evident in Kierkegaard’s retelling of the ‘fall’ in Anxiety (Kierkegaard, 1980:45). Now 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of anxiety is intrinsically tied with the Christian idea of sin, for what 
Adam is made aware of is the possibility of disobeying God and his anxiety is caused over what 
could result from such a choice. Anxiety is thus understood in this way as being anxious that our 
choices may sin against God. Nonetheless what is important to realise is that anxiety originates in 
the subject’s capacity to make choices, and the realisation that some choices may end up 
worsening the situation he currently is in. As Kierkegaard makes clear: it is the ‘anxious possibility 
of being able’ (Kierkegaard, 1990:44.)  
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5. Offence 
I have so far considered how the subject may have encounters, and further base 
his life choices upon what he learns from his encounters. However, to give a full 
understanding of this process I must not only explore how the subject accepts 
what he discovers, but also the possibility that he may reject it. This rejection of 
the knowledge given in the encounter Kierkegaard denotes as ‘offence’. The 
purpose of this section will thus be to understand how the subject may reject what 
is presented in the encounter, and on what grounds he does so.     
We may interpret two ways in which Kierkegaard perceives the ‘truth’ of Christ 
may cause ‘offence’. The first is in regards to Christianity being inherently 
paradoxical, and thus ‘offensive’ to human reason78. The second is that, because 
Christianity is a difficult and demanding form of life, it is ‘offensive’ to the ethical 
norms of the society the subject inhabits.  
First, we may consider the problem of the ‘Christian paradox’. As the ‘truth’ of 
Christianity is regarded as paradoxical it can be considered to be ‘offensive’ to 
                                                          
78 The idea that Christianity is a paradox and requires one to suspend one’s own reason can be 
dated back to St Paul’s criticism of the Greeks’ love of reason and philosophy (Colossians, 2:8). It 
should be acknowledged however that there is debate as to what exactly is so paradoxical about 
Christianity that it requires a suspension of reason, at least in Kierkegaard’s understanding. 
Alastair Hannay provides what can be understood as the ‘conventional’ interpretation that for 
God, who is eternal, to become simultaneously ‘temporal’, is a logical paradox (Hannay, 
1982:107). Tim Rose has however argued that the paradox is more one of moral understanding 
than strict logic. He argues that it is the idea that God would forgive sin that is paradoxical to 
humanity, as humanity could not conceive of doing the same thing if roles were reversed (Rose, 
2001:63). This is however a debate whose answer does not concern us. It is enough to 
understand that for Kierkegaard Christianity is a paradox which requires one to surrender one’s 
reason, and that such a request may cause offence.      
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human reason. Consequently, for a subject to adopt the Christian life, he must 
suspend his ability to reason. However, the subject may be hesitant to simply 
suspend his reason and accept such paradoxes; he might indeed choose to trust 
in his own mental capacities rather than the seemingly paradoxical claims of 
Christianity. In such a case the subject can be said to have rejected Christianity 
because it ‘offended’ him, or more precisely, ‘offended’ his ability to think 
rationality (Kierkegaard, 2009:123).  
To illustrate this we may consider the example of the Young Hegelian, and 
Kierkegaard’s contemporary, Ludwig Feuerbach. Indeed, it seems Kierkegaard 
likely had Feuerbach in mind when contemplating ‘offence’. We may observe that 
in his Journals Kierkegaard does refer to Feuerbach as an ‘offended individuality’ 
(Kierkegaard, 1985:217). To this evidence we may also add Kierkegaard’s friend 
Hans Brøchner’s recollection that Kierkegaard often discussed Feuerbach and 
referred to him as one who was ‘offended’ by Christianity (Brøchner, 1996:233)79.  
In his Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach’s arguments do interestingly bear some 
resemblance to those put forward by Kierkegaard. He argues that to accept 
Christianity one must accept paradoxes and surrender one’s reason to faith 
(Feuerbach, 1989:211). However, Feuerbach is clearly ‘offended’ by such a 
proposition as he rejects the idea of revelation precisely because it is contrary to 
                                                          
79 A comprehensive discussion of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Feuerbach is provided by Jonathan 
Malesic in ‘Illusion and Offence in Philosophical Fragments; Kierkegaard’s Inversion of 
Feuerbach’s Critique of Christianity’ (2007). 
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reason, dismissing it as ‘childlike’ (Feuerbach, 1989:208). Thus, we may say that 
Feuerbach realised that one must surrender one’s reason in order to accept the 
Christian life. Nonetheless, rather than accept this, Feuerbach was ‘offended’ by 
it. 
The second reason that the encounter may cause ‘offence’ is that it asks the 
subject to adopt a lifestyle which is very different to the social and ethical norms 
in which he currently exist. In ‘Crumbs’ Kierkegaard acknowledges that to accept 
the Christian life is incredibly demanding and a real ‘challenge’ (Kierkegaard, 
2009:126-7). In Postscript Kierkegaard similarly remarks that one of the reasons 
becoming a Christian is so difficult is that it requires one to accept a view of 
existence that contradicts the ethical norms of society. Indeed, to become a 
Christian one must ‘suspended’ the ethical norms of society, just as one must 
‘suspend’ one’s ability to think rationally (Kierkegaard, 2009:224)80. However, we 
might imagine that a subject chooses not to ‘suspend’ the ethical norms of the 
society he inhabits but rather chooses to reject the Christian life which contradicts 
these norms. In such a case the subject was ‘offended’ by the Christian life as it 
contradicted the ethical norms of his society.   
To illustrate this I may consider two examples. The first example I wish to consider 
is the conversion of St Paul. Before his conversion on the road to Damascus Paul 
                                                          
80 This need to suspend the ethical norms in order to follow the religious Christian existence gives 
rise to the famous Kierkegaardian term the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ (Kierkegaard, 
2009:224).  
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had persecuted Christians for the Jewish authorities. He carried out this 
persecution because he believed it was demanded by the customs and norms of 
the Jewish community he inhabited; Paul claimed he had sought to destroy the 
Christian church because he was ‘zealous of the traditions of my fathers’ (Galatians, 
1:14). However, when God revealed to him his son Jesus Christ, Paul converted 
from Judaism to Christianity (Galatians, 1:16).  What we infer here is that upon 
encountering Christ on the road to Damascus Paul discarded the norms of Jewish 
society in order to adopt a Christian life. Nonetheless, for the sake of example, we 
may imagine that Paul rejected what Christ revealed to him in the encounter. We 
might imagine he did so for the same reasons he was persecuting the Christians in 
the first place; he rejects Christianity because it conflicts with the traditions and 
beliefs of his community. Thus, one might interpret Paul rejecting the possibility 
of becoming a Christian because it was ‘offensive’ to the ethical norms and beliefs 
of his community81.  
The second example I consider is from the Old Testament rather than the New, 
but is nonetheless still illustrative because it is an example which Kierkegaard 
himself discusses at great length. The example is namely that of Abraham’s 
sacrifice of Isaac which Kierkegaard discusses in Fear and Trembling. Kierkegaard 
discusses how God’s commands to sacrifice Isaac were contrary to Abraham’s 
                                                          
81 Paul’s name before his conversion was Saul. Thus in ‘Acts’ the encounter on the road to 
Damascus is described as happening to Saul (Acts, 9:3-5). Consequently, if he had rejected 
Christianity in this encounter, it would have been ‘Saul’ and not ‘Paul’ who would have rejected 
Christ and continued persecuting Christians. Nonetheless I have referred to him as ‘Paul’ for the 
sake of familiarity and clarity.  
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normative understanding. It first contradicted with Abraham’s role as a father, as 
fathers are expected to care for their sons and not kill them. It was also however 
contrary Abraham’s normative understanding of justice: Isaac has done nothing 
wrong and thus to kill him would be considered unjustified. Thus, as Kierkegaard 
makes clear in Fear and Trembling, the ‘ethical expression’ of Abraham’s actions 
is ‘murder’ (Kierkegaard, 2003:60). Now, in the story Abraham of course ‘suspends’ 
his ethical understanding and accepts God’s commands. We may nonetheless 
again imagine that Abraham rejected God’s wishes because they conflict with his 
normative understanding of justice and fatherhood. In this case we might thus 
understand Abraham to have rejected God because what he learned in the 
encounter with him was ‘offensive’ to his ethical norms.     
We may thus understand that the subject may reject what is proposed in the 
encounter because it is either ‘offensive’ to his reason or to his ‘ethical norms’. 
What is common to both these instances however is that what is proposed in the 
encounter is contrary to the subject’s own understanding of existence. Thus, 
‘offence’ occurs when knowledge gained in the encounter conflicts with the 
subject’s own understanding and is thus subsequently rejected.  When this occurs 
it can be said that the encounter has failed.  
To say the encounter has ‘failed’ of course begs the question of ‘who exactly is 
responsible for this failure?’ Is the failure God’s, or more specifically Christ’s, for 
being an unconvincing advocate for the Christian life? Or is the failure that of the 
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subject’s for failing to recognise that the proper mode of existence for him is that 
of the Christian? If the answer is the latter then it implies that there is a certain 
mode of existence that the subject is expected to adopt; a ‘telos’ which he is 
expected to fulfil.  This would of course signify a teleology in Kierkegaard’s work 
and would question exactly how ‘free’ the subject is to choose the life he wishes 
to live; for although it is claimed the subject may choose the life he wishes to live, 
if there is in fact only once choice that is acceptable, is this really a free choice at 
all?  
I will return to this presence of teleology in Kierkegaard’s work, and the issues this 
raises, in the next chapter. In this section it has been sufficient to explore how 
‘offence’ at the encounter may occur. 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion  
 
We have understood the subject to be a synthesis of temporal physicality and 
eternal psyche. The ‘physical’ is representative of the subject’s finite actual 
existence and the restrictions this imposes. The ‘psyche’ conversely represents the 
subject’s ability to imagine himself differently from his current existence and the 
possibility to realise these alternatives. This synthesis is brought together by the 
subject in his free choice to realise a possibility. Thus, we may understand the 
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subject to be historically bound in finite existence, but with the freedom to always 
make choices which shape his existence and life path.  
Nonetheless, it was observed that the subject could not progress this way 
autonomously. Rather, the subject required external experiences, ‘encounters’, 
which allowed him to imagine alternative forms of existence. The crucial function 
the encounter takes in the subject’s self-development is to bestow upon him the 
knowledge, knowledge which he did not have before and could not attain for 
himself, which is required in order to make life choices.  
 It should also be recalled that, just as the subject could accept the life model 
discovered through the encounter, he could also reject it. This occurred when the 
life proposed was so contrary to the subject’s understanding of existence that he 
was ‘offended’ by it.  
Thus, in conclusion, Kierkegaard’s theory of self-development may be understood 
as a two-step process. First of all the subject must have an external encounter 
which bestows upon him the knowledge by which he may imagine a possible 
alternative mode of existence. The subject then realises this possibility by his 
choice to adopt it as a model for his own life. We may thus crucially understand 
the ‘encounter’ itself as the external experience which bestows upon the subject 
knowledge which he previously lacked and upon which he may base his life choices.  
It is this interpretation of self-development which I want to take forward to 
explore how the subject encounters and relates to the State. I will now proceed to 
193 
 
Chapter Five where I will begin reinterpreting Kierkegaard’s theological 
understanding as to develop an interpretation more suitable for exploring such 
‘political’ encounters.    
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Chapter Five: The ‘Subjective Understanding’  
 
“[A] relation which relates to itself, and in relating to itself relates to something 
else” 
(Kierkegaard, 2004:43). 
 
In the previous chapter we discovered that the above remark formed the basis of 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of selfhood. In this chapter I will attempt to 
reinterpret this understanding of ‘self’ as to construct what I will call the subject’s 
‘subjective understanding’ of his existence. This concept will then be used in 
Chapter Six as the basis of my ‘subjective approach’ to exploring the relationship 
between subject and State.  
I here draw attention to the fact that the above statement may be broken down 
into two parts: the ‘relations that relates to itself’, and the ‘something else’ which 
the subject also relates to. In order to achieve the aim of this chapter I will 
reinterpret these two components of selfhood and the manner in which they 
relate to one and other.  
Firstly, I consider the ‘relation that relates to itself’. We may understand this as 
the subject’s relating of his ‘actual existing self’ with the ‘future self he desires to 
become’ and his capacity to realise this desire through making choices. It thus 
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primarily denotes the subject as a historically bound agent, an ‘existing self’, who 
nonetheless maintains the ability to make choices about his life from within this 
context; his ability to imagine and become the ‘future self’.  
In section one I will reinterpret and defend this notion of the subject as one who 
exists within the limitations of a historical context but nonetheless retains the 
ability to make life choices.  
Secondly, the ‘something else’ we may understand as something external to the 
subject that he may encounter. When encountering this ‘something else’ the 
subject is made aware of life options, or ‘possibilities’, which are available to him. 
In this way we may conceive that the ‘something else’ makes the subject aware of 
the different person he can become and thus inspires the ‘imagined future self’. It 
was the encounter with Christ for instance that made the subject aware of the 
possibility of a Christian life and subsequently ‘inspired’ him to become a Christian.  
In section two I will provide a reinterpretation of this ‘something else’ that the 
subject may encounter. This is where my articulation will differ significantly from 
Kierkegaard’s. This is primarily because I will here need to replace God, or ‘Christ’, 
as the ‘something else’ which the subject relates to with something that is more 
suitable for a ’political understanding’. In order to achieve this I will progress in 
four steps.  
In subsection 2.1 I will consider why Kierkegaard identifies God as, not only the 
‘something else’ in his theory, but furthermore the only ‘something else’ which is 
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a valid base from which the subject may make choices. I will aim to criticise and 
show the limitations that this insistence on God places on Kierkegaard’s 
understanding as to justify my movement away from it. This will involve a re-
visiting of the problem of ‘teleology’ I raised at the end of the previous chapter.  
In section 2.2 I will then consider a second problem found when trying to 
reinterpret Kierkegaard’s theory in a more political light. This problem is to do with 
how knowledge is transferred in the encounter with the ‘something else’. To 
explain: when the subject encountered Christ the whole ‘truth’ of God was 
bestowed upon him; he only needed to accept this truth. However encounters 
with phenomena in the political world cannot bestow upon the subject a complete 
knowledge of this world in the same way as the encounter with Christ did. 
Therefore, I will not be talking about ‘one’ encounter, but rather ‘multiple 
encounters’. This shift from a ‘single encounter’ to ‘multiple encounters’ will thus 
be the second step I will have to make when reinterpreting the ‘something else’.    
In section 2.3 I will then provide my conceptualisation of what this ‘something else’ 
is. This I will call the ‘Horizon’ which I shall understand to be a perception of the 
world that surrounds the subject constructed from his multiple encounters.   
In section 2.4 I will then further illustrate this understanding of ‘something else’ 
through my simile of the ‘dark room’.  
It can finally be understood that these two components are brought together by 
the subject’s ‘choice’; the moment in which he chooses to realise and become one 
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of the possibilities revealed to him by the ‘something else’. This choice further 
shapes both the subject and his relations to the world around him. We might for 
instance consider the choice to realise the possibility of a ‘Christian life’ defined 
the subject, as he become a ‘Christian’, and shaped his relationship with the world 
around him, as to ‘become a Christian’ he had to adopt a Christian mode of 
existence.  
In section three I will consequently explore how my two reinterpreted concepts of 
the ‘relation that relates to itself’ and the ‘something else’ relate to one another 
and come together. Similar to Kierkegaard’s understanding, I will argue that these 
two components come together in the moment of choice; when the subject 
chooses to realise a life possibility that was revealed to him in his Horizon. Also, 
similar again to Kierkegaard’s account, I will argue that this choice shapes the 
subject’s identity and orientates his relations with the world around him. This 
understanding and orientation of his existence he receives through his choice is 
what I shall call his ‘subjective understanding’. It is this notion of the ‘subjective 
understanding’ which I will use as a bases to consider how a ‘subjective approach’ 
may explore the subject and State relationship in Chapter Six.  
In the conclusion and summary of this chapter I will provide a summary of this 
‘subjective understanding’ and identify any problems with my presentation of this 
concept which will have to be addressed in Chapter Six.  
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1. Imagining and Choosing Alternatives: The ‘Relation which 
Relates to Itself’  
 
In this section I will outline my understanding of the subject as having the ability 
to make life choices from within a historical context. This understanding holds that 
the subject has the ability to make choices about how he wishes to lead his life. 
Nonetheless, this freedom is not absolute, but rather is restricted and conditioned 
by the external world the subject is situated in. The subject is restricted because 
the external world puts certain limitations upon what he may realistically choose 
to do. It conditions the subject as it is only through knowledge of the external 
world that the subject may come to know the options he may choose from, thus 
facilitating his very capacity to make free decisions. 
 It may be observed here that there is a great body of literature pertaining to 
debates about the ‘freedom of the will’. Nonetheless, my intention here is not to 
enter into such debates. What I primarily wish to achieve in this section is to give 
a specifically Kierkegaardian account of choice which I use to explore the 
‘subjective approach’.  
Nonetheless, one alternative theory about freedom that I shall consider is the 
argument put forward by Arthur Schopenhauer in his essay ‘Freedom of the Will’. 
The reason for this is to defend my interpretation against a specific argument 
concerning determinism which I believe proves particularly illuminating as to why 
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this Kiekregaardian understanding of freedom complements the ‘subjective 
approach’. Why I have chosen to consider Schopenhauer’s argument in particular 
is because I believe it draws out the differing ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
interpretations of human freedom which will be important for the proposed 
approach82.   
To begin, we may once more consider our subject who wishes to become a pilot. 
Now, our subject may be able to decide that he wants to become a pilot, 
nonetheless his ability to realise this ambition is limited by the situation he finds 
himself in. He may for instance come from a poor background and consequently 
may struggle to raise the money for the pilot exams. Furthermore, he may lack the 
intelligence and mathematical skills that a pilot requires. Thus, although he may 
desire to be a pilot, the subject may be restricted and even prevented from 
realising this goal by the circumstances of his situation. Therefore, he is not 
completely free to define his life, but is rather restricted by the circumstances of 
his situation.  
We can thus see how the subject’s circumstances restrict his choice. I would argue 
that his circumstance is also what facilitates his ability to choose. In order to 
choose to become a pilot our subject must have a conception of ‘what it is to be a 
pilot’. Now, the subject was not born with this understanding, the function of a 
                                                          
82 I may therefore also make clear here that I am not attempting to give a compressive account of 
Schopenhauer nor his philosophy of the will. I am rather only making an illustration of an 
argument that will help explain my own approach 
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pilot cannot be considered innate knowledge. Nor can the subject simply invent 
what it is to be a pilot or choose for himself what being a pilot consists of, he 
cannot for instance decide that ‘being a pilot’ consists of ‘riding a bicycle’. Rather, 
he must learn from the external world about such things as ‘airplanes’ and ‘air 
travel’ before he can form in his mind an understanding of what exactly ‘being a 
pilot’ entails. It is only once he has formed a rough conception of ‘a pilot’ that a 
subject can then choose to become one. Indeed, we might say the subject is 
dependent on his existence in a world where ‘pilots’ exist. He could not for 
instance choose to become an airplane pilot in First Century B.C. Rome. Therefore, 
we may assert the subject cannot simply ‘invent’ himself as he pleases, rather he 
is dependent on the external world in order to become aware of the possible 
pathways in life that he may choose from. It is in this way that the subject’s 
situation not only restricts his freedom but also facilitates it.    
Thus, I have argued that the subject is not completely free but is restricted by his 
circumstances in two important ways. Firstly, the subject’s situation may restrict 
and even prevent him from achieving the life he desires. Secondly, the subject is 
dependent on his external world to reveal the possible life options from which he 
may choose. Consequently, we may say the subject’s environment both restricts 
and facilitates his capacity for free choice.  
Nonetheless, I would argue that, despite these restrictions, the subject always 
maintains the ability to make free choices. Upon learning about what becoming a 
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pilot entails, and further weighing up the restrictions of his own situation, the 
subject is always free to make that choice to try and become a pilot. I may also 
argue that such choices are not final or eternally binding; the subject may decide 
to try and become a pilot, but later change his mind after finding the study 
involved to be overly taxing. Thus, our subject is not only always free to make 
choices but is also always free to change his mind. This interpretation of free 
choice therefore holds that, although the subject is restricted and conditioned by 
the world around him, whatever his situation may be he always retains the 
capacity to make decisions about the direction of his life83.  
I may now turn to consider the objection to this understanding of the subject and 
his capacity for choice which comes from those philosophical positions which hold 
that the subject’s actions are completely determined. On such an understanding 
the subject’s capacity for choice would be dismissed as an illusion.  
 To illustrate this argument I will turn to the thought of Schopenhauer, and in 
particular to his essay on the ‘Freedom of the Will’. Schopenhauer argues that 
when we consider human behaviour from an objective perspective it becomes 
clear that freedom is an illusion, and in fact all our decisions and choices are 
predetermined. Viewed in this way human action, like all other worldly 
                                                          
83 It should be highlighted here that this interpretation of the subject’s capacity for choice is 
similar to the understand Kierkegaard gives, particularly in Sickness Unto Death, and which has 
been discussed in Chapter Four. The reason I have proceeded with an example rather than a 
discussion of Kierkegaard’s more abstract and philosophical articulation is because this has been 
discussed at length in Chapter Four. Therefore, the use of an example was intended to put across 
this understanding as clearly as possible without repeating what has already been said.    
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phenomena, is subjected to the rule of cause and effect. Consequently, all our 
actions and choices must have had a prior cause which brought them into being, 
and it is this cause which further determines and makes necessary these choices 
and actions. Understood in this way, free choice becomes something akin to a 
miracle; a spontaneous effect which occurred without any cause (Schopenhauer, 
2010:71). To avoid this absurdity we must therefore understand that all actions 
and choices are a result of prior causes, which Schopenhauer calls motives.  We 
may therefore understand that our decisions are not a product of free choice but 
were the result of the strongest motive which acted upon us and determined our 
actions. Thus, Schopenhauer argues, just as the movement of the billiard ball is 
determined by the strike of the cue and cannot begin before this has occurred, so 
our decisions are determined by external motives and we cannot act before these 
motives have compelled us to do so (Schopenhauer, 2010:70). 
However, difficulty arises from the fact that human motives are complex and 
difficult to identify. For instance, the motive that compels a subject to buy a 
sandwich, and in particular why to buy a certain type of sandwich, or indeed a 
sandwich and not a burger, and further why he chooses to eat now and not wait 
for his dinner at home, is far less tangible than the cause of the billiard ball moving 
across the table. This difficulty in identifying motives makes it appear as if there 
are none, thus creating the illusion that the action was the product of a 
spontaneous free decision. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer insists that, despite the 
complexity of the cause or the multiplicity of its possible results, the decision was 
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still a result of causation, and thus is no less determined than was the movement 
of the billiard ball (Schopenhauer, 2010:65). 
We may further clarify this argument by considering it in comparison to the 
phenomena of the natural world. We may for instance consider the erupting of a 
volcano. To the people of antiquity, who did not have the scientific knowledge to 
identify the cause of the erupting, this phenomenon appeared spontaneous. 
Consequently, they would often claim it erupted due to the will of an angry god, 
and thus to a degree attribute to nature a freedom of will. However, this is of 
course not the case: volcanic eruptions are caused by the building of pressure 
often due to the movements of tectonic plates. Thus, the eruption is caused and 
determined by the movement of these plates; not by the free will of nature or of 
an angry God. This is similar to our understanding of freedom: our actions and 
choices are caused by powerful motives that act upon us and compel us to make 
certain decisions. However, as these causes are often unclear to us, we instead 
explain them as the result of a free choices, just as the ancients did with the 
volcano. 
However, Schopenhauer insists that the biggest contributor to the ‘illusion of 
freedom’ is not the intangibility of causes, on the contrary the ‘illusion’ is primarily 
caused by the fact that we rarely consider the issue of freedom from an objective 
position. Instead, we often look at the problem of freedom from ‘the perspective 
of self-consciousness’, or what we might call the ‘subjective perspective’. 
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From this ‘subjective perspective’ we do not consider why an external object acts 
in the way it does, as for instance with the erupting volcano. Rather, in this 
perspective we consider ourselves and our capacity to make choices. One, for 
instance, is not concerned with an external object and its movements but rather 
one’s own ability to move; one do not ask ‘why that object moved left’ but rather 
‘do I have to go left?’, or ‘do I have the capacity to decide to go right instead?’. The 
answer to this, from a subjective perspective, will of course be ‘yes’; ‘if I don’t want 
to go left, I can indeed choose to go right instead’. In this thought process it will 
be noted that attention is given almost exclusively to the self and external factors 
are excluded; thought revolves around whether I can choose to go right and what 
factors may cause me to go right are not given proper consideration. This is very 
different to how we contemplate natural phenomena. We do not for instance 
consider whether the volcano can choose to erupt or not erupt, but rather look to 
the external causes that necessitated the eruption. The ‘subjective perspective’ 
thus overlooks external influences and focuses primarily on the self. This makes it 
appear as if one is free to choose one’s own actions and thus gives the illusion of 
freedom of choice (Schopenhauer, 2010:48-9).  
The reasons why Schopenhauer maintains this freedom of choice is an illusion are 
twofold. Firstly: as I have discussed, by focusing on the self as subject, and not as 
a phenomenon immersed in the natural world, it excludes the external causes or 
motives which will ultimately determine the decision over which direction to go. 
Thus, although it may appear to me I can choose between left and right, in reality 
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this decision will be determined by which direction has stronger motivations for 
me.  
Secondly, it confuses ‘wishing’ with ‘willing’, the former denoting the desire to do 
something, and the latter the actual doing of the action. Now, although I may ‘wish’ 
to go left or right, I cannot physically do both. What will cause me to choose one 
direction over the other will ultimately be which direction has the stronger 
motivation, and until this motivation has acted upon me I will remain ‘wishing both’ 
but actually ‘willing neither’. Thus, Schopenhauer would insist we cannot act or 
make a decision until a strong enough motive has compelled us to do so, and 
consequently the action was determined by a prior cause. Freedom of choice is 
thus an illusion; we are as much necessitated by causation as is the billiard ball and 
the volcano (Schopenhauer, 2010:68-9). 
What I wish to highlight here is the focus on perspective Schopenhauer takes when 
arguing for determinism. As he makes very clear, it is only when one takes the 
‘objective’ vantage point that the subject’s dependency on causation becomes 
clear. On the contrary, from the subjective position, it appears that the subject 
does have a free decision over what he wishes to do. Thus, Schopenhauer’s 
arguments requires one to take an ‘objective’ approach to human action in a 
similar way as do scientists in regards to natural phenomena.   
However, the intention of this thesis is to resist ‘stepping back’ from the subject’s 
perspective. Indeed, it is the desire of this thesis to better explore the subject’s 
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situation, in particular the moment in which he encounters the State. Thus, given 
this intention, it would seem most appropriate to take a ‘subjective perspective’. 
In light of this it would seem appropriate to hold the view that the subject does 
have a choice in what actions he wishes to partake in. To try and understand his 
decisions as determined by causation would be to move away from this 
perspective into the objective ‘removed’ vantage point. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I will maintain that the subject has a capacity for free 
choice, regardless if it can be argued to be an illusion from an objective perspective 
or not.  
Nonetheless, it may be worth briefly contemplating whether, if we were to follow 
Schopenhauer into the realms of his ‘objective’ philosophy, if such a deterministic 
view of human behaviour would enrich our understanding of political relationships. 
We have already alluded to the fact that understanding the causes of human 
actions is far more opaque than understanding causation in the natural world.  
This is further complicated by the fact, which Schopenhauer acknowledges, that 
humans often try and conceal their motives and we can never know truly what is 
going on in their minds (Schopenhauer, 2010:67). Thus, although such arguments 
provide interesting speculation, such an objective and deterministic account 
would not appear as the best approach to investigating the human world, 
especially not in such a complex area as political relationships. Such an attempt 
would be unlikely to be able to identify the true causes of political actions and 
decisions, if such ‘true causes’ do indeed exist, and any conclusions would likely 
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be reductive and assumptive. This is in line with my criticisms of such ‘outside 
approaches’ in Chapters One to Three, which maintained that such approaches 
overlook the experiences and perspective of the subject.  
To conclude this argument, it is worth drawing attention to a comparison 
Nietzsche made between human will and waterfalls in Human, All Too Human. The 
passage is both complex and profound, and therefore it is worth quoting at length;  
“When we see a waterfall, we think we see freedom of will and choice in the 
innumerable turnings, windings, breaking of the waves; but everything is 
necessary; each movement can be calculated mathematically. Thus it is with 
human actions; if one were omniscient, one would be able to calculate each 
individual action in advance… To be sure the acting man is caught up in his 
illusion of volition; if the wheel of the world were to stand still for a moment and 
an omniscient, calculating mind were to take advantage of this interruption, he 
would be able to tell the farthest future of each being and describe every rut the 
wheel will roll upon” (Nietzsche, 2004:74). 
We may of course observe here that Nietzsche is arguing for determinism, perhaps 
unsurprising given the influence of Schopenhauer on his thought. Nonetheless, I 
want to focus on his use of the term ‘omniscient’. It is only a calculating 
‘omniscient being’, Nietzsche claimed, who could identify the necessary causes of 
human behaviour. He further observes that even such an omniscient being could 
only identify these causes if the world stopped turning. However, we are not 
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omniscient, and the world will continue turning. We can therefore only take the 
vantage point of the ‘acting man’, the person who is ‘caught up in this illusion’. 
This is however not something my thesis shies away from, but is something it 
embraces. It is my aim to construct a paradigm for understanding political 
relationships which better appreciates the experiences and perspective of the 
existing subject. It is for this reason primarily that I shall embrace the view the 
subject has the freedom to make decisions and is not completely determined. 
I am therefore arguing for what may be called a ‘limited’ understanding of 
freedom; I am perceiving the subject as neither entirely free nor as entirely 
predetermined. I am acknowledging that the subject’s freedom is restricted by his 
the circumstances of his situation, and furthermore that this situation facilitates 
his capacity for free decisions. Nonetheless, despite the situation the subject finds 
himself in, he always maintain the capacity to freely choose between the options 
the situation presents to him. This theory of the subject and his ‘limited freedom’ 
is in line with Kierkegaard’s understanding as outlined in Chapter Four.  
 
2. The ‘Something Else’   
 
2.1 God as ‘something else’  
It will be observed that Kierkegaard was highly critical of the idea that the subject 
could base his life on any political concept or institution. Instead, he insisted the 
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only truly valid ‘something else’ that the subject should relate to was God, as is 
revealed through the person of Christ. All other possibilities could only lead to 
despair (2004:76). 
Therefore, before I begin outlining the change from a religious to a political 
‘something else’, I must defend myself against Kierkegaard’s objection. I will argue 
that by making God the only valid ‘something else’ the subject may relate to, and 
subsequently Christianity the only true form of existence that the subject ought to 
adopt, Kierkegaard makes his argument overtly teleological. This is problematic as 
such a teleology marginalises and excludes many forms of existence and 
undermines the subject’s capacity for choice.  
That, for Kierkegaard, Christianity is the only valid life form of life is unsurprising 
when we consider Kierkegaard’s overall intentions.  As Kierkegaard states in Point 
of View, the entirety of his pseudonymous work was concerned with the task of 
how one becomes a Christian and to direct his readers towards the Christian way 
of life (Kierkegaard, 1998:44).  In this way we may understand that the ‘Christian 
life’ is the overarching end or ‘telos’ to Kierkegaard’s account of human existence84. 
The teleological nature of Kierkegaard’s thought is a subject fervently debated 
amongst Kierkegaard scholars. Some have taken a biographical approach to 
understanding this structure which interprets the progression of the ‘stages’ as 
                                                          
84 Indeed ‘telos’ is the word used by commentators such as Taylor to describe Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the Christian existence (Taylor, 1975:77). 
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symbolic for Kierkegaard’s own life journey; we would thus understand the 
‘aesthetic stage’ as representative of Kierkegaard’s university years, the ‘ethical’ 
as his engagement to Olsen, and the ‘religious’ to his later Christian beliefs and 
commitments.  Others have nonetheless taken a more ‘universally applicable’ 
understanding of Kierkegaard’s thought; they have interpreted the development 
through the spheres as a model for understanding how the human self-progresses 
from infancy to mature personhood. Such interpretations have consequently 
drawn comparisons between Kierkegaard’s thought and other self-development 
theories such as Hegel’s account of the progression of human consciousness in The 
Phenomenology of Mind and Sigmund Freud’s theory of psychosexual life stages. 
Nonetheless, neither the questions of ‘how exactly we account for Kierkegaard’s 
implicit teleology?’, nor ‘what interpretation of his thought’s structure is more 
correct?’, are of central importance to my thesis. What is crucial is that 
Kierkegaard’s account of human existence is teleological, and that it is because of 
this that he holds there is only one valid possible life for the human self85.  
To further illustrate this I will thus focus on one particular interpretation of 
Kierkegaard that exemplifies the teleological nature of his thought. This is the 
interpretation that maintains Kierkegaard’s arguments bear close resemblance to 
                                                          
85 Examples of a biographical account of Kierkegaard’s thought include Walter Lowrie’s biography 
of Kierkegaard Kierkegaard (1938); ‘psychological’ interpretations include I.B. Ostenfeld’s Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Psychology (1978); there are a number of works discussing the relationship 
between Kierkegaard and Hegel, one of the most prominent being Stephen Crites’ In the Twilight 
of Christendom (Crites, 1972:66). A good summary and analysis of the differing approaches can 
be found in Taylor’s Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship (1975), in particular Chapters One 
and Two.   
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Hegel’s philosophical system. Such a view is most strongly advocated by Stephen 
Crites in The Twilight of Christendom.  Crites argues that Kierkegaard’s thought 
forms a dialectical skeleton with the ‘stages of existence’ taking a definite order as 
they lead from the lowest form of existence, found in the aesthetic, to the highest, 
found in the religious life according to Christ. Thus, Crites assert that what 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings amount to is in effect a new 
‘phenomenology of spirit’, alternative to Hegel’s (Crites, 1972:66)86. This is of 
interest to us because it opens Kierkegaard to exactly the same criticism I levied 
against Hegel and the idealists, and indeed the ‘rational approach’ more generally, 
in Chapter One: by taking such a narrow and linear approach to understanding 
human existence they excludes and fail to account for a great variety of human 
behaviour. Indeed, just as we saw Green and Collingwood degrade behaviour 
which fell out with their rational paradigm as ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’, so 
Kierkegaard degrades behaviour that lies out with a Christian existence as ‘in 
despair’ and as ‘in sin’.  The effect of this teleological character to Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy is therefore to make only one mode of existence valid for the subject, 
and in the process exclude all other possibilities.  
From what has been said, an argument could be put that Kierkegaard’s veiled 
teleology renders his work incapable of understanding human existence. An 
                                                          
86 It should be observed that such a comparison between Kierkegaard and Hegel is not limited to 
Crites. John Elrod similarly concludes that Kierkegaard’s thought can be understood as a 
‘Christian Phenomenology of Spirit’ (1975:250).   
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argument could also be advanced that Kierkegaard ultimately ends up providing a 
dialectical account of existence which is extremely similar to the Hegelian system 
he criticised. We may even level a similar criticism against Kierkegaard which is 
often cited against Marx: despite attempting to overturn the Hegelian system 
Kierkegaard ends up providing an account of existence which is far less changed 
from the Hegelian original than he would like to realise87. Indeed, from what has 
been said, there would appear good grounds upon which to raise the hypothesis 
that Kierkegaard’s thought is overtly Hegelian.  
That said, there are fundamental differences between Hegel and Kierkegaard’s 
thought that should be acknowledged. As Crites himself emphasises, unlike 
Hegel’s levels of consciousness, Kierkegaard’s ‘stages of existence’ do not logically 
follow one another nor can they be mediated by thought. On the contrary each 
stage is allowed to argue its case in completely its own terms and is embodied 
poetically in its own pseudo-author. As a consequence the subject, or indeed the 
reader, cannot move through these spheres by way of thought alone but rather 
must make a decision about which life he wishes to lead (Crites, 1972:66-7). This 
interpretation is also in accordance with George B. Arbaugh and George E. 
Arbaugh’s claim that the central difference between Kierkegaard’s account and 
Hegel’s is that movement through the former’s system is by decision and action, 
                                                          
87 For such an interpretation of Marx see Hannah Arendt’s essay on ‘What is Existential 
Philosophy’. Interestingly Arendt compares Marx in this passage to Kierkegaard but does not 
acknowledge the same return to Hegel in the latter’s thought (Arendt, 1994:175). 
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rather than speculative thought and mediation (1967:74-5). This however does 
not take away from the fact that Kierkegaard’s stages are ranked from lowest to 
highest, consequently rendering a teleological account of existence similar to 
Hegel’s.  We may observe that, as has been stated, Kierkegaard shared a very 
similar understanding of the self to Hegel and, like Hegel, believed there was an 
end or ‘telos’ which the subject ought to reach. The crucial significance between 
Kierkegaard and Hegel however is that, whilst the latter believed the subject could 
advance intellectually to this telos through speculative thought, the former 
believed he could only reach his ‘end’ by making choices and undertaking action 
in existence.  
Nonetheless, as interesting as this is, my primary task is not to discuss the debt 
Kierkegaard owed to Hegelian thought. We must always bear in mind the focus of 
this thesis is to render an interpretation of Kierkegaard, an interpretation which 
can be developed into a paradigm for understanding my political question of how 
the subject relates to the modern State. I have shown that, by holding only one 
religious option as valid, Kierkegaard’s understanding of existence becomes 
overtly teleological and reductive.  
With this in mind I revisit the issue I raised in Chapter Four in regards to the 
relation between teleology and Kierkegaard’s concept of ‘offence’. In particular, I 
raised the question at the end of Chapter Four: where does fault lie for ‘offence’ 
and the failure of the encounter? In light of the above discussion the answer is 
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clearly that fault for ‘offence’ lies with the subject. It is clear that the telos or 
proper end of the subject is perceived to be the Christian life. Thus, the subject is 
expected to abandon his ‘worldly understanding’ because this is necessary as to 
attain to his telos. When the subject takes ‘offence’ it is thus he that is failing to 
ascend to his proper and true end.  
This Christian teleology puts severe limitations on Kierkegaard’s theory. As we 
have seen this view of human existence is extremely reductive and excludes many 
other forms of life. It also undermines much of Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
freedom. This is because, although Kierkegaard maintains the subject may choose 
to become a Christian or not, for Kierkegaard only the Christian choice is valid 
whilst the alternative is to remain in sin.  Consequently, as only one choice and 
one way of life is truly valid, it undermines how free the subject really is to choose 
between these alternatives.    
I have thus shown the limitations of Kierkegaard’s insistence on there being only 
one valid from of existence and the teleological implications of this assertions. I 
now consider how my own reinterpretation avoids this danger.  
My reinterpretation will have no political ‘end’, ‘goal’, or ‘telos’ which I shall 
advocate. On the contrary, my aim will be to explore how the subject becomes 
aware of his possibilities, and how, by making choices based on these possibilities, 
he defines both himself and his relations to the world around him.  Thus, my 
approach does not wish to recommend one possibility, but rather explore how the 
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subject chooses from many possibilities, and what the consequence of these 
choices are for his political relations.   
Nonetheless, I am not here advocating that the notion of ‘telos’ should be 
banished from political discourse. As theorists such as MacIntyre have insisted, 
teleology can be a vital concept for understanding subjects’ aims and behaviours88. 
Indeed, it might be acknowledged that some of my previous discussion may be 
interpreted as alluding to an understanding of telos. Consider my example of the 
pilot from section one: he could not ‘invent’ what being a pilot was, but rather 
chose to try and be something that already existed in the world.  This something, 
namely the pilot, is thus an ‘end’ which the subject wishes to ascend to. To do so 
he must become capable in a number of practices which are necessary to become 
a ‘pilot’, for instance mathematics. Thus, we may observe that such a subject has 
indeed a telos which he wishes to ascend to, and there is a number of choices he 
must make, and practices he must adopt, if he is to achieve this.  
However, the difference between my use of telos and Kierkegaard’s is that I am 
not ascribing a telos to the subject. This does not mean that subjects will not 
structure their life on a teleological basis, as did our pilot. However it was not me 
who ascribed this telos, rather the subject selects it for himself. He similarly may 
choose to later take a different path in life, say as a farmer. Through this choice he 
                                                          
88 For MacIntyre’s arguments see After Virtue (2007), in particular the chapters on ‘The nature of 
the Virtues’ and ‘The Virtues, the Unity of Human Life, and the Concept of Tradition’.  
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would thus change the goal or end he perceives for his life, and with this its 
teleological understanding. 
Also, I do not prescribe what practice the subject must adopt in order to become 
a pilot. On the contrary, it is imagined that these practices are revealed to the 
subject through his encounters. My intentions as the theorist are rather to 
understand how encounters make subjects aware of their options, and how 
choices based on these revealed options affect their understanding of self and 
subsequent relations.  
My difference from Kierkegaard in approach here can thus be summarised briefly 
as follows: in order to avoid giving a reductive understanding of human existence 
I shall not insert in my approach an assumption about what is the proper end for 
the subject. On the contrary, I shall seek to understand how the subject may 
become aware of certain possibilities in his life through encounters, and how his 
choices in regards to these possibilities shape his relationship to the world around 
him.   
This has immediate implications for how I conceptualise the ‘something else’.  In 
particular, I must not conceive of it as a single phenomenon which prescribes one 
valid choice to the subject. Rather, I must interpret it as a broader understanding 
of the world which posits multiple possible life choices which the subject may 
choose from. How I am to conceive of such a ‘something else’ will become clearer 
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as I proceed with shifting my understanding away from Kierkegaard’s concept of 
God.    
Nonetheless, before I develop such an understanding, I may conclude this section 
by considering the potential criticism that, by removing the Christian ‘end’ to 
Kierkegaard’s theory, I corrupt his understanding of the ‘self’ and the ‘encounter’.  
The first consideration in faithfully interpreting Kierkegaard, as was made clear in 
the previous chapter, was the need to  recognise the dependence of the subject’s 
freedom of choice on his having encounters; to maintain this symbiotic mutually 
dependent relationship between ‘freedom’ and the ‘dependency on the external 
world’. I would argue that I am maintaining the emphasis on the ‘encounter’ as 
the means by which the life choices are revealed to the subject, and thus both 
restrict and facilitate his ability to make free choices. Thus I am maintaining the 
equilibrium between choice and encounter, and am faithfully reinterpreting 
Kierkegaard’s conception of the self.  
A greater challenge appears however in removing Kierkegaard’s concept from its 
religious background, and in particular removing the specifically ‘Christian 
encounter’. We might recall that Kierkegaard did not believe one should relate 
one’s life to a political concept or institution. Consequently Kierkegaard would 
appear sceptical in regards to the importance of a political encounter, and how 
fulfilling a choice based on this would be. It would instead appear that the only 
‘proper encounter’ is the religious encounter, such as the encounter with Christ. 
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It might therefore be argued that, by removing the religious element of 
Kierkegaard’s concept, I am losing something central to the ‘encounter’.  
To answer this objection I must outline what in particular is significant about the 
specifically ‘Christian encounter’. We may identify two things: first a complete 
understanding of oneself and one’s place in existence; and secondly the possibility 
of eternal salvation.  
 Kierkegaard believes it is the encounter with God which allows the subject to 
come to a complete understanding of his existence. This is because it is only by 
encountering God that the subject can realise the nature of his existence as having 
been created by a God who is qualitatively different from himself (Taylor, 
1975:242). Thus the encounter with God allows the subject to ‘truly know’ who he 
is. As Kierkegaard states, in such an encounter, the subject becomes ‘grounded 
transparently in the power which established it’ (Kierkegaard, 2004:165).  
Secondly, the encounter with God incarnate reveals to him the possibility that, if 
he chooses a life of faith, there is the possibility of ‘eternal blessedness’ (Taylor, 
1975:323-5). It is thus only through an encounter with God that relief from the 
tribulations of life can be reached. As Kierkegaard concludes Anxiety, one can only 
rest from the anxious struggles of the world when one finds the possibility of 
Atonement, and realises this possibility through faith in God (Kierkegaard, 
1980:160-2).    
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Thus we may understand the significance of the religious encounter is that it 
reveals to the subject the true nature of his existence and the possibility of eternal 
salvation. This point is illustrated in the discussion of Socrates in Crumbs. 
Kierkegaard refers to the quest Socrates was issued by the oracle at Delphi to 
‘know himself’. However, despite his many journeys and experiences, Socrates is 
never able to truly know his own nature; he did not truly know if he was a ‘mild’ 
being or a ‘monster like Typhon’. The reason for this is that, being unable to 
encounter God Incarnate, Socrates lacks that encounter which reveals the true 
nature of human existence, and the subsequent possibility of salvation through 
faith in Christ (Kierkegaard, 2009:112). Thus, despite the many encounters 
Socrates may have, he can never know the truth of his existence nor find salvation.  
Nonetheless, what is clear is that Socrates can have encounters which inform him 
about himself and open up life choices, the encounter at Delphi for instance led to 
Socrates choosing a life of philosophical enquiry.  Such encounters just do not 
reveal ‘the truth’ about his existence nor offer salvation. Similarly, in Either/Or, 
Kierkegaard speaks of encounters of an aesthetic nature, such as theatrics and 
music (Kierkegaard, 1992:123). Indeed, when we consider that Either/Or was 
written to make readers aware of the possibility of an aesthetical and ethical life, 
and to prompt a choice between them, we might understand the reading of 
Either/or itself as an encounter: it reveals to the reader knowledge of possible life 
paths and prompts him to choose between them. Nonetheless, none of these 
encounters are specifically religious; they may not offer complete understanding 
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or salvation, but they are still encounters which reveal to the subject something 
about the world and the life possibilities contained within it.  Thus, although the 
‘Christian encounter’ is needed to gain true knowledge of existence and find 
salvation, it is not necessary for one to have encounters and make choices.  
I would argue that neither of these two particularly qualities, ‘truth of existence’ 
or ‘salvation’, would be necessarily useful for a concept used to study politics. 
‘Truth’ about oneself and existence would claim that there is a final and absolute 
end condition for politics, a certainty about what politics is and the subject’s place 
within it. This would be however to exclude change from our study. This would be 
incredibly limiting as politics is by its nature volatile and subject to change. 
Secondly, the idea of a certain salvation the subject ought to attain implies a 
teleology to his existence, and I have already spoke at length as to why I do not 
want to assume a teleological structure to the subject.   
Thus, to answer potential critics, I am interpreting Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
the self and the encounter faithfully as I am maintaining the symbiotic relationship 
between freedom of choice and encounter. In removing the religious element I am 
not removing the ability of the subject to have encounters, but only encounters 
which can reveal two possibilities: the ‘truth’ about one’s existence; and the 
possibility of eternal salvation, neither of which would be suitable for a study of 
politics.  
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2.2 From ‘One’ to ‘Multiple’ Encounters  
In order to gain an understanding of the possibility of the Christian existence, for 
Kierkegaard, all the subject needed was an encounter with Christ. This was 
crucially a one-time incident through which the subject gained all the knowledge 
he required to make the decision of whether to become a Christian or not89.  
It is inconceivable however that one encounter could bestow upon the subject a 
complete knowledge of the political world he inhabits and all its possibilities. I 
must rather contend that such knowledge can only be built up over time. Indeed, 
this knowledge can never be understood as ‘complete’ as it will be constantly 
added to as the subject’s life progresses and he has more experiences. We may 
for instance imagine our subject first gained an understanding of the political 
world from his parents, then learnt more from his school, before having his own 
experiences with politics more directly in adult life. It may thus be conceived that 
his understanding of the political world will not remain uniform but may change 
as he progresses through life.  
I therefore argue that it is unfeasible to imagine that our subject has one 
understanding of his political environment which is attained through one 
                                                          
89 It should be noted that Kierkegaard makes no distinction between a disciple of ‘first hand’ and 
one of ‘second hand’; both the encounter of the life of Christ by physically meeting Jesus, and the 
encounter of the life of Christ through hearing about him from those who did, are equally valid 
(Kierkegaard, 2009:168). 
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encounter. Rather, I contend that he has a fluid conception of the political world 
which evolves as he continues to have encounters throughout his existence. 
Consequently, I will have to consider not just one singular encounter, but rather 
multiple encounters which occur over time and constantly add to, and potentially 
change, the subject’s understanding.    
This change from one to multiple encounters also changes how I perceive the 
subject, and in particular how I understand his role in gaining knowledge from his 
encounters. In Kierkegaard’s religious account the subject was completely 
dependent on his encounter with Christ, and consequently upon God, for his 
understanding of the religious life (Kierkegaard, 2009:96-7). In receiving 
knowledge Kierkegaard’s subject is completely passive; all knowledge of the 
Christian life is bestowed by God through one encounter and the subject simply 
receives this information in its entirety90. 
 However, such a concept is impossible in my reinterpretation. As we saw, the 
subject cannot receive all the information about the polity he inhabits in one 
encounter, but rather he receives this gradually through multiple encounters 
across time.  As a consequence, what he is receiving is not a complete readymade 
understanding of the world, but rather only fragments of knowledge. Thus, my 
                                                          
90It will be recalled that freedom was a central concept for Kierkegaard and in his thought the 
subject was certainly active in his ability to choose which standard of existence he was going to 
base his life choices upon. Nonetheless the subject is passive in the reception of the Christian life 
model; he simply receives this readymade model and takes no role in the construction or 
assembly of the knowledge it contains.  
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subject must take upon himself the additional responsibility of assembling these 
fragments into an intelligible whole.  
This need to assemble fragments of knowledge results in a shift in my 
understanding of the subject. He is no longer a passive recipient but rather must 
take on the additional task of sorting and assembling the knowledge he receives. 
Consequently, the subject must be perceived as an active agent who receives 
fragmented knowledge and constructs this into his own intelligible conception of 
the world around him.  
The subject can thus be understood to build an understanding from the 
fragmented knowledge he receives through his encounters. Consequently the 
‘something else’ the subject relates to is an understanding he has constructed 
through these encounters.  
I have already stated that the name I will give this ‘something else’ is the ‘Horizon’. 
It is therefore now time to investigate this concept in proper detail.   
 
2.3 The Horizon  
 
I may draw attention to two functions the concept of ‘horizons’ has served in 
wester thought. Firstly, it marks the limitations of the subject’s own understanding 
of existence. Secondly, it informs the subject’s understanding of self, providing a 
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framework of knowledge which he can use to orientate himself in the world and 
further develop his identity. I will investigate both these functions in turn91.    
I begin with Hans-George Gadamer’s understanding of ‘horizons’ as outlined in 
Truth and Method. In this text Gadamer defines a ‘horizon’ as “the range of vision 
that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” 
(Gadamer, 2012:301). 
From this we can infer firstly that a ‘horizon’ is a limitation on the understanding, 
and secondly that this limitation comes from the certain position or ‘vantage point’ 
that the subject currently occupies. This makes understanding the subject’s 
positionality or ‘situation’ crucial to our understanding of horizons; if the horizon 
is a perspective from a certain vantage point, to fully understand what it includes 
we must investigate the vantage point it was taken from.   
Gadamer accredits the formulation of the concept of ‘situation’ chiefly to Karl 
Jaspers92.  In Way to Wisdom Jaspers identifies the ‘human state’ as ‘always in 
situations’. Among the situations which the subject finds himself in there are, 
according to Jaspers, certain ones that are fundamental to existence which he 
                                                          
91 I must once again draw the reader’s attention to the fact that I am not here intending to give a 
history of the notion of the ‘horizon’ in western thought nor an extensive account of the 
particular interpretations of ‘horizons’ mentioned. My intention in discussing the use of 
‘horizons’ in western thought here is rather to draw out particular characteristics which shall 
inform my own fashioning of the concept of ‘Horizon’ which shall take the place of the 
‘something else’ in my approach. I am therefore only engaging with these other articulations of 
the concept as far as they help fashion and illuminate my own.   
92 Gadamer accredits Jaspers in a footnote to his discussion of ‘horizons’ in Truth and Method 
(Gadamer, 2012:301).  
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denotes ‘ultimate situations’. Such situations are ‘ultimate’ because they cannot 
be changed or escaped. Examples of these include ‘death’ or ‘chance’ (Jaspers, 
1954:19-20). 
Jaspers is here clearly concerned with the fundamental conditions of human 
existence. Nonetheless, what we may elicit from this is that we can understand 
existence as always located within situations, situations which the subject cannot 
remove himself from. This is indeed how Gadamer utilises the concept, arguing 
that the idea of a situation implies that we are always ‘inside of it’ and are unable 
to ‘remove ourselves from it’. The consequence of this inability to remove 
ourselves is that we can never gain objective knowledge of our existence. On the 
contrary, trapped as we always are within the ‘situations of life’, our 
understanding of existence is always a limited and imperfect subjective one 
(Gadamer, 2012:301).   
It should be observed that Gadamer does not see such horizons as fixed or static. 
He, on the contrary, argues that a subject’s horizons may be expanded, and indeed 
even that a subject may open up new ‘horizons’. Nonetheless, what horizons may 
never become is objective; understanding is always limited by the position of the 
subject within existence.  The ‘horizon’ is thus fundamentally a body of subjective 
knowledge; it is the subject’s own perspective of his existence gained from inside 
of it (Gadamer, 2012:301-2).   
226 
 
This limited subjective appreciation of his existence is what I shall understand as 
the subject’s ‘Horizon’. Therefore, when talking of the ‘Horizon’, I am denoting the 
limited subjective understanding of the particular world the subject inhabits from 
his position within it.  
I may now further synthesise my concept of ‘Horizons’ with that of the encounters. 
I have said that the subject gains an understanding of the world around him from 
piecing together the fragments of knowledge which he gained through multiple 
encounters. Such knowledge, having been gained by the subject from his situation 
within the world he inhabits, is therefore the subject’s own perspective, or his 
subjective appreciation of the world he inhabits. We may consequently 
understand the ‘Horizon’ to be the subjective knowledge of the world constructed 
from the fragments of knowledge gained in the subject’s encounters.  
Furthermore, just as I understood Gadamer’s ‘horizons’ to be fluid, so I may also 
understand my ‘Horizon’ as fluid as it changes and evolves as the subject has more 
encounters.  
I now consider the second function of ‘horizons’ that I identified at the beginning 
of this subsection: its ability to inform the subject of his identity and orientate him 
in the world. To understand this I turn to the arguments contained in Taylor’s 
Ethics of Authenticity, a work which is more focused on the development of the 
human self than Gadamer’s Truth and Method, which is primarily concerned with 
methods in historical and textual analysis.  
227 
 
We may recall from Chapter Two that for Taylor human existence is perceived as 
fundamentally ‘dialogical’ in character; the subject cannot define himself alone in 
isolation but can only come to understand who he is through interaction with 
others, in particular ‘significant others’, such as parents (Taylor, 2003:33-5). Thus, 
Taylor insists we must understand human self-development as constructed in a 
dialogical nature between the subject and an ‘other’. Taylor insists these ‘others’ 
are not just restricted to persons, but also includes the cultural framework the 
subject inhabits. Taylor argues that such cultural contexts indeed provide a 
‘background’ which the subject relates to and defines his identity against. Such 
cultural backgrounds are what Taylor denotes as ‘horizons of significance’ (Taylor, 
2003:35-6). 
To make this argument clearer I consider Taylor’s examples. Taylor describes a 
person who defines his identity by the fact that he has exactly 3,732 hairs on their 
head.  However such a fact does not tell us anything about the subject’s identity, 
indeed the fact that he defines himself in such a way appears completely arbitrary 
and has no intelligible significance. However, this will change if we consider that 
the society the subject is part of is a cultural community that holds the number 
3,732 to be sacred. Now, the subject’s decision to define himself by the number 
of hairs on his head gains significance as it identifies him as special amongst his 
community. Crucially, this significance can only be realised when we relate the 
subject’s features to the beliefs of his community. It is thus that the beliefs of the 
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community form a ‘horizon’ against which his identity is significant and intelligible 
(Taylor, 2003:36).  
It is the same with the subject’s actions. Again, Taylor asks us to imagine a subject 
who decides to identify himself by doing something seemingly arbitrary: wriggling 
his toes in mud. Once more, if we try and comprehend this action in isolation, that 
is in abstraction from the ‘horizon of significance’, it cannot reveal anything that is 
significant about the subject. However, if we then realise that the subject’s 
community believe that mud is the element of the world spirit, and by dipping 
one’s toes in the mud one can contact this spirit, we suddenly understand why this 
action is significant for the subject; he is participating in the communities sacred 
practices and thus identifying himself as part of this social and religious belief 
system. Again, what is fundamental is that the subject’s actions can only be 
understood as significant when we relate it back to his horizon (Taylor, 2003:36).  
We may therefore understand that horizons form for Taylor a vital ‘reference 
point’ for the subject’s development of self-identity; it is by relating to this 
meaningful background that the subject develops his identity and can give his 
features and actions significance.   
It will be evident as to why such an account is appealing for the formulation of my 
own understanding of ‘Horizon’: like with my ‘something else’ the ‘horizon of 
significance’ is something that the subject is able to relate to when trying to 
develop his self-identity.  Indeed, in light of this we can understand how the 
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‘horizon’ allows the subject to orientate himself in the world: it is by relating back 
to the horizon, and the understanding reflected in it, that he is able to comprehend 
what type of community he currently inhabits. In a similar way, I will therefore 
propose that the ‘Horizon’ allows the subject to comprehend what sort of society 
he inhabits and orientate himself within existence.  
Nonetheless, it may be observed that in many ways what Taylor is describing as a 
‘horizon’ is rather different from my conception. In a sense, Taylor’s 
understanding can be understood as simply the background or context that the 
subject inhabits; it is not the subject’s own perception of this environment as has 
been constructed through his encounters. This is indeed quite evident from 
Taylor’s assertion that horizons are independent of the subject and ‘given’ (Taylor, 
2003:39). My concept however is clearly neither ‘independent of the subject’ nor 
‘given’ as it is constructed by the subject from the encounters he has within the 
situation of existence. Indeed, referring back to Chapter Two, it is this appreciation 
of ‘horizon’ as basically the context, as opposed to a subjective perception of 
context derived from particular encounters, which makes Taylor’s understanding 
particularly illustrative of the ‘contextual approach’. 
Thus, although I want to draw from Taylor this notion that subjects form their 
understanding in relation to these ‘horizons’, I do not share with him the belief 
that horizons exist independently of the subject and are given. On the contrary, I 
am asserting that ‘Horizons’ are constructed from the knowledge gained from 
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encounters, and are thus dependent on, and to a degree relative to, the subject.  
It is thus this ‘Horizon’, understood as a ‘constructed perception’ and not a ‘pre-
given’, that subjects relate to. In other words my concept of ‘Horizon’ is not simply 
the cultural context the subject inhabits; it is rather the mental perception of this 
context constructed by the subject from knowledge gained in his encounters.  This 
indeed again reveals the central difference between my approach and the 
‘contextual approach’: the latter attempted to examine context as it informed the 
subject’s relationship; I wish to explore the encounters which give the subject a 
perception of the political world he inhabits.  
Taylor could respond to my articulation of the ‘Horizon’ with the accusation that 
it is a form of ‘soft relativism’: if one does not have a framework of meaning which 
is independent of the subject, then one will lose the common point of reference 
that made the subject’s identity intelligible. Without a common point of reference 
the subject’s choices and actions will become simply results of his own preference 
or caprice, thus causing my account to slide into ‘soft-relativism’ (Taylor, 2003:38).  
In response I would argue that, as my account of the ‘Horizon’ perceives it as 
constructed by the subject from the fragments of knowledge gained through his 
encounters, it is undoubtedly subjective. This is unsurprising as the aim of this 
thesis is to lay the foundations for a subjective approach to the relationship 
between subject and State: one constructed from the subject’s limited perspective 
within his historically bound context.  
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However, I would adamantly insist that this subjective nature of ‘Horizons’ does 
not cause my understanding to slide into ‘soft relativism’. To explain we must 
consider again how the ‘Horizon’ is constructed. I said that it was constructed by 
the subject’s assembly of fragmented knowledge he obtained through multiple 
encounters with the external political world. Crucially, this world does exist 
independent of and prior to the subject. Thus we may say that, although the 
‘Horizon’ is subjective and particular to the subject, it is not formed out of pure 
caprice as it is constructed from the common source of the world we all share.  
From this discussion of ‘horizons’ I am now able to give a sketch of what I 
understand by the ‘Horizon’. First of all, it is an understanding constructed by the 
subject. It is constructed over time as the subject gains fragments of knowledge 
through his encounters and assembles these into an intelligible whole. In this way, 
it represents the limited subjective appreciation of the world from the subject’s 
position within it. It is this limited subjective perception that he then relates to in 
order to understand both himself and his relations within this world. In this way 
the ‘Horizon’ forms the ‘something else’ that the subject relates to.   
 
2.4 The Simile of the Dark Room  
I wish to make the above outline of the ‘Horizon’ clearer by using my simile of the 
‘dark room’.  I wish to illustrate in particular with this simile how the subject 
constructs his perception of his situation from the knowledge gained from 
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encounters with it, and how he relates to this perception in order to understand 
and orientate himself within this situation. I also wish to further explore here how, 
by relating to this perception, the subject also becomes aware of the possibilities 
contained for him within this situation.  
We may imagine our subject finds himself in a dark room. The only light in the 
room is coming from a small portable lamp. The light emanating from the lamp is, 
however, insufficient to illuminate the room entirely. In order to discover his 
surroundings and orientate himself the subject must therefore take the lamp and 
investigate the room.  
As the subject traverses the room the lamp is able to illuminate small parts of it. 
He may for instance cast light on one part of the room and find a door. As he moves 
away from the door to discover more, darkness will again fall on the door and 
obscure it from his vision. He continues like this for some time revealing the size 
and shape of the room as well as its features: a television at its centre and a closed 
window at the opposite side to the door. Again, each of these features is revealed 
to the subject when he casts the lamp’s light upon them. However, when he moves 
on, darkness once more descends on these features obscuring them from his view. 
Nonetheless, although he can no longer see them, the subject knows the features 
of the room exist around him as he has consigned the knowledge of them gained 
through his encounters to his memory.   
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From these visual fragments our subject is thus able to gain an understanding of 
what the room looks like. He does this by taking from his memory the fragmented 
visions and constructing them into a visual representation of the room in his mind. 
Consequently, our subject is able to orientate himself within the room; he has a 
vague understanding of what the room consists of and, by relating himself to this 
understanding, is able to gain an appreciation of where he is located in regards to 
its features. We will notice however that, when orientating himself, he is not 
relating himself to the room as it immediately exists before him, this is impossible 
as it is shrouded in darkness. The subject on the contrary is relating himself to the 
mental perception of the room he has constructed. Thus, we may say, when 
orientating himself, the subject does not relate to the room itself as it physically 
exists before him, but rather to the mental perception of the room he has 
constructed from memory. We may understand this mental perception he relates 
to as his ‘Horizon’.  
This ‘Horizon’ has, however, not only revealed to the subject the nature of this 
room, but also the possibilities contained for him within it. The existence of the 
television informs the subject the possibility of him watching television. The 
existence of a window informs him of the possibility to escape. Again, we might 
observe that it is his ‘Horizon’ that informs the subject about his options. He 
cannot relate directly to the objects like the television and the window as, standing 
in the darkness, he can no longer see them. It is rather the knowledge that they 
are there, gained from his encounters and integrated into his ‘Horizon’, that he 
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relates to when considering his options. Similarly, the fragmented knowledge of 
such phenomena as the window alone cannot inform him of the possibility of 
escape. It is rather only when this knowledge is embedded in the ‘Horizon’, and 
thus complemented with the knowledge that he is trapped in a dark room, that 
the possibility of escape becomes intelligible to him. Thus, again, I contend it is the 
‘Horizon’ which he consults in order to comprehend his situation and the 
possibilities contained within it.  
 It is worth stressing here that, although I allow that the ‘Horizon’ is clearly a 
subjective understanding of the subject’s situation, this does not result in a form 
of ‘soft-relativism’93. The subject has not constructed his understanding of the 
room through his own fancy or caprice, but rather from his own experiences inside 
the room. Therefore, it is possible that different subjects may gain slightly differing 
perceptions of the room; a subject who is afraid of the dark for instance may 
overlook certain features which a calmer person will take note of. Nonetheless, 
both subjects have the same common basis for their understanding: the physical 
room they find themselves in.  Thus, this understanding is subjective but it is not 
a form of ‘soft-relativism’ as it is constructed as result of encounters with an 
independent and pre-existing physical space.  
Thus, I may say that the ‘Horizon’ of the room is the mental perception of this 
room as has been constructed by the subject’s encounters with its features. In the 
                                                          
93 I am here again referring to Taylor’s objection to ‘constructed horizons’ in Ethics of Authenticity 
(Taylor, 2003:38-9).  
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same way I understand the ‘Horizon’ of the subject’s existence as the mental 
perception of the world the subject inhabits as has been constructed through 
encounters with features of the this environment. The subject cannot step outside 
this mental perception as to observe his situation objectively, but rather is always 
limited to this subjective mental perception of his environment. This mental 
perception both makes the subject aware of the nature of this world he finds 
himself in, and thus helps him orientate himself within it, and further reveals to 
him the possibilities this world contains for him. This ‘Horizon’ therefore forms the 
‘something else’ the subject relates to when making his choices.  
 
3. Choice  
 
In order to explain how the subject’s choice bring the two components discussed 
in this chapter together I will have to briefly recount what I have argued so far. 
 I have argued that the subject has the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities 
to the life he currently lives and further has the ability to realise these choices. This 
capacity is however dependent on the subject being made aware of the alternative 
possibilities which are available for him within the world he inhabits. The subject 
is made aware of these possibilities through his ‘Horizon’. This is the mental 
perception of the subject’s world constructed from the knowledge gained from 
encounters within it. Consequently, in order to realise a possibility, the subject 
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must select a life option revealed in his ‘Horizon’. In this way the subject and the 
Horizon are brought together as the subject chooses from the ‘Horizon’ something 
he wishes to become himself.  
In this way I may understand the ‘subject with his capacity for choice’ and his 
‘Horizon’ as existing in a symbiotic relationship; the subject requires the ‘Horizon’ 
in order to become aware of the options that he may choose from, and the 
possibilities the ‘Horizon’ reveals to the subject require his choice in order for 
them to be released. This symbiotic relationship is thus held together in the 
subject’s choice; the moment in which he chooses to realise one of the possibilities 
revealed in his ‘Horizon’.  
The relationship between these two concepts explained, I now turn to consider 
how this choice shapes and defines the subject and his relations with the world 
around him.  
We may here consider that when the subject chooses to realise a possibility that 
has been revealed in his ‘Horizon’ he appropriates knowledge of this to himself, 
and in this process thus further defines who he is.  One might for instance consider 
that when one chooses to become a Christian one appropriates the knowledge of 
‘what a Christian is’ and defines oneself by it. Thus, similarly, when the subject 
chooses to be ‘a farmer’ he adopts a ‘farmer’s way of life’ and thus appropriates 
this understanding of ‘farming’ as to identify himself94.  
                                                          
94 The importance of ‘appropriation’ in defining the subject’s understanding of himself and his 
relations to the world for Kierkegaard is clearly evident in his understanding of the appropriation 
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It should however be observed that to simply ‘call oneself something’ is not the 
same as to ‘become something’. We might for instance recall that for Kierkegaard 
many of his fellow Danes, despite calling themselves Christians, could not actually 
be truly considered Christians as they did not behave in a Christian way95. Similarly 
we might for instance imagine that our subject chooses to become a farmer but 
nonetheless never leaves his job in an inner city office. In such a case, although 
the subject chose to try realise the possibility of farming, he can never be 
considered to have successfully become a farmer. This is because being a farmer 
involves partaking in certain practices associated with farming. We may for 
instance imagine that during his ‘encounters with farming’ the subject realised 
that ‘farming’ involved ‘growing and selling crops’. Consequently, if the subject 
wishes to become a farmer he must adopt this practice of ‘growing and selling 
crops’, which may involve him leaving his office job and moving to the countryside. 
Thus in order to realise these possibilities contained within his horizon, the subject 
must adopt certain practices which effect how he lives his life and relates to others. 
Consequently, the subject must not just appropriate this knowledge from the 
Horizon in order to realise a possibility; he must also adopt the practices 
                                                          
the Christian life. It is worth however noting that this idea of ‘appropriation’ is also considerably 
stressed in the Postscript. Consider for instance Kierkegaard’s claim ‘the subjective truth’ is ‘the 
truth of appropriation’ (Kierkegaard, 2009:19). 
95 In ‘Point of View’ for instance Kierkegaard complains about his contemporaries who declare 
themselves Christian but never think about God or say his name unless it is to curse (Kiekregaard, 
1998:41). Also consider in Postscript where Kierkegaard argues that just inhabiting a State where 
the prevailing religion is Christianity, such as Nineteenth Century Denmark, does not make one a 
Christian (Kierkegaard, 2012:45).   
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associated with it. The adoption of these practices will consequently shape his 
relationship to the world around him.  
Thus, to summarise: the subject brings together his capacity to make choices and 
his ‘Horizon’ when he selects possibilities from the latter which he wishes to 
become. This choice defines the subject as he appropriates knowledge from the 
Horizon and attributes to himself. This further shapes his understanding of, and 
relationship with, the world around him as he must also adopt certain practices if 
he is to realise the desired possibilities. It is this understanding of his himself and 
his relationship with the world constructed through encounters and choices which 
I call the subject’s ‘subjective understanding’. It is this ‘subjective understanding’ 
I take as the basis to forming a ‘subjective approach’ to the subject and State 
relationship in the next chapter.   
 
4. Summary and Conclusion       
I will now proceed to the summary and conclusion of this chapter. Here, I aim to 
summarise how I progressed in reinterpreting Kierkegaard’s religious theory into 
the grounds for a more political approach.  
Nonetheless, before doing so, I wish to address a potential misunderstanding that 
could arise from how I have depicted the construction of this ‘subjective 
understanding’. In order to provide a clear articulation of this concept, it was 
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necessary to isolate the key components of Kierkegaard’s understanding of self 
and reinterpret them in turn. However, this may have given a false impression that 
the ‘subjective understanding’ always follows a linear pattern: from encounter, to 
construction of ‘Horizon’, to choice. Such an interpretation would of course render 
an incredibly abstract and false understanding of how subjects come to 
understand themselves in the world. In particular, it would lend to the idea that 
the subject could sit back and construct an understanding of the world from his 
encounters as if he was constructing a picture from jigsaw pieces. Once he had 
proceeding to construct a coherent enough picture of the world he could then 
simply make a choice about which possibility he wished to realise, as if selecting 
off a menu. This would render the false impression that the subject firstly enjoys 
a privileged position where he can gain knowledge of the world prior to making 
any commitments, and secondly that he has no commitments or contextual 
factors that influence this choice.  Such an interpretation of the subject and his 
relations would consequently be as abstract and removed as Rawls’ ‘Original 
Position’, however rather than making choices from ‘outside the world’ the 
subject would be making them from a ‘bubble within it’. 
This is however not as I intend it to be understood, and as I have stressed it was 
only necessary to present the concepts in linear fashion as to give a clear account 
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of them96. On the contrary, I imagine the subject’s ‘subjective understanding’ to 
be a fluid perception which changes and evolves as the subject has new 
encounters and makes new decisions throughout his life. Indeed, we might 
imagine that ever since the subject first had encounters, and made choices in 
regards to these, he has had this ‘subjective understanding’ of himself and his 
relations. Consequently, to try and pinpoint a time when the subject was not 
involved in this conception of himself would be a fruitless exercise. Instead, I 
therefore maintain we can imagine this ‘subjective understanding’ to be a fluid 
concept which informs the subject’s understanding of his existence from birth 
until death. Consequently, we must always perceive encounters, the construction 
of ‘Horizons’ and the making of choices, to occur within and be informed by this 
constantly changing ‘subjective understanding’.  
This of course effects how we understand the subject’s encounters. He will for 
instance not only be gaining from these encounters knowledge of his environment, 
but also assessing this knowledge and the possibilities it entails against this 
‘subjective understanding’.  This will of course be vital for understanding the 
subject’s encounter with the State, as it suggests that the former will assess the 
later on the basis of this ‘subjective understanding’. Nonetheless, the ‘encounter 
with the State’ is the subject for Chapter Six, and therefore I will leave this 
                                                          
96 It might also be observed that Kierkegaard’s conceptualisation, which saw the subject having 
one encounter which revealed one option, an option which by selecting the subject could ascend 
to the highest sphere of existence, also contributes to this linear perception.  
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reconsidering of the encounter for the next chapter. I will instead now finish this 
present chapter with a summary of how I reinterpreted Kierkegaard’s theological 
understanding as to form the basis of my ‘subjective approach’.  
I began this chapter by addressing the issue of the subject. I gave an interpretation 
of the subject which saw him as embedded within a historical context, but 
nonetheless with the ability to still make choices within this context. This was seen 
to be in line with Kierkegaard’s understanding presented in Chapter Four.  
I then proceeded to reinterpret Kierkegaard’s ‘something else’. I dismissed 
Kierkegaard’s concept of God as the only ‘something else’ which a subject could 
relate to as it resulted in an overtly teleological theory which excluded many forms 
of human existence. I further argued from this that my ‘something else’ could not 
be as rigid as Kierkegaard’s and must provide more valid possibilities than one. I 
then began addressing the problem of knowledge received in the encounter. I 
argued that knowledge of the subject’s political environment and possibilities 
could not be gained through one encounter but must be gathered from many. 
Thus I asserted the subject must construct this ‘something else’ from the 
knowledge gained across his encounters. This ‘something else’ I proceeded to 
denote as the ‘Horizon’. I further articulated this ‘Horizon’ as a mental perception 
the subject constructed from the knowledge gained in his encounters.  
I then finally considered how the subject related to this ‘Horizon’. I argued that 
this was achieved when the subject chose what possibilities displayed in the 
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‘Horizon’ he wanted to realise. In making this choice the subject further defined 
himself, as he appropriated knowledge from his Horizon to attribute to himself, 
and the world around him, as he adopted certain practices and dispositions 
according to this adopted life model. In this way the subject constructed a 
‘subjective understanding’ of his existence. It is this ‘subjective understanding’ 
which I will now take as the foundation for my ‘subjective approach’ to 
understanding the subject and State relationship.   
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Chapter Six: Encountering the State  
 
In the previous chapter I reinterpreted Kierkegaard’s theological understanding of 
the self into what I termed the ‘subjective understanding’. This last chapter will 
now investigate how this approach may be used to better understand the 
relationship between subject and State.  
In section one I will first reconsider the ‘encounter’. The issue was raised in the 
previous Chapter that the construction of the ‘subjective understanding’ did not 
follow a linear progression, but was rather a constantly evolving fluid process. I 
will thus explore in this section how encounters occur within this process, and in 
particular how the knowledge gained in an encounter is evaluated against the 
existing ‘subjective understanding’.  
I will then in section two consider how one might approach the encounter 
between subject and State. It will be explored how the subject may encounter, 
and evaluate his encounters, with the State. It will also further reflect on the 
ethical implications of this discussion.  
In section three I will explore the ‘subjective approach’ at work. To do so I will seek 
to use this approach to investigate a particular encounter which the subject may 
have with the State: namely the encounter a subject may have with the Courts in 
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Scotland. The purpose of this investigation will be to identify what in particular the 
‘subjective approach’ would focus on, and how this focus differs from the other 
approaches discussed in this thesis.  
In section four I will considering what questions the ‘subjective approach’ asks 
about the nature of the encounters which the subject has with the State, what 
bearing these have on their relationship, and the further areas of exploration 
which this approach could venture into.  
Finally, in section five, I will conclude by considering potential objections which 
may be made against the proposed ‘subjective approach’.  
 
1. The Encounter  
 
When the subject has encounters we must consider that he not only receives 
knowledge which is assimilated into his ‘Horizon’, but also evaluates what is 
presented against his ‘subjective understanding’. Thus, to understand the 
encounter fully, we must comprehend how such evaluation occurs.  
To illustrate this I might again turn to Kierkegaard’s account of the subject being 
‘offended’ by the encounter with Christ. We will recall Kierkegaard suggested that 
the Christian life was very hard to adopt as the expectations given by Christ were 
very different from the understanding subjects held about their own existence. It 
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was this incompatibility between their own understanding and what was being 
conveyed to them by Christ which subsequently caused subjects to be ‘offended’.   
We might therefore perceive that the knowledge and possibilities received in the 
encounter are judged against the subject’s own understanding of his existence. It 
should be observed that Kierkegaard argues that the subject should choose to 
abandon his understanding and accept the absurdities which are conveyed to him. 
This is justified because it was deemed as necessary if one was to become a 
Christian, and thus attain to the proper telos of human existence.  Thus, 
Kierkegaard’s term for this choice as the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’; 
the subject’s postponement of human norms and understanding in order to carry 
out tasks necessary to achieve one’s proper ‘end’ as directed by God (Kierkegaard, 
2012:24). However, given that my approach does not prescribe a telos to the 
subject, I need not consider here the suspension of understanding in order to 
achieve teleological ends.  
What is more important to recognise here is that the knowledge the subject is 
presented with in the encounter is evaluated against the subject’s own 
understanding of existence. The more it corresponds is to this understanding the 
more likely the subject is to accept it and consider choosing the possibilities 
presented; the more at odds it is with his understanding however the more likely 
he is to reject it and dismiss the possibilities it reveals. To interpret this into the 
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terminology developed in Chapter Five: the encounter is always judged against the 
‘subjective understanding’.  
The example of the subject who is considering the possibility of becoming a farmer 
will help illustrate this. We must consider here that the subject is not deliberating 
this choice from a removed position where she has no pre-existing commitments 
or obligations. On the contrary, she is evaluating this possibility from a position 
where she has already made choices and has ascribed to practices and obligations 
as a result of these. It is this process of encounters and choices which has shaped 
her understanding of existence, what I have termed her ‘subjective understanding’. 
It will consequently be this perception of her existence which she consults when 
making the choice of whether to realise the possibility of becoming a farmer or 
not.   
Let us imagine for instance that the subject has had encounters which have made 
her aware of the possibility of having children and becoming a mother. We might 
also further imagine that this subject has chosen to realise this possibility and 
elected to have a child.  As has been previously discussed however it is not enough 
to simply say one ‘is something’, but one must also adopt the practices as are 
associated with this role. Thus, the subject has not only decided to be a mother 
but has also subsequently adopted the practices and obligations associated with 
‘motherhood’, such as say feeding and caring for her child. This role, along with its 
practices and obligations, are consequently incorporated into her understanding 
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of existence. Thus, we might say the subject in question has a ‘subjective 
understanding’ which incorporates both her awareness of the ‘existence of 
motherhood’ as well as an understanding of herself as a ‘mother’ along with the 
practices and responsibilities associated with this appropriated role.  
It is this ‘subjective understanding’ that the subject will now relate to the option 
of becoming a farmer against. Let us imagine for instance that the subject realises 
that the profit she may make from farming will allow her to provide better food 
and clothes for her child. In this case the knowledge of farming complements her 
‘subjective understanding’ and as a result she may be more likely to select to 
realise this possibility. On the contrary, we might imagine that the long hours 
associated with ‘farming’ will conflict with the understanding of her responsibility 
to care for her child. In this case the knowledge of what farming entails is in conflict 
with her ‘subjective understanding’. In such a case she will likely be ‘offended’ by 
it and subsequently reject the possibility of becoming a farmer.  
Of course, the fact that the subject’s ‘subjective understanding’ is in conflict with 
the knowledge received in the encounter does not necessarily mean the subject 
will reject it. We might for instance imagine that our subject realises that the 
possibility of farming is at odds with her understanding of herself as a mother but 
nonetheless chooses to realise this possibility anyway, neglecting or abandoning 
her child in the process. In this case we might say that the subject rejected this 
part of her ‘subjective understanding’ and chose to adopt the new possibilities 
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revealed by the encounter instead97. Nevertheless, despite the outcome of her 
choice, what we must recognise is that the information received in the encounter 
is evaluated against the subject’s current understanding of her existence; the 
encounter is always evaluated against the ‘subjective understanding’.   
 
2. Encountering the State  
 
Chapter Five argued that the subject can never in one encounter be presented 
with the entirety of his environment. On the contrary, it was proposed that his 
perception of this environment was constructed from the many fragments of 
knowledge he had received across multiple encounters. Similarly, I claim that the 
subject never encounters the State in its totality, especially given its nature as a 
‘disembodied order’, but rather builds a perception of this through multiple 
encounters with its different manifestations and representations. Such 
encounters could for instance be with the police force, social services, the court 
system, figureheads such as the Queen or president, or it could be through how 
the State’s laws regulate and impact upon the life of the subject: laws for instance 
restricting the sale of alcohol or cigarettes.  
Now, we may perceive that when a fragment of knowledge is received in the 
encounter it is subsequently evaluated against the ‘subjective understanding’. 
                                                          
97 This ‘rejection’ of the ‘subjective understanding’ would be in line with what Kierkegaard 
expects the subject to do when presented by the possibility of the Christian life.  
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Thus, when encountering the State the subject is both learning more about this 
institution and assessing it against how he understands his own existence. Thus, 
as the subject builds his perception of the State from these encounters he is not 
constructing this as a something of neutral worth or as something with no 
immediate bearing on his life. He does not for instance regard this institution he 
is learning about as something ‘objective’, as say a scientist would treat the 
discovery of a new bacteria or the construction of a new form of plastic. He is 
rather constructing this understanding always as it relates to his own existence 
and considering how this institution affects him.  
I consequently would propose that the subject’s relationship to the State is 
formulated through the construction of this perception. The relationship can thus 
be understood to grow out of and be a product of the subject’s encounters with 
the State’s manifestations. The State is furthermore not something that is 
considered as separate to the subject’s existence, but is rather always considered 
in relation to it. I might therefore say that the encounters with the State are part 
of the subject’s self-development; his ever evolving perception of the State is 
intertwined with his own becoming.  
Now, I have suggested that the subject is likely to look favourably on what is 
encountered if it corresponds to his ‘subjective understanding’. Thus, we may 
perceive that the more encounters the subject has had with the State which 
correlate with his ‘subjective understanding’ the more likely the subject will have 
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a positive appreciation of the State he inhabits. On the contrary, the more 
encounters the subject has had which have conflicted with this perception, and 
thus the more times he has been ‘offended’ by what he has encountered, the more 
likely he is to form a negative relationship with the State. Thus, the subject’s 
perception and relationship to the State is always rooted in the nature of these 
encounters, and in particular to how the information the subject receives 
correlates to his own understanding of existence.  
In order to clarify this argument I shall relate it to the thought of Green, and in 
particular his framework for understanding ‘political obligation’. We will recall 
how, in Chapter One, I identified the way in which Green combined the political 
thought of Rousseau and Austin. To recollect, Green imagined the State as Austin 
described it: a sovereign power which issues commands to its subjects in the form 
of laws. However, the subject’s obedience to these laws was dependent on the 
Sovereign and his commands being in accordance with the ‘general will’ or 
‘common good’ of its people. Thus Green synthesised Rousseau’s notion of ‘the 
general will’ and Austin’s understanding of law as the positive commands of the 
sovereign. The result of this was that the grounds of ‘political obligation’ rested in 
the State’s actions being within the parameters of what was perceived as the 
common good of the subjects it sought to rule over. When the ‘general will’ and 
the State’s commands ceased to be in harmony, so political obedience would also 
cease (Green, 1986:69). 
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Nonetheless, it was argued that Green’s understanding of the ‘general will’ or 
‘common good’ was largely based on what was perceived as ‘rational’. Thus, we 
could interpret the State’s commands as ‘being in accordance with the ‘general 
will’’ as equivalent to the State’s commands ‘being in accordance to reason’. The 
result of this was that reason became the central pivot upon which relations 
between subject and State were understood. It furthermore excluded many 
actions and forms of behaviour which were contrary to Green’s understanding of 
reason from consideration. This was demonstrated by Green’s association of such 
forms of behaviour with primitivism and their subsequent dismissal as forms of 
‘savagery’.   
In contrast to this understanding of reason I have explored an alternative 
understanding of what it is that the subject uses to determine the validity of the 
State. This is his ‘subjective understanding’, with which he evaluates the 
manifestations of the State that he encounters. On this understanding, it would 
be subsequently proposed that the subject will obey the State and feel obliged 
towards it if his encounters with it correspond to his ‘subjective understanding’. 
When they conflict however he will be ‘offended’. If the subject is offended by the 
State it is likely he will build a negative perception of it and relationship with it. In 
such a situation it is unlikely that the subject will feel any form of loyalty or 
obligation towards the State.  
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I again illustrate this with reference to Green. In ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom 
of Contract’ Green remarks that laws which restrict the sale of alcohol or make 
schooling compulsory will not cause any offence to a subject who provides for his 
household, saves his wife from overwork, and sends his children to school. This is 
because such laws support, rather than interfere, with his way of life. The State 
consequently appears to such a subject as ‘a powerful friend’ (Green, 1986:203). 
It is rather to the drunkard, or the negligent husband and father, that such laws, 
and by extension the State, would appear offensive and the State an interfering 
nuisance. This is because such laws inhibit and restrict how he wishes to lead his 
life.  
 Of course, Green would undoubtedly conceive that the former subject is able to 
perceive the State as a ‘friend’ because of his superior rationality and 
consciousness of his proper ends. The latter subject in contrast would not 
recognise that the State is trying to help him, and instead regard it as a nuisance, 
because of his depraved reasoning and ignorance, or indeed Green might suggest 
his primitivism.   
My ‘subjective understanding’ however provides an alternative way of considering 
this. I might propose that the first man, through his encounters and the knowledge 
gained from them, has come to an awareness of the possibilities of being a ‘good 
husband’ and a ‘good father’. He has further chosen to realise these possibilities, 
thus appropriating to himself these notions of ‘good husband and father’. These 
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identities have further prescribed to the subject certain behaviours and practices 
which shape his relations to the world. His intention to be a ‘good husband’ has 
for instance prescribed to him the practices of ‘providing for his wife’, ‘not getting 
too drunk’ and ‘sending his kids to school’. This understanding of himself, and the 
practices he ought to prescribe to and follow, are subsequently incorporated into 
his ‘subjective understanding’.   
Now, let’s imagine this subject encounters the State in the form of the law 
restricting the sale of alcohol. Assessing this against his ‘subjective understanding’ 
the subject would find this law favourable to him. This is because it compliments 
his understanding that one should not drink too much in order to be a ‘good 
husband’ or ‘good father’.  Consequently, he views the State favourably and a 
positive relationship is formed. The subject is indeed more likely to feel loyalty and 
obligation to such a State whose intentions are so in accordance with his own 
understanding.   
When what is encountered is however in conflict with the ‘subjective 
understanding’, and the subject is subsequently ‘offended’ by the State, the 
relationship sours. We may for instance imagine that the subject likes to drink 
alcohol, and indeed furthermore shares the view of the Bishop of Peterborough 
that to drink alcohol is his right as an Englishman98. In this case it is perceived in 
the subject’s ‘subjective understanding’ that he has a right to freely buy alcohol 
                                                          
98 See discussion of Green in Chapter One for the debate between himself and the Bishop.  
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and get intoxicated if he so chooses. Consequently, when he encounters this law 
prohibiting the sale of alcohol it conflicts with his ‘subjective understanding’ as it 
appears to be curtailing what he perceives as his right. He is consequently 
offended by this encounter. It is furthermore unlikely that a subject who perceives 
his State as one which infringes upon his rights will feel any particular affection or 
obligation towards it. Thus, from this ‘offensive encounter’ the subject’s relation 
towards the State sours99.  
The more encounters the subject has with the State that ‘offend him’ the more 
negative the subject’s perception of the State will be, and consequently the poorer 
the relationship will be that develops between them. In particular, we might 
imagine that, if the subject builds such a negative perception of the State, the less 
likely he is to feel any loyalty towards it or any sense of obligation100.  
It thus follows that it is in the State’s interest that its encounters with its subjects 
ought to be conducted in a manner as correspondent to the subjects’ ‘subjective 
                                                          
99 Interestingly such arguments were utilised in recent political debates in Scotland. The view that 
restrictions in the sale of alcohol is a breach of rights and the law is an argument that was made 
against the Scottish Government’s plans to introduce minimum pricing on alcoholic beverages. 
The Scottish Whiskey Association for instance applied for a Judicial Review of the legislation 
claiming it broke free trade laws. The Scottish Whiskey Association’s argument can be viewed on 
their website, http://www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/news-publications/news/scotch-whisky-
industry-challenges-minimum-pricing-of-alcohol#.V7xDR2fwuM8, accessed 23/08/2016   
100 The question may consequently be asked whether there is a quantitative point which might be 
discovered where the number of ‘offensive encounters’ results in the subject rebelling against 
the State. Or conversely it may be asked if offence alone is enough to cause a rebellion, or if this 
needs to be complimented by other factors. The nature of rebellion is however beyond the 
remits of this thesis. 
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understanding’ as possible. This is the best way for the State to cultivate affection 
amongst its subjects, and strengthen the sense of political obligation in the polity.  
This brings me to one final difference between my understanding of the 
‘encounter with the State’ and Kierkegaard’s ‘encounter with God’. We may recall 
that for Kierkegaard ‘offence’ in the encounter was perceived as a ‘failed 
encounter’. This was because the encounter failed to convince the subject to 
accept the Christian life. Nonetheless, the failure of this encounter was perceived 
as a failure on the part of the subject. The justification for this was found in 
Kierkegaard’s teleological understanding where failing to accept the Christian life 
was failing to ascend to one’s proper telos.   
However, as my approach abandons the notion of a pre-prescribed telos for the 
subject, I cannot assert that an encounter with the State that causes ‘offence’ may 
be interpreted as a failure on the subject’s part. Without an overriding telos there 
is no reason why the subject ought to abandon his understanding when it conflicts 
with the State. One could of course argue that the subject should accept the 
State’s authority because it provides protection. Nonetheless, there is no a priori 
reason why he should desire this protection. There is also no reason why he should 
seek protection from this particular State, and not join or form another.  Rather, 
it follows that if the State wishes to convince its subjects to be obedient it must 
convince them through encounters. Consequently, it follows that it is the 
responsibility of the State to ‘come down’ to the subject’s level, to speak to him in 
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a manner as corresponds with his ‘subjective understanding’, if it is to be 
successful in getting the subject to accept its authority.  
It should be further acknowledged that this argument also has ethical implications. 
It in particular contends that if a State asks its subjects to do something contrary, 
or indeed repugnant, to their understanding then they do not have an obligation 
to carry this order out. Subjects are thus not expected to simply follow the State’s 
command because they have a ‘duty to obey’, but rather always have a choice in 
such matters.  
To illustrate this one may consider the case of Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann took a 
leading role in the Nazi Holocaust, in particular facilitating the transport of 
Europe’s Jewish population to ‘Extermination Camps’ such as Auschwitz.   This was 
despite the fact that Eichmann insisted that he was not an anti-Semite and held 
nothing ‘personally’ against the Jews.  Rather, he helped facilitate the holocaust 
because he was following the laws of the Nazi State; his role in the Holocaust was 
his ‘duty’ as a ‘law-abiding citizen’ (Arendt, 2006:135-7) 101 . We might 
consequently interpret that Eichmann was ‘offended’ by the actions of the Nazi 
State, as he himself did not share its views on the Jews,  but nonetheless still felt 
obliged to obey it and followed its commands out of a sense of a ‘higher duty’. 
                                                          
101 In illustrating this example I am drawing from Arendt’s account of Eichmann given in Eichmann 
in Jerusalem (2006). As Arendt scholars such as Susan Neiman have acknowledged, Arendt’s 
portrayal of Eichmann is highly controversial. It has indeed been suggested that she ‘excused the 
criminals and blamed the victims’ (Neiman, 2010:305). Nonetheless my intention here is only to 
give a brief illustration to support my argument.  Arendt’s portrayal is sufficient to meet this 
purpose, and I need not consider the controversy surrounding Eichmann or Arendt further.  
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Indeed, the idea of ‘offence’ is encapsulated in how Eichmann claims he felt upon 
encountering the ‘Final Solution’. Consider for instance: that upon encountering a 
gas chamber Eichmann described it as ‘monstrous’ and claimed that the 
experience left him ‘physically weak’ and ‘left behind a certain inner trembling’ 
(Eichmann quoted in Arendt (2006:87)); upon seeing a ‘mobile gas van’ at work 
Eichmann claimed ‘I hardly looked. I could not… I was much too upset’ (Eichmann 
quoted in Arendt (2006:87)); that after seeing the aftermath of a shooting in Minsk 
he felt ‘weak at the knees’ (Eichmann quoted in Arendt (2006:88)); and that he 
told an S.S. commander that ‘it is horrible what is being done around here; I said 
young people are being made into sadists’ (Eichmann quoted in Arendt (2006:88)). 
Yet, despite this professed deep feeling of ‘offence’ at these encounters, Eichmann 
still felt an obligation to the Nazi State and carried out its orders to aid in the 
‘liquidation’ of Europe’s Jewish population.   
The ethical implications of the ‘subjective approach’ would however maintain that 
a subject such as Eichmann would not be under any obligation to carry out or obey 
the State’s commands. Equally, it would maintain that the claim one was ‘only 
following the law’ would not be an adequate defence for partaking in such actions 
that are repugnant to one’s own understanding. It would rather maintain that the 
subject always retains the choice whether to obey the State or not.   
Beyond the ethical dimension I might add that this stance by the ‘subjective 
approach’ also increases one’s ability to explore cases such as Eichmann’s. For 
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instance, having dismissed the idea that Eichmann ‘ought’ to unquestionably obey 
the State, it raises the question of why he chose to obey the State, and felt obliged 
to it, despite its demands being so repugnant to his understanding? The ‘subjective 
approach’ therefore turns to ask the question: ‘what encounters left such a 
significant impression on Eichmann that he felt he must obey its laws against his 
own moral beliefs?’ It would subsequently proceed to explore what encounters 
subjects may have had with the Nazi State which convinced them that they ought 
to obey it unquestionably.  Exploring this would allow us a greater appreciation of 
how authoritarian States, such as the Nazi State, relate to, and attempt to 
establish a hold over, their subjects.  
However, to conduct such investigations one needs to first understand how the 
‘subjective approach’ might proceed in interpreting encounters. In order to 
explore this I now turn to my example of the encounter with the Scottish courts.  
 
3. The Encounter in the Court 
 
In this section I wish to examine one encounter which the subject may have with 
the State he inhabits. Now, it might be observed that there are a number of 
encounters that the subject could have with the State which would be good 
candidates for examination. One might for instance consider that paying taxation 
is an appropriate encounter to consider given that it is a universal experience 
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which every member of the polity usually undergoes, for it is expected that most 
people who inhabit a particular State will pay taxes to it. One might also advocate 
that the experience of casting a vote in an election as an encounter which should 
be explored, for this is often perceived as a democratic right and indeed is 
something that subjects have often fought to attain.   
Nonetheless, the particular encounter I wish to examine is the one which the 
subject has when attending Court in Scotland.  
I find this example particularly illustrative for two reasons. The first is to do with 
the intentions behind the establishment of Courts. We may firstly observe that 
royal officers, most notably the Sheriff, were considered to be a direct 
representation of the Crown, and thus when encountering such an officer the 
subject could be considered to be encountering the Crown directly. In the 
medieval period we may further observe the establishment of courts, and in 
particular the Sheriff Courts, as a means of extending royal power into the 
localities and, more importantly, giving the Crown representation in these areas102. 
We may thus understand the intention behind the establishment of these Courts 
                                                          
102 For further general discussion of the establishment of Sheriff Courts see the work  Scottish 
Medievalists such as A.D.M. Barrell, in particular Medieval Scotland (2000), and Michael Brown,  
The Wars of Scotland 1214-1371 (2004). In his study of the ‘Sheriff Court Book of Fife’, William 
Dickinson has also described how certain privileges granted to Sheriff’s were intended to convey 
to the subject the fact that he was a representative of the Crown (19268:xxx). In assessing the 
intention behind the establishment of courts, and sheriff courts in particular, one might also 
consider how these were established, not only as a means to give direct royal representation, but 
also to combat the power local magnates held over the localities. In his biography of David I of 
Scotland, Richard Oram for instance discusses how the establishment of the first Sheriffs in 
Moray were used to counterbalance the power of the local rebellious Earls (2008:102-4).  
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as an attempt to give the Crown an authority and presence that subjects may 
encounter and relate to. This link between the court and the central power is also 
maintained today. We may for instance observe that the Sheriff in particular is still 
appointed by the ‘Sovereign’ on the recommendation of the First Minister of 
Scotland (Manson-Smith, 2008:63).  
The second reason relates to the nature of this particular encounter. When a 
subject is summoned before the court he stands accused of breaking the State’s 
laws, and is punished for this if found guilty. We consequently may understand 
that in this encounter the subject is being presented with the State’s claim to 
authority; the State is in effect demonstrating its legitimacy to give commands and 
further displaying its ability to punish those who fail to obey them. The court thus 
provides a particularly interesting instance for study as it is an encounter in which 
the knowledge the State attempts to convey to the subject is that of its authority 
over the subject’s existence.  
Thus I find the encounter with the court illustrative as one might understand it as 
a direct encounter with the State in which the State attempts to assert its authority 
over the subject. It is for these reasons I believe it is more interesting encounter 
to explore than that of taxation or voting.  
Nonetheless, a full examination of the evolution of the legal system and courts is 
beyond the remit of this thesis. Instead, I shall here focus on one particular 
historical example of the ‘encounter’ in the Scottish courts.  This particular 
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historical encounter is the trial of John MacLean on the accusation of sedition in 
1918.  
On the Ninth of April 1918 MacLean was brought to trial in Edinburgh on eleven 
charges of sedition. These included addressing audiences across Scotland’s central 
belt with statements that were likely to both disrupt the recruiting and discipline 
of H.M. Forces and insight mutiny, sedition, and dissatisfaction amongst the 
civilian population. This was contrary to the Defense of the Realm Acts (1914). 
MacLean was found guilty of all charges (Broom, 1973:103-5).  
What is of particular interest in analyzing this encounter is the language used by 
both subject and State when expressing their respective positions. Firstly, we may 
observe the Lord Advocate, Scotland’s chief legal officer and thus a representative 
of the State, insisting that in Britain no person is prevented from publicly 
discussing politics, or even advocating socialism. However, MacLean he claims has 
gone beyond this as he has attempted to incite disloyalty, sedition and mutiny. 
This is something ‘no society can afford’. Interestingly the Lord Advocate goes on 
to further insist that no person ‘this side of Eternity’ could understand why 
MacLean would carry out such actions which risks the destruction of the very 
liberty and safety which he enjoys, and which ‘we’ were defending abroad (Broom, 
1973:105).  
We might therefore observe that Lord the Advocate is claiming that the State is 
there to protect the liberty and safety of its subjects. We can also further 
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understand that, in the Lord Advocate’s view, to oppose the State is consequently 
irrational and unintelligible because it risks the subject’s freedom and safety. This 
is made evident by his claim that no person ‘this side of Eternity’ would understand 
Maclean’s motives. MacLean is thus portrayed as an irrational and unintelligible 
troublemaker.  
MacLean, speaking in his own defense, however argued that his actions were 
clearly intelligible and indeed justified 103 .  He insisted that, unlike the Lord 
Advocate, he himself represented the cause of freedom and justice and 
represented the position of society against its oppressor.  
To support his claims MacLean mentions several cases in which the British State 
has, he insists, acted to the detriment of its subjects104. This includes the millions 
of men that were sacrificed during the Great War, as well as atrocities MacLean 
claims were inflicted upon himself and other objectors to the war whilst 
incarcerated in Peterhead prison. He also proceeds to sight the ‘Defense of the 
Realm Act’, passed at the outbreak of the war, as a breach of Britain’s constitution. 
The effect of this Act he subsequently claims was to ‘throw aside every law’ in the 
county and permit the State to override the rights and interest of its individual 
subjects. Although MacLean focuses primarily on the ‘atrocities’ that the State has 
                                                          
103 MacLean’s entire speech is reproduced as Appendix II of Broom’s John MacLean (1973).   
104 It should observed that MacLean also makes reference to atrocities he claims the British State 
made against foreign nations. MacLean for instance accuses the British State of deliberately 
attempting to starve Russian women and children in a bid to topple the Bolshevik regime. 
However, as I am primarily concerned with the State’s relationship with its own subjects and not 
those of other States, I will focus on the atrocities MacLean claims the British State committed 
against its own subjects.     
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committed since the outbreak of war, it should also be observed that he alludes 
to previous injustices such as the ‘sweeping’ of the people from the Scottish 
Highlands. MacLean thus portrays the State as an oppressor who willingly 
overrides the welfare of its subjects in order to pursue its own ends. This is an 
image which contrasts sharply with the picture of the State providing for the 
security and liberty of its subjects, as presented by the Lord Advocate.    
These accusations allow MacLean to insist that he is not a ‘traitor’ to his country, 
as the Lord Advocate claims, but rather its defender. He argues that, as the war 
has no benefit for the ‘working people’, and, considering that these ‘working 
people’ make up the majority of the State’s subjects, the war is consequently not 
in the interest of the country at all. Rather, he insists it is being waged in the 
interest of a dominant class, who he claims are in control of the State, and who 
seek personal gain at the expense of their fellow countrymen. Furthermore, 
MacLean predicts that the conclusions of the Great War, coupled with the nature 
of capitalism, will result in an even greater war in the near future. Consequently 
he declares that those in control of the State are taking it down a road which will 
only lead to its destruction. Therefore, by calling for a revolution and re-
organization of society, MacLean insists he is not endangering his country but is 
rather attempting to save it from future catastrophe. In light of this Maclean insists 
that it is he who should be considered the true patriot.  
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What we may initially observe here is that both subject and State make conflicting 
claims about the nature of their relationship. The State claimed it has authority 
over the subject as it provides him with security and liberty. Why a subject would 
wish to challenge or undermine this authority is consequently incomprehensible 
to the State, as such behavior jeopardizes what security and liberty he enjoys. 
Consequently, the subject’s actions are dismissed as unintelligible and irrational. 
In the Lord Advocate’s words: nobody ‘this side of eternity’ could comprehend 
why one would undertake such a position.  
The subject however puts across a different view. MacLean claims that it is in fact 
the State which has transgressed against its subjects. He claims that rather than 
protecting their lives and liberties, the State has abused its subjects and used their 
lives to meet its own ends. It is thus not the subject who has transgressed against 
the State; but rather the State that has transgressed against its subjects.  
We thus have a situation where the subject and the State are refusing to recognize 
the other’s political claims. This can be seen to result from the fact that both have 
different and conflicting perspectives of their relationship which appear 
irreconcilable. The result is this conflict between subject and State which we have 
observed playing out in this encounter.  
I will in this section explore how my ‘subjective approach’ interprets this 
encounter, and what light such an exploration sheds on the relation between 
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subject and Sate. However, before doing so I wish to first consider how the other 
three approaches outlined in this thesis might interpret this example.  
I will begin with the ‘rational approach’. We may consider that the ‘rational 
approach’ would agree largely with the position of the State. We can for instance 
imagine theorists like Hobbes agreeing with the Lord Advocate that the subject 
ought to obey the State as it provides him with security. Equally we can imagine 
Hobbes, and other thinkers illustrative of the ‘rational approach’, dismissing 
MacLean’s position as irrational in the same manner as the Lord Advocate did.   
The problem with the ‘rational approach’ is that it views the situation from a 
removed vantage point, and in particular judges MacLean against its assumption 
of what a hypothetical ‘rational actor’ would do. It is for instance presumed that 
such a ‘rational actor’ would not undermine the authority of the State as to do so 
risks the security and liberty he enjoys. Thus, by virtue of ‘obedience to the State’ 
being perceived as ‘rational’, Maclean’s position of disobedience is perceived as 
‘irrational’. The main concern here is that this approach makes no attempt to 
understand Maclean’s position or the encounter he has had.  Furthermore, as a 
consequence of this failure to consider the subject’s perspective, it does not allow 
any opportunity to reconcile the positions of the subject and State. It simply posits 
that rational subjects will obey the State’s laws, and dismisses those who object 
as irrational.  
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More consideration for the subject’s perspective might be found in the ‘contextual 
approach’. This is because this approach gives greater attention to the historical 
and cultural context in which this encounter occurs. Historian T.C. Smout for 
instance locates MacLean’s trial within the context of the social and economic 
changes which occurred in Scotland over the previous hundred years. In particular, 
he relates Maclean’s position to the greater sense of alienation between the 
British State and its subjects which had resulted from the Great War.  This 
alienation he argues originated from what was perceived as the State’s inept 
management of the war, which saw the Government sacrifice an estimated ten 
per cent of Scotland’s adult population for purposes the populace could not 
entirely sympathize with. This ultimately gave the perception that the State was 
willing to sacrifice its subjects in order to achieve its own aims (Smout, 1997:267-
9). Smout also highlights that the particular language of ‘class’ had currency due 
to social and economic changes which had occurred over the previous century. He 
highlights in particular that the weakening of Church influence, and the breaking 
down of old communal and kinship ties by industrialization, had resulted in ‘class’ 
becoming the dominate structure within which subjects developed their self-
understanding (Smout, 1997:204). Thus, we might understand that a ‘contextual 
approach’ would seek to understand the subject’s position by reflecting it back 
into the cultural and economic changes which had shaped the context in which 
the encounter occurs.     
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This examination of the historical context behind the encounter certainly does 
make the example more intelligible to the observer, especially an observer who 
views events long after they have occurred. It for instance makes clear that 
MacLean’s position has its origins in the economic and social changes which 
occurred throughout the Nineteenth Century. What the ‘contextual approach’ can 
thus be understood to be doing is stepping back from the moment of the 
encounter in an attempt to gain a more expansive and deeper understanding of 
the historical and cultural context which MacLean inhabits. This context is then 
used as a ‘lens’ through which one may survey and explain MacLean’s actions. This 
process of ‘stepping back’ is what I have argued makes the ‘contextual approach’ 
a ‘removed approach’. What it consequently does not do is try and step in towards 
the moment of the encounter and understand what is occurring in this particular 
moment: what is the State conveying to the subject in this encounter, and how is 
this message being received?  As a result the significance of this moment, and the 
perception of the State that the subject receives in it, are overlooked as the 
‘contextual approach’ retreats back from the encounter in order to survey the 
‘greater historical picture’.  
I finally consider the ‘critical approach’. Out of all the approaches it would seem 
the ‘critical approach’ is most likely to sympathize with MacLean’s perspective, 
especially considering his claims that the British State is sacrificing the bulk of its 
subject’s in the interest of a ‘dominant class’. This sympathy however does not 
268 
 
make the ‘critical approach’ more suited to understanding the encounter than the 
other approaches.  
We might first observe that the ‘critical approach’ sympathizes with Maclean as 
he resembles its assumption of the State as ‘oppressor’ and the subject as 
‘oppressed’. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind here that, as I outlined in 
Chapter Three, these concepts were assumptions that the ‘critical approach’ made 
prior to its investigation. This assumption in regards to the subject then became 
the lens through which this approach sought to understand his relationship with 
the State. Subsequently, it was able to understand behavior that corresponded 
with this assumption, but nonetheless was forced to exclude positions which 
conflicted with it. It was in this way I said the ‘critical approach’ shared much in 
common with the ‘rational approach’; both enter the investigation with a prior 
conception about the subject and seek to understand his relations as correspond 
to this archetypical model.  
This means that, although the ‘critical approach’ may sympathize with MacLean’s 
position, it does not really make any conscious effort to understand this encounter 
or seek to see the State from the subject’s perspective.  Rather, its explanatory 
power lies in the fact that Maclean’s position happens to correlate with its 
archetypical view of the subject and his relations.  
The weakness of the ‘critical approach’ becomes evident if we imagine that 
MacLean was not a Marxist agitator but was rather conservatively or 
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nationalistically orientated. In such a case the ‘critical approach’ would not be able 
to understand the subject’s perspective as it does not correspond with its 
archetypical subject. In such a situation MacLean and his position would instead 
be dismissed as a form of ‘false consciousness’.  
To elaborate this point we may consider the trial of Adolf Hitler in Munich in 1923. 
Hitler, in a remarkably similar manner as MacLean, rejected the accusation of 
treason which was levied against him. Instead, he insisted that it was the State, in 
this case the Weimar Government, who had committed treason against its 
German subjects. Labeling the Government the ‘November Criminals’ for their 
signing of the 1918 Armistice and the subsequent treaty of Versailles, Hitler 
insisted that it was not he that should be on trial for treason but rather the 
authorities themselves (Kershaw, 2000:214). Thus, we may observe a similar case 
where the subject rejects the claims of the State and instead insists that it was the 
State which had transgressed against its subjects. However this time the claim 
comes not from a Marxist perspective but from a nationalist one.  
If the ‘critical approach’ was to attempt to understand the position of Hitler, as it 
did MacLean, it would fail. Although it may agree that the State has betrayed its 
people, and indeed many Marxists did believe that Versailles was a capitalist plot 
which should be resisted105, it would perceive Hitler’s nationalistic articulation of 
                                                          
105 It should be noted that Versailles not only caused offence to the nationalistic and conservative 
minded sections of the German population, but also the communists as well. As historian Michael 
Burleigh notes many communist believed Versailles to be part of a larger ‘intra-imperialist’ plot’ 
(Burleigh, 2000:49).  
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the problem as a ‘false consciousness’.  It would be viewed that Hitler only saw 
matters in such terms as he was deluded and manipulated by German traditions 
and culture, and thus was ignorant to the true nature of oppression which existed 
between subject and State. As a consequence, the approach would dismiss Hitler 
from its paradigm of understanding in the same manner as the ‘rationalist 
approach’ dismissed and excluded the perspective of MacLean. The point I am 
trying to make here is that, although it may claim to understand the perspective 
of Maclean, the critical approach here only explains its archetypical oppressed 
subject which MacLean happens to resemble to a degree. However, in reality the 
‘critical approach’ offers no understanding of McLean’s particular situation, 
cannot help us understand the State from his perspective, and is of little worth 
when applied to other cases where its archetypical subject does not apply.  
Having thus outlined the weaknesses of the three approaches discussed, I turn to 
consider how the ‘subjective approach’ would interpret this encounter.  
To interpret this ‘encounter’ through my ‘subjective approach’ I return to what 
was said at the trial. We will recall that the Lord Advocate, representing the State, 
claimed that the subject ought to obey the State because the latter secured the 
former’s security and liberty.  We may thus understand the State is conveying to 
the subject that it expects his obedience in return for providing this security and 
liberty. This is consequently the knowledge the State wishes to convey to the 
subject through this particular encounter.  
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The State further expects the subject to accept this claim. It expects this because 
it believes that a rational subject desires security and liberty, and will consequently 
accept the State’s claims of authority.  It is thus by extension only an irrational 
subject who would refuse this. Indeed the State’s bewilderment that a subject 
would challenge this claim is evident in the Lord Advocate’s phrasing that no one 
‘this side of eternity’ would understand MacLean’s position.  
Thus, the ‘subjective approach’ focuses on and draws attention to the particular 
message that the State conveys to the subject in the encounter and the language 
in which it seeks to express this message. In the MacLean example this is the 
message of ‘protection for obedience’ which is expressed through the language of 
rationality.  
Having received this message in his encounter, we might imagine that MacLean 
then evaluates it against his ‘subjective understanding’. However, this information 
does not correlate to his own understanding, indeed it conflicts with it. This is 
because Maclean’s previous encounters have conveyed to him the notion that the 
State does not protect its subjects, but rather exploits them for its own ends. Such 
encounters which, judging from Maclean’s speech, have in particular conveyed 
this understanding are the State’s conduct during the war and his treatment in 
Peterhead prison.  What is however important to recognize here is that the 
perception of the State and his relationship with it that MacLean has developed is 
a highly negative one which is at odds with the Advocate’s claims.  What we 
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consequently have here is an instance of ‘offence’: the claims put across in the 
encounter do not resonate with the subject, and he consequently is offended by 
them and rejects them.   
Thus what the ‘subjective approach’ has interpreted here is that neither the 
message nor the language used by the State has been successful in convincing 
MacLean of its legitimate authority.  Indeed, given MacLean’s previous encounters 
and his subsequent ‘subjective understanding’, the message of ‘protection for 
obedience’ has caused him ‘offence’. This ‘offence’ has further soured the 
relationship between this particular subject and the State he inhabits and 
entrenched his views that it only serves the interests of a minority of its subjects.  
What it can therefore be claimed that the ‘subjective approach’ does is to make a 
conscious attempt to understand the encounter which the subject has: what is 
conveyed to the subject in this moment, how this message is conveyed, how it has 
been received by the subject, and the result of this for the subject and State 
relationship. 
I may argue that this is what makes the ‘subjective approach’ a different approach 
in kind to the three ‘removed approaches’. Each of these approaches attempted 
to understand the example by stepping back, by retreating from the moment of 
the encounter, in an attempt to understand this moment as part of a ‘bigger 
picture’. They then selected their preferred ‘lens’: whether this be an 
understanding of ‘rationality’; a deeper and more expansive understanding of 
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historical context; or the belief that the subject was oppressed, to survey the case. 
The problem with such approaches are; firstly, the selection of these lenses, whilst 
bringing certain aspects into focus, obscure a great deal. This leads to the exclusion 
of behavior and perspectives which are obscured through the attribution of labels 
such as ‘barbarism’ and ‘false consciousness’. Secondly, by the retreating back 
from the moment of the encounter, they overlook significant specifics of the 
encounter and the perception of the State the subject receives from it.  Thus, in 
their pursuit of the ‘bigger more comprehensive picture’, these approaches 
overlook the significance of these specific moments of encounter, and how the 
subject and State relationship is informed and built from them.  
The ‘subjective account’ on the contrary does not retreat from the encounter but 
rather attempts to step into it. It seeks to understand what is occurring in this 
moment: what is being conveyed by the State to the subject, what means and 
what language is being used to convey this message, and how the subject perceive 
and evaluates this. It can therefore explore how the relationship between subject 
and State is effected and grows out of such encounters. It thus opens the 
possibility to, by examining, analyzing, and piecing together these intricate 
moments, gain a far more detailed picture of the subject and State relationship 
than would be possible by only adopting a broad removed ‘lens based’ approach. 
It is in this way I described the subjective approach as ‘sharp and delicate 
instrument’ which is similar to a ‘surgeon’s knife’; it does not seek a broad means 
of standing back to survey the body before it but rather cuts into it, selecting and 
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examining its key moments in order to gain a more intricate understanding of what 
has occurred.   
Having thus explored a particular encounter with the ‘subjective approach’, and 
having further explained its key differences from the other three approaches, I 
now consider what questions this approach asks and  what further explorations it 
may take us on. 
 
4. Further Exploration  
 
In order to discuss how one might further explore the ‘subjective approach’, how 
it might investigate further the subject and State relationship and what particular 
questions it may ask in regards to this, I must first reiterate what I understood the 
‘encounter’ to be.    
I understood the encounter to be an experience which bestows knowledge upon 
the subject. Thus the ‘encounter with the State’ is an experience in which the State 
conveys to the subject knowledge of its existence in his life. It thus makes the 
subject aware of its actions which effect his existence, and conveys why the 
subject should accept these actions.  
Thus, the first question the ‘subjective approach’ can therefore explore is: what 
message does the State conveys to the subject in the encounter? In the example 
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of Maclean the message was for instance that the subject ought to obey the State 
for protection106. Nonetheless, this idea of ‘protection’ may not always be the 
message which the State wishes to convey. We might for instance consider that it 
was less a message of ‘protection’ that the Nazi State conveyed to its subjects as 
one pertaining to the purity of the ‘race’. As Hitler made evident in Mein Kampf, 
one of the key purposes the Nazi State, and one of the key reasons why Germans 
should obey it, was to preserve the health and purity of the ‘German race’ (Hitler, 
2007:367)107. We might also observe that the Soviet State’s message was related 
more to the idea of ‘class’ as opposed to the protection of the individual subject. 
Leon Trotsky for instance, when addressing Moscow workers in his position as 
‘Commissar of War’, informed subjects that they must rally behind the Soviet 
Republic to prevent the return to power of the bourgeoisie (Trotsky, 1972:103-4). 
What precisely the message the State conveys to subjects in the encounter is thus 
a key area that the ‘subjective approach’ can explore.  
                                                          
106 We might observe that this message that the State provides security for its subject is a 
message which was tied very much to the original creation of courts, particularly the Sheriff 
Courts which were established in localities.  Consider for instance John I of Scotland asserting 
that his establishment of Sheriff Courts in the Western Isles was intended to bring ‘peace and 
security’ to that region. We may thus again interpret the message that the Crown was attempting 
to convey to its subjects was that its authority should be recognised and its laws obeyed if the 
subject wished to live ‘securely’ and in ‘peace’. This particular Act is from John I’s parliament at 
Scone on the Ninth of February 1293. It is available at the ‘Records of the Parliament of Scotland’, 
http://www.rps.ac.uk/, accessed 14/08/16 
107 As Richard Evans explains, Mein Kampf was a book that every subject in the Nazi State was 
expected to have on their bookshelves (Evans, 2006:402). Indeed Z.A.B. Zeman notes that copies 
were even presented to newly married couples (1973:63). In this way reading and receiving Mein 
Kampf can be understood as an encounter through which the Nazi State intended to 
communicate with its subjects.  
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The ‘subjective approach’ may then further explore what language is used by the 
State in conveying this message. If we return again to the example of MacLean we 
will see that the language the State’s message was conveyed in was that of 
‘rationality’108. However, once more we may observe that ‘rationality’ need not 
necessarily be the language that States chooses to communicate in. We may find 
an interesting contrast to the language of ‘rationality’ in the Nazi State’s use of the 
language of ‘honour’. This is particularly evident in the trial of military generals 
accused of the attempted assassination of Hitler. In particular, the judge preceding 
over the trial, Roland Freisler, labelled the crime ‘the most shameful deed ever 
committed in our history’ (Freisler quoted in Koch, 1997:213). This ‘shamefulness’ 
Freisler sought to attribute to the act was indeed further reinforced by his 
judgement that the accused should be hung rather than shot, a punishment 
reserved for particularly ‘shameful crimes’ (Freisler quoted in Koch, 1997:212). 
                                                          
108 We might indeed consider that the language of rationality is a language particularly prevalent 
in the expression of the law. Let us consider again the Scottish example. A trend may be observed 
developing from the late Seventeenth Century in which the State has sought to present its laws 
as in accordance with the ‘laws of reason’. I may in particular draw attention to the ‘institutional 
writings’ composed in Scotland at the end of the Seventeenth Century. In particular we may 
consider The Institutions of The Law of Scotland written by Viscount Stair, a text which is often 
recognized to mark the creation of modern Scots law (Marshall, 1981:101). In this text Stair 
defines law as ‘the dictate of reason, determining every rational being to that which is congruous 
and convenient for the nature and condition thereof’ (Stair, 1981:73).We might similarly observe 
the basis of reason, and indeed the assumption of the ‘reasonable man’, as central to modern 
law. In a case of ‘negligence’ for instance in Scots law the standard of care that is expected be 
given to an employee is that ‘expected of the hypothetical or notional “reasonable man”’ 
(Marshall, 1987:422). Similarly, in the Criminal Justice and Licensing Act (Scotland) 2010, we may 
find the definitions of ‘threatening and abusive behavior’ and ‘stalking’ to include actions which 
would cause a ‘reasonable person’ to suffer alarm (Criminal Justice and Licensing Act (Scotland) 
2010). Thus in encounters with the legal system the subject is perhaps most likely to find the 
State’s message conveyed through the language of rationality. If this is the case, and if so what 
effect this has on subject and State relationship, are questions the ‘subjective approach’ could 
explore.  
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Thus, rather than being portrayed as ‘irrational’ or ‘unintelligible’ like MacLean, 
we find the defendants here are being portrayed as ‘shameful’. It is thus conveyed 
to the subject, not that it is ‘rational’ to obey the State, but rather that it is 
‘honourable’. This displays an interesting difference in the use of language to 
convey the State’s message.  This is something the ‘subjective approach’ could 
explore further.  
The ‘subjective approach’ may then consider how subjects evaluate and respond 
to this message. Do they for instance accept this message and the States’ claims?  
Does the message and the language it is conveyed in inspire a feeling of obligation 
or even a sense of loyalty towards the State? On the contrary, does this message 
fail to resonate with the subject? Is the message for instance not an entirely 
convincing one? Or is the language used not effective means in which to 
communicate with its subjects? Furthermore, does either the message or the 
language cause ‘offence’ to subjects? If so the ‘subjective approach’ can explore 
why this is the case, and thus further investigate how the State may address the 
manner of its encounters so as to better communicate with its subjects in future.  
This focus on a specific encounter can also progress to an overall exploration of 
how the subject encounters the State.  One might for instance survey a broad 
range of encounters as to establish ‘what is the most predominant message which 
the State wishes to convey to its subjects?’, and ‘what language is most frequently 
used to express this message?’ From this one might explore what the overall 
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perception of the State that subjects who inhabits it receives, and how they 
respond to it. If the State is failing to give a positive overall impression to its 
subjects, and is thus inspiring more ‘offence’ than a sense of political obligation, 
the ‘subjective approach’ may further look to how the State may address this 
problem.  
Such an exploration may raise further questions not only about the message and 
the language the State uses in relating to its subjects, but also what means it uses 
to communicate. We might for instance observe that, in Scotland, the Sheriff Court 
has in the past taken on a far greater significance for subjects than simply to 
prosecute those accused of crimes. The court for instance previously served as a 
focal point for the local community where subjects could gather to hear recent 
political news.  As William Dickenson has shown in his study of the Sheriff Courts 
in Fife in the Sixteenth Century: the Sheriff Court was where subjects in this period 
would gather in order to receive such information as what Acts had recently been 
passed by parliament. (Dickinson, 1928:cv). Also, being the main source of political 
news in the locality, one might find in attendance at the court representatives 
from all classes of local society. Dickinson for instance highlights that at some court 
sessions in Fife there is recorded in attendance such diverse figures as the provost 
of St Andrews and the local shepherds from Craighall (Dickinson, 1928:cv). Thus, 
one might understand that the Sheriff Court was in the past much more than a 
judicial assembly where criminals are prosecuted, and as a consequence the 
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‘encounter’ with the court was a much more universal and richer experience in 
the Sixteenth Century than it is in the Twenty-First. 
Now, however, such knowledge as the proceedings of parliament is more often 
conveyed to subjects indirectly through the media. Thus, rather than receiving the 
State’s message through a direct encounter with it, modern subjects are more 
likely to receive this information from media outlets through their television 
screens or on their smart phones. The ‘subjective approach’ can explore what the 
effect of this changing nature of the encounter with the State is; it can ask for 
instance whether the subject is more likely to react positively or negatively to the 
State when he encounters it indirectly through the media on an IPhone than if he 
was to encounter a direct manifestation of the State. 
The ‘subjective approach’ can also explore the effect of the number of encounters 
the subject may have with the State. One might for instance imagine that a State 
orientated towards totalitarianism, in which the subject encounters the State in 
nearly every action he undertakes, might be more likely to irritate a subject and 
cause him offence. However, one might imagine a minimalistic State may also 
cause the subject great ‘offence’; one might for instance suppose that if the 
subject encountered the State only in negative experiences, such as the 
enforcement of laws and taxation, he would hardly come to see such a State as a 
‘friend’. It thus raises the question: is more or less encounters more conducive in 
fostering a positive relation between subject and State? Is there perhaps an 
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equilibrium between totalitarianism and minimalism where the quantity of 
encounters is right in order to cultivate political obligation?  
Of course, previous political philosophers would have an opinion on this debate. 
We might for instance imagine Locke, with his vision of the ‘umpire State’, would 
argue that the minimalistic State, and thus less encounters, would be the best 
approach (Locke, 2009:324).  Rousseau, at least in the Government of Poland, 
would however argue that the State needs to be present in every moment of the 
subject’s life if it is to inspire loyalty in him; the subject must have ‘imbibed love 
of the fatherland… with his mother’s milk’ (Rousseau, 1985:19). Nonetheless, both 
these suggestions come from the wearing of different ‘lenses’, in this case a 
‘rational’ and ‘contextual’ lens respectively, when looking at the problem, and thus 
are naturally incredibly broad and exclusionary. Also, given their differing 
assumptions about the subject, there would be little common ground from which 
they may discuss and evaluate this. We can indeed imagine Rousseau dismissing 
Locke as unrealistic, and Locke Rousseau as ‘Irrational’. The ‘subjective approach’ 
however offers a more delicate and precise way of exploring this question through 
examining and piecing together the nature and effects of these encounters.  
The ‘subjective approach’ also further opens up the possibility of exploring how 
encounters effect issues in contemporary politics. Take for instance the British 
State’s failure to convey to its subject’s that its membership in the European Union 
(hereafter EU) was beneficial. The subjective approach here can explore why 
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certain encounters the subject had failed to convey strongly enough that EU 
membership was beneficial. Was it for instance the language used in conveying 
this message which failed to convince? Was it on the contrary the fact that the 
most numerical, or the most significant encounters, that subjects had with 
Britain’s membership of the EU were negative, such as restrictions of the sale of 
fruit or on fishing quotas?   
We might for instance consider one encounter which subjects may have had which 
was intended to convey the benefits of European Union membership: the sign 
displayed on projects that were completed with the aid of EU funding. On the sign 
is typically an EU flag and the message that this project was completed with the 
aid of the EU. We might here consider for instance such a sign being attached to a 
bus shelter advising of EU funding in providing public transport. The message 
conveyed when the subject encounters this is clear: your ability to move quickly 
and efficiently around the area has been made possible by the British State’s 
decision to be a member of the EU.  The language is understated, there is no 
appeal to culture or class. It simply states the fact. It is a message that is conveyed 
directly in the form of a sign.  
However, it would seem that such direct and clear communication was not 
sufficient for the State to convince its subjects that being a member of the EU was 
in their interests. The ‘subjective approach’ can explore why this message failed 
to penetrate the publics’ consciousness significantly. Was the message about 
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greater mobility not one subjects were particularly concerned about? Or, rather, 
was it that the means and language deployed in communicating this message were 
so understated that it failed to resonate with subjects who encountered it?  
On the contrary, we might consider an encounter with the State’s membership in 
the EU which did resonate strongly with British subjects. Consider for instance the 
European Commission Regulation on the quality standards for bananas109. This 
regulation seemed to have had such an impact on the British subjects’ 
understanding of Europe that it can be found referenced in the speech of 
politicians.  Boris Johnson for instance in 2016 claimed it was ‘absolutely crazy that 
the EU is telling us… how bendy our bananas have got to be’ (Johnson quoted in 
The Guardian Newspaper, (Henley, 2016)). Indeed, the regulation of bananas 
became such a contentious issue that the European Parliament Information Office 
even published information clarifying the issue in 2016110.   
Why did this encounter with banana regulation appear to resonate so much more 
with subjects than that with funds for public transport? Why did the regulation of 
bananas cause such offence? These are the questions that a ‘subjective approach’ 
can explore. In investigating such encounters this approach can build an intricate 
and detailed understanding of how subjects came to oppose the State’s actions, 
                                                          
109 This is in particular Commission Regulation (EC) 2257/94 of 16 September 1994 laying down 
the quality standards for bananas, available at EUR-Lex, Access to European Union Law; 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994R2257:EN:HTML, accessed 
19/08/2016  
110 This information can be found on the European Parliament Information Office in the United 
Kingdom website; http://www.europarl.org.uk/en/media/euromyths/bendybananas.html, 
accessed 19/08/2016  
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such as in the case where the majority of British subjects voted against EU 
membership.  
Nonetheless, as alluded to with the example of Eichmann, the ‘subjective 
approach’ is not limited to exploring ‘liberal States’ but also authoritarian ones. It 
could for instance explore what encounters convinced subjects like Eichmann that 
they ought to obey the Nazi State. What message did such encounters convey that 
was so successful? What language resonated so effectively? It was for instance 
suggested during his trial that Eichmann had great admiration for Hitler (Arendt, 
2006:149). The ‘subjective approach’ thus might ask: ‘how did the German subject 
encounter Hitler?’; ‘what message was conveyed in these encounters?’; ‘what 
language did these encounters use to convey this message?’ This would be of use 
not only in exploring historical cases such as the Nazi regime but also modern 
forms of authoritarianism. Furthermore, by comparing encounters subjects have 
with authoritarian States with those they have with liberal States we may gain a 
sharper understanding of both.  
Thus, we have observed the difference in approach the proposed ‘subjective 
approach’ offers, and what avenues of exploration it may continue down. With 
this discussion I have gradually been moving beyond an initial exploration of the 
‘subjective approach’, and towards particular areas in which it may be applied. I 
am consequently coming towards the end of the remit of this ‘prolegomena’, and 
thus may now proceed to bring my thesis to a close. Before doing so however, I 
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will consider potential objections and counter points that may be raised against 
the proposed ‘subjective approach’.  
 
5. Potential Objection to the ‘Subjective Approach’  
I will now conclude this chapter by considering potential objections which may be 
raised against the ‘subjective approach’ proposed in this thesis.  
It may be argued that, by taking the perspective of the subject as the primary basis 
for the subject and State relationship, my approach incurs the problem of setting 
this perspective as the ultimate standard of political discourse. It would 
consequently appear as if the ‘subjective approach’ provides an argument that 
political discourse ought always be conducted according to the subject’s 
perspective, regardless of whether such a perspective is moral, or indeed, factually 
accurate. It would equally provide a mandate for the State to convey whatever 
message to the subject it chooses, as long as such a discourse complemented its 
subjects’ beliefs and fostered political obedience.  
In order to avoid this problem, it could be suggested that I ought to support my 
approach with a previously established normative framework, as such a 
framework would allow me the means to evaluate and reject discourses which are 
morally questionable or false.  
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In this section I will consider these two criticisms before giving initial reply. I will 
then consider the merit of a normative framework for my thesis, before explaining 
why I do not believe adopting such a framework would be the best course of action 
for this thesis.  
Let me begin with criticisms stemming from my taking the ‘subject’s perspective’ 
as the basis of the relationship between subject and State. To illustrate this 
problem let me return to section two of this chapter, where I compared my 
understanding of political obligation to that of Green’s. Green, I argued, 
maintained that the subject would be obliged to the State as long as the State’s 
commands corresponded to the ‘common good’, which I argued was equitable to 
‘what is rational’. I criticised this understanding as I maintained it made the 
assumption that the subject was ‘rational’ and that his relations to the State would 
be based on his ‘reason’, consequently excluding any perspective or behaviour 
which conflicted with this understanding.  
In place of this I maintained that the subject would feel obliged to the State as long 
as his encounters with it corresponded to his ‘subjective understanding’; when 
encounters corresponded with this understanding a positive relationship would 
develop, when they conflicted the subject would be ‘offended’ and a rift would 
develop between himself and the State.  
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The problem with this, it could be argued, is that it centres the relationship 
between the two entities on the ‘subjective understanding’, regardless of whether 
such an understanding is moral, or indeed, if it corresponds to reality.   
To illustrate this problem we might imagine that the subjects in question are racist. 
From the portrayal of my argument it could be maintained that, if it wished to 
encourage a sense of political obligation, the State ought to embrace this racist 
perspective. It certainly would appear unadvisable for the State to question this 
understanding, or promote an alternative discourse such as that of equal human 
dignity, as such an alternative perspective may cause the racist subjects ‘offence’.  
I might here revisit the case of Eichmann. I maintained that Eichmann’s position 
was untenable as I rejected the notion that a subject ought to accept the State’s 
position, or carry out its commands, when these were contrary to his own 
‘subjective understanding’. However, my thesis would not appear to cast any 
criticism on a subject whose ‘subjective understanding’ did correspond to the 
perspective of the Nazi State, for instance a zealous Nazi who wholeheartedly 
believed that the Jews ought to be exterminated. My theses would thus appear to 
condemn the reluctant Eichmann, yet seemingly pass no criticism of the zealous 
Nazi who was happy to exterminate millions.  
This issue becomes equally troubling when we consider it in relation to factual 
truth. As was stated, this presentation of my argument would maintain that the 
State ought to accept the subject’s perspective, even if it did not correspond to 
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reality. Thus we might for instance imagine a considerable portion of the State’s 
subjects believe the world was flat. It would be argued that the State should not 
hold the position that the world was round as this may cause offence.  On the 
contrary, if the State was to win the obligation of its subjects, it ought to embrace 
this subjective belief that the world was flat. This could lead to the absurd situation 
where State schools are instructed to teach students that the world was flat out 
of fear that, if they did not, such encounters would cause offence and weaken the 
sense of obligation among the polity.   
Such an argument secondly give a dangerous mandate to the State. It would in 
particular suggest that the State may convey to the subject whatever message it 
pleases, as long as this message resonated with its subjects and encouraged 
obligation. It would in effect give the State the mandate to lie, as long as such lies 
won it the obligation of its citizens. I would thus appear to be embracing the 
argument of Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince: a ruler should deceive his subjects 
if necessary in order to hold on to power (Machiavelli, 2009:70-1). Such a position 
would see nothing wrong with the Nazi State propagating Jewish conspiracy 
theories, and subsequently persecuting its Jewish populace, as long as such a 
discourse was successful in maintaining the obligation of the majority of its citizens.  
I recognise that these are indeed potential dangers and valid counter arguments 
to my approach. Nonetheless, I would argue that the potential uses, and misuses, 
of this thesis, and the evaluation of political systems and discourses it may reveal, 
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are beyond the scope of these prolegomena. The intention of this thesis is rather 
primarily interpretive and hermeneutical: it sought to develop a concept through 
which one may interpret how the subject experiences the State, and how the 
relationship between the two grows out of this. An evaluation of what is revealed 
through this concept is however another step, a step which lies beyond the 
interpretive intentions of this thesis. Of course such ethical issues, and potential 
uses of my concept, would be important for a full development of a ‘subjective 
approach’ to politics, nonetheless, as I have stressed, this thesis does not intended 
to present a comprehensive account of such an approach, but rather only a 
prolegomena to it; the concept of the encounter was used to open the door to this 
approach, such ethical and evaluatory questions require substantial work which 
must be conducted beyond the threshold.  
Nonetheless, critics may still argue that I ought to adopt a normative moral 
framework to support my thesis. Such a framework would provide a standard with 
which I could judge and asses subjective positions. This would consequently 
prevent it from lending itself to arguments whose ethical implications, or factual 
truth, were dubious or dangerous.  
To illustrate, I may consider adopting a liberal normative framework for my thesis. 
Such an approach would assert the principles of liberalism as a prior ethical 
standard with which I could asses the finding of my hermeneutical inquiry. Let us, 
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for arguments sake, say the primary value of this liberalism is the autonomy of the 
individual.   
By adopting such a framework, I could now asses the findings of a ‘subjective 
approach’ to the relationship between particular subjects and the State they 
inhabit. I could in particular evaluate the perspectives of subjects my approach 
uncovered. I could, for instance, after uncovering that subjects in a State are 
particularly hostile and racists towards a minority group within that polity, reject 
the idea that the State should embrace such a discourse as it contradicts the 
principles of my liberal framework; adopting a racist dialogue would infringe upon 
the individual autonomy of those subjects who are members of the minority group 
in question.  
This would also allow me to be more critical about questionable discourses the 
State might be promoting in its quest to establish a sense of political obligation. 
This normative framework would, for instance, allow me to reject messages and 
arguments which were factually untrue as these violate the value of subject 
autonomy; deliberately misleading discourses undermine the subject’s ability to 
evaluate autonomously the nature of his relationship with the State.  Similarly it 
would allow me to reject ethically questionable discourses. The Nazi State’s 
discourse in regards to its Jewish subjects could for instance be criticised, and 
rejected as an appropriate basis for subject and State relations, as it infringes upon 
the autonomy of individual Jewish subjects.  
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Such a background of norms would thus provide a means by which to evaluate 
perspectives and discourses, and thus avoid the trap of endorsing ethically 
questionable or false arguments. It would consequently seem advisable for me to 
adopt such a background.  
Nonetheless, I would still resist the need for me to adopt such a set of norms, at 
least as far as the aims of this thesis are concerned.  This is because the adoption 
of a set of previously established norms would inhibit my approach’s ability to 
understand the subject and State relationship, and, as an interpretive and 
hermeneutical concept, it is the ability to understand which is of primary concern 
to this thesis.  
If for instance I was to adopt the priori standard of liberalism for my thesis, I would 
exclude the encounters, and perspectives that result from such encounters, which 
run contrary to the established liberal principles. I would for instance reject anti-
liberal beliefs as unethical, regardless if these beliefs affected the nature of the 
subject and State relationship. This would however severely limit my approach’s 
ability to understand the relationships it investigated; a racist or sectarian 
discourse can, of course, still be important to a particular subject and State 
relationship, whether we believe such discourses are morally repugnant or not. 
The task, in order to understand such a relationship, is therefore not to judge such 
values but rather to try and understand them: what encounters led to the 
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construction of such perspectives; what bearing does such perspectives have on 
the encounters between subject and State.  
I would similarly argue that such an approach is necessary, not just in regards to 
perspectives that may be ethically questionable, but also in regards to 
perspectives that may be factually incorrect; for a belief may be false, but this does 
not prevent its ability to effect the subject and State relationship. Therefore, in 
order to understand this relationship, we must consider such false perspectives 
and how they arise and effect the relationship between subject and State: what 
encounters created this belief, and how does this belief influence the subject’s 
subsequent encounters with the State.  
I may thus argue that a background of normative values is not only unnecessary 
for the intentions of this thesis but, as a hermeneutical concept aimed at 
interpreting and  understanding the subject and State relationship, such a priori 
assumption would be detrimental to the project.  
Indeed I might go further and argue that the adoption of a normative framework 
prior to hermeneutical investigation could corrupt our own understanding of 
moral norms. In particular it would give such principles an air of ‘objective facticity’, 
when in reality they are the product of our own encounters and choices. If I was 
for instance to take my own liberal or Christian principles as a framework to my 
study it would create the impression that these values are objectively true, and 
consequently mask the fact that they are rather a product of my own encounters 
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and choices which other people, who have had different experiences, may not 
share. Thus I believe the avoidance of adopting such principles is not only 
necessary to allow my approach to understand the subject and State relationship 
as best it can, but is also important for our own ethical awareness.   
Nonetheless, I may concede that, if I was to advance this approach beyond a 
conceptual investigation, and towards a full ‘subjective theory of politics’, I would 
need to consider an ethical dimension, as such a project would not just be 
concerned with interpreting a particular phenomenon, but also evaluating them 
as to give a comprehensive consideration of politics. Such a project would 
however involve investigation into other organisations that make up and shape 
the subject’s existence, organisations such as the family; religious institutions; and 
private companies. It would also raise additional questions, such as how the 
subject is, or ought to be, educated, and who would be primarily responsible for 
such education. Such a work would be imperative in future research into the 
‘subjective approach’. However such work is beyond the scope of this primarily 
interpretive and hermeneutic prolegomena.   
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Conclusion  
Kierkegaard described the earliest of his major works, Either/Or, as a ‘double-
edged little dagger’ (Hannay, 1992:2). I have also elected to convey the nature of 
my approach through allusion to sharp and intricate instrument; the surgeon’s 
knife. I chose to do so to express how my approach differed from what I 
perceived as the three major approaches to the question of the subject and State 
relationship. In particular, I wished to convey that, whilst the other approaches 
attempted to step back from the relationship and survey it from a ‘removed 
vantage point’ through their preferred lens, my approach wished to step in 
towards this relationship; it desired to cut into it and identify the moment in 
which the subject encountered the State. It sought to explore how this 
encounter occurred, what was conveyed in this encounter, how this message 
was received, and how the relationship between subject and State was informed 
and grew out of such moments. In this manner of exploration I believed my 
proposed ‘subjective approach’ differed in kind from the other approaches in the 
way in which it seeks to address the subject and State relationship. In this 
conclusion I shall summarise the exploration of the possibility of this ‘subjective 
approach’ which I carried out in this thesis.  
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Part One of this thesis sought to answer the question: ‘Why should one consider 
a ‘subjective approach’? I thus attempted to answer this question by outlining 
what I perceive to be the three predominate approaches to the subject and State 
relationship, and what I perceived their limitations to be.  
In Chapter One I considered the ‘rational approach’. I argued that this approach 
could be understood through two key arguments. The first was that ‘rationality’ 
ought to be the means by which political relationships are understood. This 
argument was normally levied against accounts which believed the subject and 
State relationship was based on understandings of religion or custom. Thus, this 
argument maintained such customary understanding ought to be replaced by 
clear rational principles.   
The second key argument was that the relationship between subject and State 
could be understood from the premise that the subject was ‘rational’. I 
demonstrated that this argument could be articulated in two forms. The first was 
based on the hypothesis of a rational actor abstracted from his social context, and 
the choices such a subject unencumbered by historical or cultural context would 
make. This second form perceived the subject as part of a historical context, but 
nonetheless still presumed his primary characteristic was that he was ‘rational’.  
This subject was therefore once more expected to base his choices on this 
understanding of ‘rationality’. Consequently, what both these manifestations of 
this argument shared was the assumption that the subject was rational and that 
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this rationality would direct his actions and choices. This argument thus 
maintained that the subject would obey the State as it was ‘rational’ to do so.  
The ‘rational approach’ thus attempted to survey the subject and State 
relationship through this understanding of ‘rationality’, which consequently 
became the ‘lens’ through which this approach understood the relationship. As a 
consequence, the subject’s experiences and perception were overlooked in favour 
of this understanding of ‘rationality’. Furthermore this overt focus on ‘rationality’ 
rendered the ‘rational approach’ unable to appreciate standpoints and behaviour 
which did not correspond to this understanding. Such positions were consequently 
degraded and excluded, typically by the attribution of derogatory labels such as 
‘savagery’ and ‘barbarism’ which associated them with a more primitive state. This 
neglect of the existing subject’s experiences and perception, and the exclusion of 
orientations which did not correspond with ‘rationality’, were consequently the 
limitations I identified in the ‘rational approach’.  
Chapter Two sought to illustrate the ‘contextual approach’ to the subject and State 
relationship. It argued that this second approach could be illustrated through 
three key arguments. The first was a belief that ‘reason alone’, or ‘reason 
abstracted from context’, was an inadequate means of understanding the 
relationship between subject and State. I further argued that this argument could 
be recognised in two forms. The first was a criticism of the premise of the abstract 
rational actor. The second was the argument that reason alone was insufficient in 
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cultivating a strong enough bond between subject and State. What I said was the 
common denominator in this argument, and thus that which illustrated this first 
key argument, was its rejection of abstract reason as a suitable premise from 
which to approach the relationship between subject and State.  
This led to the second key argument: that in order to properly understand the 
relationship between subject and State one must examine the context that the 
subject inhabits. This argument could again be observed to manifest in different 
forms and with differing emphasis depending on what contextual phenomena is 
given focus.  Thus, we observed certain illustrations of this argument laying 
emphasis of the role of historical traditions in informing the subject on his 
relationship towards the State, whilst others emphasised the importance of the 
cultural framework the subject inhabited in informing his political orientations. 
However, the common denominator to these arguments was that, in order to 
understand the subject’s political relations and his relation to the State in 
particular, one must study the context in which the subject is situated.  
The third key argument of this approach I illustrated was the ‘particularity of focus’. 
This argument maintained that one must not consider the relationship between 
subject and State generally, but rather one must focus on the particular 
relationship between a particular subject and the particular State he inhabits.  
I observed that this ‘contextual approach’ shared common ground with my 
proposed ‘subjective approach’. In particular both approaches wished to consider 
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particular subjects as they relate to the particular States they inhabit. Nonetheless, 
I maintained that beyond this common ground the two approaches parted ways. 
This was as a result of the ‘contextual approach’, haven identified the subject as 
one who inhabits a particular context, sought to use this context in order to 
understand and explain his relationship to the State. The ‘contextual approach’ 
thus retreated back from the subject’s experiences and perspective in order to 
gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the historical context. 
This subsequently became the ‘lens’ through which the ‘contextual approach’ 
sought to survey the relationship between subject and State. As a result of this, 
focus was shifted from the subject, his encounters and the perception gained from 
these, and was instead turned on the context. As a subsequent consequence of 
this, the ‘contextual approach’ often made the assumption that subjects will 
orientate their lives to the historical and cultural conditions in which they inhabit, 
and overlooked, and even became dismissive of, perspectives and behaviour 
which went against this context.  
In Chapter Three I illustrated the third and final approach: the ‘critical approach’. 
I observed that, like the ‘contextual approach’, the ‘critical approach’ also 
dismissed the notion of the subject as an abstract unencumbered being and 
instead insisted he must be considered as he exists imbedded within a particular 
historical context. However, where the ‘critical approach’ differed significantly 
form the ‘contextual approach’ was that the former was highly critical of the 
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phenomena which constituted this context believing it did not inform but misled 
the subject about his relations with the State.  
I argued that the ‘critical approach’ could be illustrated through two key 
arguments. The first argument concerned how the traditions and cultural practices 
mislead the subject in regards to his relation with the State. It was maintained that 
these phenomena veil the true nature of the State and manipulate the subject into 
a being more suitable to be governed. From this followed the normative claim that 
these illusions must be unmasked and the true nature of the subject and State 
relationship revealed.   
This led to the second key argument of the ‘critical approach’: that the ‘true nature’ 
of the subject and State relationship was one of oppression. It was maintained that 
the State primarily attempts to ‘hold down’ the majority of its subject’s and exploit 
them, typically as to serve the interests of a ‘ruling class’ or ‘elite’.   
I argued that it could subsequently be interpreted that the central assumption of 
the ‘critical approach’ was that, if a State existed, then subjects must be being 
oppressed. This idea of ‘oppression’ consequently became the ‘lens’ through 
which the ‘critical approach’ surveyed the subject and State relationship. As a 
consequence, the subject, his encounters and perspective, were again overlooked 
as focus turned to forms and systems of oppression. Furthermore, orientations 
that did not correspond with this assumption about ‘oppression’, those for 
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instance of subjects who did not believe they were oppressed, were dismissed as 
‘false consciousness’.  
Thus, one might understand the limitations of these three approaches all to a 
degree stemmed from their nature as ‘removed approaches’; they attempted to 
step back from the subject’s experiences and perceptions to fashion ‘lenses’ 
through which they would survey the subject and State relationship. The result of 
this was that the experiences and perceptions of existing subjects were 
overlooked, and indeed perceptions which did not correlate with the preferred 
lens were excluded. It was consequently to address this limitation that I argued a 
‘subjective approach’ should be considered’; it would consciously aim to focus in 
on the particular experiences the subject has with the State and the perception 
that is gained from these. The particular experiences I desired to explore were the 
moments in which the subject encountered the State; the perceptions I wished to 
consider those which arose from these encounters. It is this desire to ‘step in’ and 
explore these particular encounters, as opposed to retreating back to survey the 
relationship, which I believe makes the ‘subjective approach’ a different kind of 
approach to the other three approaches; a ‘sharp instrument’ as opposed to a 
‘lens’.  
In Part Two of this thesis I began exploring this alternative approach. It was thus 
concerned with the question: ‘How may one begin exploring the possibility of a 
‘subjective approach’? 
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I began this task in Chapter Four with an exploration of the philosophy of 
Kierkegaard. In particular I sought to gain an interpretation of the concept of the 
‘encounter’ in his thought. In order to gain an interpretation of this concept, and 
appreciate the significance it held for his philosophy, I also had to consider his 
understanding of the ‘self’ and ‘freedom’.  
I argued that for Kierkegaard the subject was understood to be a being who was 
restricted by his historical situation but nonetheless retained the ability to imagine 
and choose alternatives to this situation. It was by imagining and realising these 
alternative possibilities that the subject could proceed through a process of self-
development. Nonetheless, in order to choose alternative possibilities the subject 
needed to discover what possible options were available to him which he could 
choose from. These possibilities were revealed to the subject through his 
encounters with the external world. To use Kierkegaard’s primary concern of how 
one may become a Christian to illustrate: in order to become a Christian one had 
to have an encounter with Christ which would reveal the possibility of a Christian 
existence.  
Thus, the ‘encounter’ could be interpreted as the external experience which 
bestowed upon the subject new knowledge, and in particular informed him about 
alternative life forms which he may choose to realise. 
It was also observed that this concept of the encounter existed in a symbiotic 
relationship with the subject’s ability to make choices: the subject required 
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encounters in order to make him aware of the possibilities he may choose from; 
nonetheless, the possibilities revealed in the encounter required the subject to 
choose them if they were to be realised. This was again illustrated by Kierkegaard’s 
concern with how one might become a Christian: the subject required the 
encounter with Christ to become aware of the possibility of a Christian existence; 
nonetheless he must also choose to appropriate this Christian life for himself if he 
was to truly become a Christian. This relationship was encapsulated by 
Kierkegaard’s definition of ‘self’ as: ‘a relation which relates to itself, and in 
relating to itself relates to something else’.  
Chapter Four also finally highlighted that, just as the subject could choose to 
realise a possible existence, he could also choose to reject it.  This rejection could 
occur when the knowledge bestowed upon the subject contrasted significantly 
with the subject’s own understanding of existence, thus causing him ‘offence’.  
In Chapter Five I began my reinterpretation of Kierkegaard as to fit a more political 
understanding. I did so by reinterpreting the components of his definition of self 
and the relationship which held them together.  
I began reinterpreting the ‘relation that relates to itself’; the subject understood 
as existing within a particular historical context who nonetheless maintained the 
capability to imagine and realise possible alternatives to his current existence. I 
argued that one may understand the subject as having the ability to make choices 
in regards to his life pathway, although such choices were understood to be 
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restricted and facilitated by his historical situation. I further defended this 
interpretation against an understanding of determinism as illustrated by 
Schopenhauer in order to explain why I believed such an understanding was 
suitable for my exploration of the ‘subjective approach’.   
I next reinterpreted the ‘something else’ which the subject must encounter in 
order to become aware of the possibilities he can choose from. Here, I developed 
my concept of the ‘Horizon’. This was understood to be a mental perception of the 
subject’s environment constructed from the fragments of knowledge the subject 
receives from his encounters. It was argued that this ‘Horizon’ both made the 
subject aware of the world around him and revealed to him the possibilities this 
world contained for him. By revealing to the subject the possibilities he may 
choose to realise, the ‘Horizon’ thus became the ‘something else’ in my 
reinterpretation.  
‘The subject with his capacity to realise possible alternatives’ and the ‘Horizon’ 
were thus brought together by the subject’s choice: that is his choice to realise 
one of the possibilities revealed in the Horizon. In this way these two components 
were brought together in a symbiotic relationship: the subject required the 
Horizon to make him aware of the life options he may select from; the possibilities 
contained in the Horizon required the subject to choose them in order to be 
realised.  
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I also argued that through this choice the subject defined himself and his relations 
to the world around him. He defined himself as he appropriated knowledge from 
his Horizon as to attribute to himself. He shaped his relations with the world 
around him as this act of appropriation also involved the adoption of certain roles 
and practices associated with this knowledge. This understanding of the subject’s 
existence formed through encounters and choices I denoted the subject’s 
‘subjective understanding’.  
In Chapter Six I used this ‘subjective understanding’ as basis from which to explore 
the subject’s encounters with the State. Before I could do so however I had to 
reconsider how I had presented the encounter. In order to fully articulate the 
‘subjective understanding’ in Chapter Five I presented its components as if they 
followed a linear pattern: from encounter, to Horizon, to choice. However, I 
contended that in reality the subjects ‘subjective understanding’ would be more 
fluid and continually evolving as he would continue to have new encounters and 
make more choices up until his death. The consequence of this was that one must 
always consider that the subject already has a ‘subjective understanding’ when he 
has encounters, and that he evaluated the knowledge received in his encounters 
against this perception. It was thus contended that the subject does not only 
receive knowledge about the world he inhabits when he has encounters, but also 
evaluated this knowledge against his subjective understanding.  
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This was vital in understanding his encounters with the State. It was in particular 
argued that these encounters did not just reveal to the subject knowledge about 
the State he inhabited but were also judged against his ‘subjective understanding’.  
Thus, if the encounter, and what it informed the subject about the State, 
corresponded with this perception of existence he would be more likely to feel 
positive about the State, but if it conflicted then he may become ‘offended’ by it. 
The relationship between subject and State could thus be interpreted to grow out 
of these encounters: if the subject has many encounters which correspond with 
his ‘subjective understanding’ he is more likely to form a positive relationship and 
even feel obliged towards the State; many instances of ‘offence’ would however 
sour the relationship and the subject would become less likely to feel any sense of 
political obligation. It was also from this discussion further contended that the 
subject does not discover and relate to the State as something ‘objective’ but 
always considers it as it relates it to his ‘subjective understanding’; the encounters 
with the State are thus entwined with the subject’s own becoming.  
I also considered in Chapter Six the ethical implications of the ‘subjective 
approach’. In particular I argued, as this approach does not attribute a telos to the 
subject’s existence, it cannot be expected of him to unquestionably obey the State. 
Consequently, the emphasis is put on the State to convince its subjects to obey its 
rule and remain loyal; the State must come down to the subject and communicate 
in a manner intelligible to him during encounters.  
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I proceeded to explore the particular example of the Scottish Court system as to 
illustrate what the ‘subjective approach’ may investigate in such particular 
encounters. It was here argued that the subjective approach would explore: what 
message is conveyed in the encounter with the State? What language is 
furthermore used to convey this message? It was also contended one can explore 
how the subject may respond to this message and the language used, and how the 
State may seek to alter the encounter if it fails to resonate.  
Before acknowledging potential objections to the ‘subjective approach’, I raised 
further questions the approach could ask and the areas of exploration it could lead 
us upon. I will not here repeat all these questions and avenues of exploration. I 
will instead end this thesis by identifying two specific projects which could further 
our exploration of the ‘subjective approach’ and the relationship between subject 
and State.  
The first project would be a comprehensive study of the encounter the subject has 
when attending court. The reason why I consider this to be a particularly fruitful 
study is because, as I stated in Chapter Six, in this encounter we may understand 
the subject to be having a direct encounter with the State in which the latter 
expresses its claims of authority over the subject. I thus believe this avenue of 
research would be illuminating as it could explore how the State has sought to 
express its claims of authority over its subjects’ lives across history: what messages 
it has used; what language this has been articulated in; what means have been 
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used to express this message; how the subject has responded to such encounters. 
Such a study would thus be imperative in exploring how the State presents itself, 
and conveys its claims of legitimate authority over its subjects’ existence, to the 
subject and what perception of the State the subject receives from this.  
The second area of research I perceive as fruitful would be an exploration of a 
particular development in contemporary politics. The development I have in mind 
is Britain’s, or rather the ‘British subject’s’, encounter with his State’s involvement 
in the EU.  Such research would focus on what encounters the subject had with his 
State’s involvement with the EU: where he had these encounters; what means 
were used to express why the State was a member of the EU; what was the 
message that was conveyed about EU membership; what language was these 
messages conveyed in. I believe this would be a fruitful exploration as it would 
illuminate how a State attempts to convey the reasons for its actions to its subjects, 
in this case why it was a member of the EU. It would also be able to explore why 
certain encounters which one would at first deem to be important, such as 
freedom of trade and funding for scientific research, failed to resonate with 
subjects as strongly as seemingly insignificant issues did, such as the regulations 
on the shape of bananas.  Such research would also have impact as it could 
enlighten as to why sometimes the State fails to communicate with its subjects in 
certain encounters, and how it could address this in the future. It could also 
immediately impact on the politics of the EU as, following the Brexit vote, it could 
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explore how other EU member States might communicate the reasons for their 
membership to their subjects effectively.  
I have thus argued why we should consider a ‘subjective approach’ when 
investigating the subject and State relationship, I have explored how such an 
approach may be formulated, and have finally looked beyond the horizon towards 
future journeys of exploration that the ‘subjective approach’ may take us upon. I 
have thus reached the limits of my prolegomena and subsequently also the end of 
this thesis.  
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